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1INTRODUCTION
" Min jung ( ) n. the masses of people; the masses; the
people; people in general; the populace."1
"Minjung are the masses, the humanity and the ordinary people 
....They are also the poor people of the ruled and low classes, 
who struggle against poverty."2
"Minjung is no more than a ’false image’ created by two factions 
of some Korean intellectuals and writers. The one faction, 
advocating elitism, clings to right wing ideology and the other, 
vigorously advocating 'minjung consciousness', is obsessed by 
left wing ideology."3
This thesis is a study of concepts of the Korean masses. The identity 
of the Korean masses is multi-faceted. They have been referred to as 
the 'minjung' and characterised in the 1970s as 'the subject of 
history’(yoksa-ui chuch'e) and as the 'oppressed people' who struggle 
against the political, economic and cultural oppression of the ruling 
power. This min jung struggle ultimately created a new opportunity for 
democracy in 1987.
My examination of the Korean minjung is thus necessarily a complex 
one, for it concerns that element in Korean society which is not easy 
to define, which is constantly in transition, which has been subject 
to various forms of internal and external domination throughout 
history, and which reached its greatest status and influence in the 
late 1980s (though now in decline). Indeed, minjung discourse became 
the most significant element in political and cultural critique of 
the authoritarian politics of the 1970s and 1980s.
However, despite the level of public and intellectual discourse, 
concepts of minjung do not lend themselves to scientific 
definition or to reduction into a single well integrated ideological 
concept. I will show that they are fluid notions which vary as the 
condition of the people varies, and are substantially influenced by 
those with a vested interest in their exploitation, especially by 
intellectuals who in reality are far removed from the common people 
and yet purport to interpret their situation. I will thus demonstrate 
that the theoretical bases for concepts of minjung are vague, 
inconsistent and self-contradictory.
The aim of this work is also to examine the complexity of the 
historical and cultural factors shaping popular aspirations and 
populist theories (although mainly shaped by intellectuals); to 
analyse prevailing theories and perceptions of the minjung, 
particularly of the Yushin period (1972-1979); and to examine the 
validity of those theories which led to a new minjung historiography.
To analyse the minjung phenomenon systematically and in its full 
context, this work will concentrate initially on the development of 
populist ideals and on populist struggles throughout history, with 
reference to the interpretations of those ideals and struggles in 
minjung historiography. When the context of minjung thinking has been 
explored, I will examine the theoretical basis underlying the Minjung 
Movement. To this end, the framework of the first two parts will b$ 
historical, distinguishing theory and historiography. This will be 
followed by a detailed examination of the thought of the minjung 
school of the 1970s and 1980s. Although this approach may be 
considered arbitrary, an analysis of the minjung phenomenon in a 
historical and cultural context, and of the nationalism which has 
been the dominant theme of that phenomenon, requires particular
3attention if the minjung phenomenon and related popular thinking is 
to be understood.
The sources for my analysis reflect the wide range of disciplines and 
socio-economic interests that have impacted on the notion of minjung. 
These sources include renowned minjung proponents such as Yi Ki-baek 
(historian), Han Wan-sang (sociologist), Pak Hyon- ch'ae (economist), 
Kim Chi-ha (intellectual writer and dramatist), So Nam-dong 
(theologian), as well as numerous other commentators, critics, 
politicians, intellectuals, nationalists, and so on. Moreover, I will 
trace the threads of minjung thinking and minjung consciousness 
through history and this century to present the existential context 
out of which modern concepts of minjung developed. Due to the complex 
nature of these concepts, however, I do not claim to give exhaustive 
treatment to their analysis, but to convey a sound overview from 
which some conclusions may be drawn regarding the validity of minjung 
theories.
Chapter one, therefore, will be devoted to an examination of minjung 
'theory' viewed from a historical perspective. This examination will 
begin by discussing the concepts and etymology of minjung, before 
turning to the question of the relationship between the people's 
consciousness and their socio-economic condition. It will then 
examine modern Korean nationalism and the people's reactions towards 
nationalism, and focus on those elements which demonstrate that 
nationalism is perceived by minjung proponents in terms of a class 
struggle against the influence of foreign powers.
Chapter two will provide an outline of minjung historiography whici) 
interprets Korean history from a socio-economic perspective and 
concludes that the people are the subject of history. Although my 
outline will offer a general picture of the most distinct
4
characteristics of minjung historiography, particular attention will 
be paid to the development of populist notions (as nationalist 
ideals) of history and culture which brought about a national vision 
for people solidarity and their common objectives, and especially 
the awakening of their socio-political consciousness.
Chapter three will outline the minjung background of authoritarian 
politics, particularly the interplay of forces between the opposition 
movement and the various regimes. It will focus on the major 
conflicts between these two forces, which culminated in the Kwangju 
Incident of 1980 and subsequently the class struggle ideology known 
as the 'minjung minju-juui’ (people's democracy). Chapter three will 
conclude with an examination of the role of radicalism in generating 
both ideological and physical resources for Korea's democracy 
movement.
Part two (Chapters from four to six) will focus on an analysis of 
concepts, thought and approaches emanating from the minjung school.
It will include an examination of three dominant theories: 
socio-economic aspects of minjung theory; cultural theories based on 
traditional symbolism as employed by mask drama and court-yard 
play(nori); and Minjung Theology. In particular, it will concentrate 
on the impact of each theory in terms of the extent to which it 
influenced the overall perceptions and response of the people, 
especially those of the opposition movement.
In conclusion, I will attempt to assess the legitimacy of the 
theories of minjung and of the political claims of the Minjung 
Movement. My analysis will look for any inherent contradictions in 
minjung thought and ideology, the capacity of the movement to form a 
cohesive force with relevance to modern Korea, and factors which may 
have overtaken minjung aspirations.
5PART I BACKGROUND TO THE MIN JUNG MOVEMENT
Chapter One
Minjung Theory: Etymological And Nationalist Origins 
Introduction
According to Alaine Touraine, "the destruction of any permanent 
social structure for the sake of permanent change provokes 
behaviour aimed at defending identity."1 He adds that this 
struggle is "the search for self in a fragmented experience that 
depends not only on the intermittent initiatives of the players 
but on community identity."2 The movements behind this struggle 
often attach themselves to the fringes of established 
organisations, but at the same time exhibit "both an opposition 
to the existing power structure and a rejection of the old 
ideological and political forms of struggle."3 Touraine also 
maintains that the nature of opposition generated by these 
movements represents a denial of the social order as a whole, 
rather than hostility towards a specific adversary. He thus 
argues that society which aims at permanent change "causes an 
appeal to identity that is as void of content as the change, 
which becomes an end in itself."4
Korea's historical heritage, especially the specific 
characteristics relevant to the condition of the ordinary Korean 
people, has played a major role in the formation of this people 
in imparting to them a consciousness of their identity and 
socio-political condition. A key factor in this formation was the 
social condition associated with class structure, specifically, 
the relationship between the ruling class and commoners, and the
role of various sub-groups.
As the Korean people have progressively achieved greater economic 
and political independence and freedom over the past thirty 
years, they have become increasingly conscious of their own role 
in society and in the world community. Consequently, the word 
min jung arises wherever reference is made to 'the people's will', 
or general 'consensus' or any other aspect of 'the people'. There 
are now established phrases such as the Minjung Movement, Minjung 
Religion, Minjung Arts, Minjung Culture, Minjung Economy, Minjung 
Democracy and so on, as well as commercial propaganda with titles 
such as 'This is a minjung program'.
Despite the public acceptance of this terminology, concepts of 
minjung as 'the [oppressed] people', and their ideology as 
'people oriented democracy'{minjung minju-juui) , are extremely 
complex. This complexity arises from the broad spectrum of 
beliefs on which concepts of minjung are based. These beliefs 
variously demand economic, political, social and cultural change, 
with the leading force of revolution being that of the masses 
exclusively, not the rulers or the bureaucracy. The power of 
this exclusionary position has given minjung theory its 
particular attractiveness. It encapsulated a putative historical 
unity and identity which embodied all that was best in Korean 
national history. It is presented as a single struggle, seen from 
the perspective of a single and conscious class, the working 
people (somin).
This chapter will examine the theoretical notions and etymology 
associated with the various aspects of minjung. It will also
7consider that popular consciousness which has been alleged to 
reflect the people's (minjung) socio-economic condition as well 
as their role in political struggle. Particular attention is also 
paid to the development of nationalism and its relevance to 
min jung objectives, particularly in terms of the struggle against 
Korea's subservience to foreign powers.
1. Etymology And History Of Minjung
Etymology and Meanings of Minjung
The social class structure of the Yi dynasty and its background 
discussed in Chapter two is essential to understanding the 
notions of 'majority of people' or 'the masses' indicated by such 
terminology as minjung, paeksong, p'yongmin, somin, inmin, 
kongjung, taejung, simin, kung’min and other similar words. 
Whilst a wide range of words apply in some sense to the 
'majority', their individual usage has varied as a result of 
either social and political change, or the circumstances of each 
place requiring a different word to express a local difference in 
meaning. In addition, as each word is expressed in Chinese 
characters, the constituent ideas can to large extent be derived 
from the classical Chinese meaning.
Etymologically, min (jg) refers to 'people', and jung ($fc) refers 
to 'crowd'. In combination the term indicates "masses of people, 
the masses, the people".5 The equivalent term used in reference 
to the socialist bloc as in 'The People's Republic of Korea' is 
inmin which, according to Professor Kim Po-gyun, lacks the 
meaning of 'the ruled'.6 In order to grasp the concept of 
'minjung' as a word and as an entity, scholars and commentators
8have attempted to examine its meaning in its historical, social, 
economic, political, and religious contexts, as well as to define 
differences between minjung and inmin, minjung and taejung, and 
other synonyms. The issue is, when do people choose to use the 
word 'minjung' rather than any other word to represent or to 
express 'the masses' and, when 'min jung' is used, what conditions 
and factors qualify individuals who constitute the minjung ? Who 
makes up these masses?
Socio-Political Perceptions
In examining the various concepts of minjung and their actual 
substance, I refer to a round-table discussion on 'Concept and 
Reality of the Masses (Minjung ui Kaenyom kwa ku Silch’e) ' 
involving Song Kon-ho, An Pyong-jik and Han Wan-sang7, published 
in the magazine, 'Wolgan Taehwa', in November 1976. The 
significance of this discussion is not only that it is recognized 
as "the most noteworthy discussion on the theme of minjung in the 
1970s..."8 but, more notably, that the theories of the three 
intellectuals involved were adopted by those seeking a 
philosophical basis for minjung ideology.
The first of these, Song Kon-ho, prominent journalist and former 
chief editor of 'Tonga Ilbo' and now of 'Han'gyore Sinmun', 
develops the notion of minjung as an "oriental concept"9, 
differentiating 'the masses in the East' from 'the masses in the 
West'. He argues that concept of minjung has grown out of the 
long political, social and economic conditions of feudal systems 
of the East where people struggled and resisted with 'han ' to be 
free from their feudal lords. Unlike the West, which established 
a democratic process as a tool for political, economic and social
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democratic process as a tool for political, economic and social 
management, and where people succeeded in forming a real power 
base for the masses, the people in the East remained as a people 
with only resistance towards, or a consciousness about, their 
condition, but without succeeding in establishing a process 
through which they could also develop their own idependent power. 
Therefore, the masses of the East(minjung) are different to the 
masses of the West(kongjung), even though in their own unique way 
the former still constitute "the 'majority1(tajung or taejung) 
and thus possess a genuine political significance."10 Song 
stresses the fact that the:
"Minjung is a powerful political resistance force which 
struggles, on the one hand, against the oppression and the 
colonial and semi-colonial control of nations in Asia and 
Africa, and strives to develop a new history in those 
countries on the other."11
In addition, Song takes the view that the word minjung is largely 
based on a sociological concept which takes into account the 
social, political, economic and cultural conditions of society. 
However, the recent response to the word minjung, according to 
Song, has been more affected by a change in literary fashion and 
literary criticism, than changes in social theory. For example, 
he argues that, in examining and analysing how individual writers 
shaped characters in their literary works, critics consciously 
used the word minjung to identify and to distinguish characters 
who had 'a different standpoint', namely, a 'viewpoint of the 
masses or crowd', consistent with the way the term is generally 
used in sociology. According to his view, the words kongjung and
10
taejung, in contrast, were particularly associated with the 
interpretation and translation of Western literature and culture. 
He comments, "The concepts of kongjung and taejung ...were 
largely formed in the context of the development of democratic 
societies in the West...."12 Song continues:
"The English word 'people' may refer to konjung, kung'min, 
taejung, inmim, and minjung. In Korean, however, kongjung, 
taejung, and minjung are defined differently. For instance, 
the word kongjung, in my observation, seems to indicate the 
foundation of society or the structural human element which 
supports national/democratic systems whilst modern unified 
democratic nations are emerging and whilst these nations 
or democratic systems are in the historical limelight....
[The word] taejung, on the other hand, came into vogue when 
the Nazis opposed the communists in the 1930s (after the 
phenomenon of conflict, which followed the growth of 
capitalism in the 19th century, became noticeable). At that 
time, in comparison, [the masses who were described as] the 
kongjung appeared to maintain and to develop democratic 
systems, whilst on the other hand, [the masses who were 
described as] the taejung under the Nazis, appeared uncertain 
whether to accept or reject this system."13
In addition to any subtleties of meaning outlined by Song, each 
of these words is also unique in its daily usage. Kongjung, for 
instance, has the connotation of 'a public crowd' or the 
'public', whereas taejung has the connotation of 'crowd' in the 
sense of 'an audience' or 'popular gathering' or 'masses of 
people' who have a common interest such as a recreational theme.
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Taejung may thus indicate a crowd involved in a certain style of 
literature, the performing arts, sport and so on. The word 
taejung certainly has no connotation of masses whose motivation 
is based on politics or social issues of any kind.
Perceptions Based in History
In contrast to Song's view, An Pyong-jik, economic historian, 
argues that the "concept of minjung cannot be grasped in class 
terms"14, because minjung is too complex to grasp or 
conceptualise merely as a sociological term. He considers that 
the word minjung largely suggests the nuance of majority versus 
minority. In this regard, the other synonyms such as paeksong, 
simin, taejung, kongjung and somin suggest the same nuance, the 
majority. However, minjung as a concept implies also the 'non 
privileged'. This is so, according to An, because political 
power has traditionally been held by the minority, and the 
majority, having always been the ruled classes and thus 
antagonistic towards the privileged, were identified as the 
minjung. 15 Moreover, even if one accepts that minjung implies 
the notions of 'tajung - the masses' and 'the ruled classes', 
these notions alone do not fully clarify the nature of minjung 
because the minjung as 'the ruled classes' did not only exist in 
a particular phase of history, but have continually existed 
throughout history and pre-history. Therefore, in An's view, a 
distinction must be made between the terms paeksong and minjung 
to illustrate the historical development of the notion of minjung 
in its full sense. An states :
"The words, paeksong and minjung, incorporate the concepts
of both 'the majority' and 'the ruled classes'. Nevertheless,
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in my view, paeksong are the masses without a self- 
consciousness, whereas the minjung do have a self- 
consciousness. .. . In other words, minjung were the people who 
understood themselves not only as subject to the rulers in 
history, but also acknowledged themselves as the masses who 
stand in that phase of history in which they can claim to be 
one of the principal actors who in fact make history."16
An further argues that a distinction should also be made between 
minjung and simin (bourgeoisie/citizens). Whilst 'simin' as a 
word denoted the concept of 'the masses' in the West, the use of 
the word minjung has its own particular socio-political nuances 
in most countries of the East, particularly in colonised or semi- 
colonised countries. The word simin, he asserts, is rather a 
bourgeois concept, because historically citizens (simin) in the 
West were able to build a nation on the foundations of a 
bourgeois economy. In contrast, the masses (minjung) in the under 
-developed nations of the East, in the early twentieth century, 
had no strong craft tradition as a basis for establishing modern 
capitalism and, therefore, had no ideological and structural 
resources which could deal with such a system. The minjung could 
not thus be understood as part of the bourgeoisie. The minjung 
as they have existed in Korea must therefore, according to An, be 
understood in light of the fact that the nation had been 
colonised and had no experience of any process through which to 
build the role of the common people in dealing with the 
development of a modern capitalist society. In this sense, 
minjung as a social group bears a distinct meaning. An summarises 
the major characteristics of minjung as follows:
"Minjung were not the privileged but the ruled class. They 
were the majority, but not citizens, that is simin. They 
were, nevertheless, the principal actors of the national 
independence movement.... In that sense, the word min jung, in 
my view, may be understood as a historical concept."17
Minjung as the Oppressed
Paek Nak-ch'ong, literary critic, argues that, "As long as the 
concept of minjung is to be interpreted as the masses of the 
majority, who are not leaders or the minority rulers, there is no 
further need to define it."18 This is because, "All the synonyms 
of minjung such as minso, somin, paeksong, inmin, or kung 'min 
taejung originally have the same meaning. Therefore, there seems 
to be no reason why one should be particularly concerned about 
the meaning of each word."19 However, he comments:
"If anyone only looks at the real picture of minjung in 
history, how they lived, one would spontaneously understand 
why the word minjung...is accompanied by an image of 'the 
ruled' or even 'the oppressed' people."20
Similarly, the background to the words paeksong, p ’yongmin and 
somin is also best examined in a socio-historical context 
because these terms reflect distinct characteristics (identity, 
social status, and rights and obligations) of the Korean masses 
in different eras.
For example, the term paeksong was used to describe the ruled 
people who lived under a despotic Confucian feudal society. They 
were the masses of the peasant class under the yangban
14
bureaucratic state of the Yi dynasty. The term p'yongmin, on the 
other hand, was used not only to describe the common people who 
lived in the transition period (late 18th century to early 20th 
century), when the dynasty underwent a transformation of its 
social structure from feudalism towards modernity, but was also 
used more specifically to describe the emerging class structure 
shaped by the people's new economic and political aspirations. 
Furthermore, p'yongmin were the particular people who were 
confronted with the national trauma of annexation by Japan early 
in the nineteenth century which, ironically, generated in them a 
new level of consciousness as individuals and as a nation. 
Therefore, their aspirations consisted not merely of seeking 
liberation from oppression, but a broader pursuit of human 
equality and liberty. They were the first generation of the 
Korean 'plain' class people {minjung) who succeeded in 
establishing for themselves the perception that while they were 
the plain people, they were not necessarily destined to be always 
the subjects of the 'ruling' class, the yangban.
The analyses by both Song and An of the words that represent 
'people' or 'classes of people' whether literally or socially or 
politically, focus on those characteristics of nationalism 
(particularly Afro-Asian nationalism) which, according to Peter 
Worsley, serve specific historical needs in the anti-colonial 
era. These needs are:
"the real needs of the mass of the population: sometimes 
separate though parallel needs, sometimes needs common to 
all.The needs satisfied by contemporary Afro-Asian 
nationalism can be simply stated. They are:
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1. Independence
2. Decolonization
3. Development "21
This analysis introduces notions of nationalism as viewed by Song 
and An, and represents the most commonly agreed approach not only 
amongst minjung commentators, but also the majority of people.
This analysis is strengthened when these words are examined in 
view of the people's consciousness of social and political 
conditions: the needs of people and how they react to these 
needs.
2. People'8 Consciousness
Most exponents of minjung theory identify the characteristics of 
the people, at various times and places, according to the level 
of their consciousness, as evident in recorded history or as 
currently observed. The essay by Chong Ch'ang-yol, Professor of 
Sociology at Hanyang University, on 'Paeksong Uisik, P ’yongmin 
Uisik, Minjung Uisik (Consciousness of paeksong, the Commoners 
and the Masses) is a noteworthy example of this form of analysis.
Throughout modern history the Korean masses, according to this 
view, have appreciated the fact that they were ethnically 
homogeneous, and that as such they aspired to build 'one nation'. 
This notion of the minjung was a most appropriate basis and 
rallying point for national independence, for people's liberation 
and for the transformation of the class structure. The people 
(minjung) were the natural force opposed to the feudal system, 
the colonised semi-feudal system and Japanese imperialism.
Evidence of this opposition role of the minjung is seen, 
according to Chong, in such historical events as the Tonghak 
Peasant’s Movement and the March First Movement. When we look at 
these developments, however, we recognize the fact that, although 
people existed as the 'majority of people (minjung) ' over many 
mi H ennia, their socio- political consciousness has changed and 
progressed with time and place. In the case of Korea, the 
characteristics of the people as expressed historically in terms 
of paeksong, p ’yongmin, and minjung, were quite distinct.
In arguing his theory of people's consciousness in the context 
of the socio-political history of Korea, Chong Ch'ang-yol asserts 
that the "minjung are the masses who do not merely obey the 
authority of the ruling class as their subjects, but also fight 
against the ruling class in order to obtain their own rights as 
human beings."22 Based on this premise, he distinguishes minjung 
consciousness into three phases:
"Firstly, people and their self-consciousness as minjung, 
began from 1876 after the opening of the ports to the present 
time; secondly, masses as paeksong with paeksong 
consciousness were formed in the period from the end of the 
14th century to the middle of the 18th century; and thirdly, 
masses as p ’yongmin with a p'yongmin consciousness were 
formed from the middle of the 18th century to 1876. During 
this last period, the masses were the minjung (as the 
majority of society), but their consciousness did not yet 
match minjung critical self-consciousness. Rather, it matched 
p'yongmin passive consciousness ...."23
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Paeksong Consciousness (Paeksong Uisik )
"Paeksong, who were mainly farmers, existed as the 
cultivators of the land either as slaves or as tenant-farmers 
.... And at the same time, yangban landlords monopolised the 
control of politics, the creation of culture and its 
enjoyment. Therefore, paeksong became the type of people who 
were required to behave as subjects and to obey 
unconditionally the yangban class and the King. The King was 
the figure head who was also the controller of the alliance 
of public political power, which functioned as a kind of 
mutual insurance for the yangban class."24
This concept of paeksong, expressed by Chong Ch'ang-yol, was 
clearly based on the despotism of the Yi dynasty in which the 
fundamentalist Confucianism of Korea was unchallenged and 
developed into a monopoly ideology dominating the entire spectrum 
of Korean cultural and political life. Paeksong were, therefore, 
mainly the farmers who had become subjugated to the nobility and 
the authorities from the beginning of the Yi dynasty to the 
middle of the 18th century when the dynasty went through massive 
social, political and economic change.
During the Koryo kingdom period, prior to the Yi dynasty, the 
word " . ..paeksong did not represent the ordinary ruled peasants, 
but the ruling class in villages and therefore meant a special 
class, namely the privileged."25 However, "paeksong as a 
special class became extinct when the Kingdom was taken over by 
the Yi dynasty and the peasants, or the farmers, came to be 
called p a e k s o n g 26 Such a fundamental change of the social
structure from the Koryo kingdom to the Yi dynasty was, according 
to Chong, due to the political intention of the Yi dynasty which 
initially relied on the peasants, mainly the farmers, for its 
social development, and aimed to use that development in a 
structured way to strengthen the foundations of the dynasty.27 
Due to the distinction between their earlier and later status of 
paeksong, I have chosen to use the term paeksong rather than an 
English translation.
Consequently, society as a whole was quickly divided into 
'inferiors' and 'superiors'. Under this social system, the people 
with no rights had no other way of containing their frustration 
than by building up their emotions internally. This internal 
frustration and heart-break expressed as 'han', is according to 
most minjung theorists the fundamental core of minjung 
consciousness.
Commoners' Consciousness (P'yongmin Olsik)
The development of commoners' consciousness, according to Chong, 
was the direct outcome of the substantial social change that 
occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his 
view, two social factors were the main cause of this change : 
first, the emergence of landlords from among the commoner-class; 
second, the extension of the market system and improved 
agricultural technology which enabled farmers to grow large- 
scale crops for sale rather than consumption, and at the same 
time, to become either agricultural entrepreneurs or owners of 
sizeable land holdings. This new phenomenon of 'large scale 
farming (kwangjak)', resulted in a polarization of a newly 
emerging rich commoner-class (p'yongmin kyegup) and peasants
unable to hold on to their land, while at the same time 'freeing' 
most farmers from their immobility and bondage to land.
Liberation of farmers from their land brought economic unrest 
into society and, as a consequence, there emerged a 
transformation of class structure based on new economic strength. 
Chong analyses the essence and consciousness of the p'yongmin as 
follows:
"These people (p ’yongmin) were a wide ranging combination 
which were largely the peasant farmers and the slave farmers, 
together with the fallen-yangban, merchants and artisans and 
craftsmen.... Because they were not a social class or classes 
as such in society, they did not have a centripetal 
organisation nor did they have their own status in the view 
of the world. Therefore, their struggle against their social 
conditions was neither continuous nor consistent, and 
inevitably always ended as a temporary revolt."28
The word p'yongmin ( ) itself literally means 'plain person',
a person of no importance, in contrast to a person of the 
'nobility -kwijok - the term kwijok was coined earlier this
century to refer to aristocracy in Western literature). This word 
is thus structured on the basis of class-consciousness and is 
used in a comparative sense. The p'yongmin (or somin - a term 
more commonly used today), in general, were a mixed group of 
commoners, as described by Chong. In combination these groups 
were redirected and reeducated by the 'fallen' yangban to build a 
collective consciousness of their own identity, and were thus 
very different to the peasants of the early Choson period. 
Intellectually, they were more self- conscious, more liberated
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and had higher expectations of themselves as well as of society.
Physically, they generally had improved living standards, better 
social opportunity and greater mobility. Furthermore, as a whole, 
this group introduced commercial activity and challenged the 
existing social and economic order, as well as the degenerate 
political system. A succession of uprisings marked the beginning 
of this new characteristic displayed by commoners, as p ’yongmin 
(or somin). Their political and social struggle in the cause of 
justice and equality, as Chong asserts, later became the 
spiritual foundation of the Peasants' Revolt (Tonghang’nan) in 
1894-1895, of the Yonghakdang Movement in 1898-1899, and of the 
Hwalbindang Movement in 1898-1904.29 Although their mobilization 
was fragmentary, and lacked cohesion, these characteristics were 
largely determined by the oppressive political and social 
environment in which they found themselves. Chong concludes that 
the majority of society therefore did not have minjung critical 
self-consciousness even though they had some elements of it.30
Masses' Consciousness (Minjung Uisik)
According to Chong Ch'ang-yol, the first phase of minjung 
consciousness is evident in the ideology of Tonghak (Eastern 
Learning), the pokuk anmin sasang (ideology of sustaining the 
nation and maintaining peace for the people) of the Peasants' 
Movement in 1894, which was a practical response to the peasants' 
demands for political, social and ideological change. Three 
elements of Tonghak are particularly important to an 
understanding of the majority's social expectations and their 
humanitarian aspirations : firstly, the ideal of the liberation 
of mankind; secondly, the rejection of the entire existing social
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order and foreign invasion; and thirdly, the establishment of a 
system of thought in which people were able to learn respect and 
appreciation for human dignity and moral goodness.31 Chong 
summarises the ideology of Tonghak as follows:
"The ideology of Tonghak (poguk anmin sasang) is a structure 
of consciousness in which the peasants, as the leading force, 
struggled to establish people's liberation and the liberation 
of peasants (farmers) from their social oppression. It is 
also a structure of consciousness which struggled to achieve 
a unity of people as a nation which would be founded on their 
liberation. Therefore, the ideology of the Tonghak Peasant's 
Movement, especially the doctrine of pokuk anmin was...the 
origin of min jung consciousness."32
However, Chong adds that the Tonghak doctrine as national 
liberation ideology specifically for a nationalist movement, 
contained a number of deficiencies inconsistent with minjung 
ideology: firstly, this doctrine lacked not only an understanding 
of human rights based on natural law, but also an intellectual 
awareness of individual rights; secondly, it lacked understanding 
of the class structure; and thirdly, it lacked scientific 
knowledge to fully understand imperialist structures and the 
characteristics of Korea's colonization.
Chong maintains that, by contrast, minjung ideology came to 
possess all those features necessary to deal with the crisis of 
the Korean nation. As he expresses it:
"...in my view, minjung consciousness and the minjung
culture were the incorporated consciousness of the liberation 
of mankind, the liberation of the classes, and the liberation 
of the nation. These three forms of consciousness became 
incorporated into an integral perception as they formed a 
single organic relationship."33
He interprets these three forms of consciousness as follows:
"Consciousness of the liberation of the people is based on 
the realisation that human rights are basic rights by nature, 
and that freedom is fundamental in that context. Such 
consciousness also inspires people to establish the aim that 
the labour force be liberated from capitalism.
"Consciousness of liberation of the classes is based on: 
firstly, the consciousness that labourers and farmers, as a 
class, must be liberated from colonial capitalism and from 
the landlord system of semi-feudalism; and secondly, the 
consciousness that the nation must build a democratic 
republic based on the people (min jung) , where the min jung 
themselves are the political sovereign.
"Consciousness of liberation of the nation was established in 
response to the reality of invasions by imperialism and its 
ruling structure."34
People's consciousness, as the basis for nationalist revolution 
against colonial power, however, was professed much earlier. Sin 
Ch'ae-ho (1880-1936), a leading historian, ideologist and 
revolutionist in the 1920s declared :
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"In order to maintain the life of the Choson nation, one must 
get rid of the Japanese, the robbers. In order to get rid of 
the Japanese, revolution is the only answer...[and] the first 
step of our revolution is to call for the awakening of the 
people (minjung)."35
In particular, Sin called for the awakening of the nation and the 
opening of the minds of the minjung to recognise the fundamental 
importance of having 'the nation-state' not only as the ideal 
form of political organization, but also as the only way for the 
nation's long term survival. His call was addressed to the 
ordinary people whom he denoted as the majority, characterised by 
spiritual unity under oppression, whose strength lay in their 
solidarity and self-reliance. What Sin called for then, and what 
Chong argues in his theory of people's consciousness, sixty years 
later, is a nationalism broadly 'anti-colonial' in nature or, in 
the words of K.R.Minogue, "a collective grievance against 
foreigners".36
The Basis of Minjung Consciousness
Minjung consciousness is largely based in theories of capitalist 
imperialism and 'anti-colonialism'. It reflects the people's 
aspirations to humanity, freedom, self-reliance and especially 
national sovereignty. Minjung consciousness has thus been 
inspired by nationalist ideals, and is seen by minjung proponents 
to be capable of struggling against foreign invasion and 
occupation, as well as against internal oppression. Minjung 
consciousness, as the spiritual means for the national struggle, 
therefore, has not only been idealized, but also actively 
promoted by many Koreans, especially nationalist activists
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(including minjung proponents). More fundamentally, elements of 
neo-Marxism have become powerful factors in minjung thinking, 
such as that of leftist intellectuals, Christian activists and 
university students, especially in the opposition movement of the 
1980s.
However, we should not be distracted from the fact that theories 
of people's consciousness, such those focussed on the paeksong, 
p'yongmin and minjung, are mainly the interpretations and 
articulations by the minjung school of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Minjung consciousness, particularly as the psychological basis 
for defending political independence and democracy, and in terms 
of its role in determining the "historical view of minjung- 
nationalism"37, needs to be studied in the context of Korea's 
modern nationalism, through which the nature of that 
consciousness was developed and expressed. The following 
examination of the characteristics of Korean nationalism aims to 
undertake this analysis.
3. Theories Of Nationalism
Nationalism - The National Disposition
Pak Il-song, former Director of the Institute for North Korean 
Affairs, notes that, historically, external threats to Korea's 
self identity acted to form the people’s spirit of nationalism.
"Nationalism is a view of history that the master of a 
society is its people and the subject of national history 
is also its people.... While we were invaded by external 
forces 936 times, we were transmitting generation to
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generation the glorious spirit of our ancestors, which can 
be categorized as 'self-reliance *, 'unity' and 'peace'.
These ancestors had defended themselves with the foundation 
ideologies of Tang'un the Great, which are Hongik in'gan 
chongsin (benevolence), pride of the Choson, and fraternity 
(oneness)...."38
This interpretation of nationalism reveals one of the most 
consistent and popular features of Korean nationalism which has 
inspired the Korean people. It is closely related to the argument 
put forward by minjung proponents that the masses are the subject 
of history which is realised through their "human struggle for 
historical and political liberation...."39
In his highly acclaimed essay, 'Makings of Perceptions of 
Nationalism by Korean Intellectuals and Students (Han'guk 
Chisikin ' kwa Taehaksaeng ui Minjok-uisik Kujo) ', Professor Kim 
Tong-song summarises the core features of Korean nationalism 
prevalent since liberation to the present time. The recurrent 
features he cites are familiar themes associated with minjung 
ideology, namely:
"1. recognition of national fraternity and accentuation of 
national independence;
2. the emergence of people's democracy opposed to imperialism 
and feudalism;
3. the political mobilization of people's consciousness in 
respect of their rights;
4. determination to achieve independence, self-reliance and 
political influence; and
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5. determination to achieve modernization."40
Kim's essay comprehensively covers post-liberation Korean 
nationalism and is the foundation on which the team of scholars 
headed by Professor Sin Chong-hyon argue that Korean nationalism 
is largely linked to nationalistic ideals derived ultimately from 
Western theory. These ideals include notions of 1) ethnocentrism; 
2) patriotism; 3) group consciousness; and 4) ideology/ 
ideological orientation.41 Any theory which explicitly seeks to 
fit Korean nationalism into this type of theoretical framework, 
according to Professor Sin and his team, is inevitably 
problematic.42
An Pyong-jun, Professor of Political Science at Yonsei 
University, distinguished the recurrent features of nationalism 
into four categories: ethnonationalism; cultural nationalism; 
resistance nationalism; and integral nationalism. On this basis, 
An also distinguished the characteristics of Korean nationalism 
into four categories: 1) ethnocentrism; 2) revivalism; 3) 
nationalistic resistance ; and 4) intellectualism.43 An takes a 
position consistent with Hans Kohn who defined nationalism as "a 
state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people, and 
claiming to permeate all its members.”44 At the same time, An 
borrows from Anthony D Smith's perspective which defines 
nationalism as:
”... an ideological movement, for the attainment and 
maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of 
a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an 
actual or potential 'nation' like others.”45
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However, the most distinctive characteristic of Korean 
nationalism, which An identifies (along with most other Korean 
commentators) is that of 'resistance'. The word 'resistance' has 
been so intoxicating that it has had not only "...the power of 
stopping [the] thought"46 of Korean nationalists, but also the 
power of manoeuvering their thought into self-righteous illusion. 
This 'resistance' orientation of Korean nationalism has been 
regarded until recent times as "the national disposition of the 
Korean people."47 It is a characteristic, which along with the 
other aspects of Korean nationalism, was intrinsic to the 
motivation and rhetoric of the Minjung Movement.
The problematic nature of Korean nationalism, resulting from the 
national disposition towards resistance, is evident in a number 
of respects : firstly, it confused the people's values, 
aspirations and their perspective of nationalism, in particular, 
their understanding of the objectives of the nationalist 
movement. Any doctrine which advocated collective resistance to 
foreigners or their domination was deemed to be justifiable as a 
nationalist ideology, resulting in a multiplicity of ideologies 
ranging from the far left to the far right. Song Kon-ho and Kan 
Man-gil, the co-editors of 'A Theory Of Korean Nationalism 
(Han' guk Minjokjuui-ron)' alert their readers that this distinct 
characteristic of Korean nationalism has resulted in ideological 
discrepancies and limitations.48 According to both commentators, 
the emergence of many misleading descriptions of nationalism in 
the late Korean dynastic period (kaehwa sidae) were typical 
outcomes of "the interpretation of nationalism as mainly the 
'ideology to struggle against foreign invasions 
(chohang-juui) '."4 9
Secondly, the xenophobic nature of Korean nationalism prior to 
liberation not only lacked capacity to accommodate any social or 
political change beyond the prevailing colonial environment, but 
also contradicted the broader needs and objectives of the 
nationalist movement. Ironically, the rejection of things 
external generated multiple theories of nationalism, based on 
foreign ideologies. Thus, communism, based on the theories of 
Marx and Lenin, gave substantial impetus to the nationalist 
movement itself, but at the same time, became the major factor 
which divided nationalist groups against each other beyond 
reconciliation both during and after liberation. This particular 
characteristic of Korean nationalism, however, lost much of its 
impetus after the Korean war, when the aspirations and objectives 
of the nationalist movement became more closely focussed on the 
accomplishment of 'national unification'. In this context, the 
core and cause of Korean nationalism were often misused, 
particularly by both nationalist and minjung leaders, using the 
argument that the enemies of the nation cannot be anyone but 
'foreigners or others', and therefore, must be rejected at all 
cost, even through revolution. This theme was again evident in 
the anti-Americanism of the Minjung Movement of the 1980s, 
especially that of radicalism.
In analysing xenophobia and the underlying nationalistic 
rhetoric, K. R. Minogue perhaps provides a clearer approach to 
understanding Korean nationalism and its distinctive features: 
ethnocentrism and anti-foreign authoritarian elitism.
"Nationalists present their political struggle as one carried
on by one homogeneous society against outside oppressors; but
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they then have to admit that these outside oppressors have 
internal allies - stooges, traitors, tribal and traditional 
habits of thought- in short, all that resists the national 
leadership itself. This nationalist self-characterisation is 
simply a misleading description of the fact that the 
nationalist process is a condition of civil war and often, as 
we have seen, a civil war in which little notice is actually 
taken of the outside oppressor."50
Nationalism Based On Ethnocentrism
The origin of ethnocentrism in Korean society, according to 
Professor An, arose mainly from the existence of two cultural 
factors: firstly, the social practice, from the very beginning of 
Korean history, of the people being taught to value the 
homogeneity of their ethnicity as the prime essence of national 
fraternity; and secondly, the historical and cultural continuity 
of their homogeneous ethnicity and common language. As An 
comments, the homogeneity of ethnicity and language has not only 
been the source of unity among the Korean people, but also "the 
strength of blood kinship."51 Furthermore, the Korean people 
hold a strong conviction that "the historical consciousness of 
"us" and "others" was developed from the early 13th century when 
the Koryo Kingdom was placed under Mongol rule(1231-1270)".52 
Claims concerning the homogeneity of ethnicity, language, culture 
and history of the Korean people go back more than a millennium 
to the period when the Silla Kingdom achieved the first 
unification of the three Kingdoms (Kingdoms of Paekche, Silla and 
Kokuryo) in 676 AD. In fact, their claims regarding the origin of 
their ethnicity stretch back to around the third millennium
BC.53.
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Historically, the rise of nationalist ideologies, such as the 
poguk anmin sasang (ideology of sustaining the nation and 
providing peace for the people) advanced by Tonghak peasants 
(1894), Ch'oksa wijongnon (ideology of rejecting heterodoxy, 
i.e., Christianity) professed by extreme Confucianists since 1895 
and the Tongdo sogiron (ideology to maintain the Oriental Way and 
to adopt Western technologies) advanced by the ruling elite in 
the Taehan Cheguk (1897-1910) period immediately prior to 
Japanese annexation, were, with the exception of aspects of the 
latter, classical examples of Korean ethnocentrism based on 
xenophobia.
Professor Yi Chong-su argues that the maintenance of 5,000 years 
of Korean history itself, despite the numerous intrusions and 
attacks by foreigers, is creditable to the strength of 
ethnocentrism. He states further:
"The Korean people have repelled foreign invasions, never 
submitting to them. The Korean people, proud of 5,000 years 
of their great history, will develop as they learn from their 
experiences.... The history of the Korean people is 
distinctive from all others because the Korean people took 
form and developed in a way different from others. The Korean 
people learned from foreign threats and conflicts with 
aggressors that national solidarity and cooperation were 
highly valuable. The Korean people have developed their 
cultural tradition despite the confusion caused by conflicts 
with foreign powers.”54
Regardless of its accuracy, this statement is noteworthy in terms
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of understanding the collective perception of the Korean people.
It reveals the foundation of Korean nationalism which, to a large 
extent, is based on xenophobia and on perceived persecution, and 
is especially relevant to the min jung ideology of the 1980s.
Whilst Korean ethnocentrism oscillates between the ideal and 
practical, it especially encourages systemic racism. As Professor 
An Pyong-jun points out, ethnocentrism in Korean society may not 
be explicit in form or structure 55, but racism rooted in 
homogeneous ethnicity is systemic and culturalized as a form of 
patriotism and thus nationalism. No outsiders, whether Chinese 
residents living for generations in the Korean community 56, or 
Korean people from different regions, are treated as one of 
"us".57 In this context, the essence of Korean homogeneous 
ethnicity contributes nothing more than a contradiction towards 
Korea's aspirations of national equilibrium and fraternity. 
Nicholas Eberstadt goes so far as to say that, "Korean 
nationalism - the sentiment and theory of racial rule - is 
subversive of democracy, and is inimical even unto democracy's 
basic principles."58 It runs counter, therefore, to the 
objectives of the Minjung Movement despite being most forcefully 
promoted by that Movement.
Nationalism Based on Revivalism
The ideals of cultural revivalism, which emphasized the 
preservation of Korean culture, language, tradition and spiritual 
values, were embraced by the Korean people in three forms: 
namely, 1) traditional customs known as p'ungsok; 2) an awakening 
of national consciousness; and 3) a reassessment of national 
history from the people's viewpoint. These three aspects of
cultural revivalism are detailed separately below.
The Korean people considered their p'ungsok, as one of the most 
important features of the Korean way of life, which enriched the 
nation, provided energy for the revitalization of individuals, 
and spread harmony amongst the people. Rooted largely in the 
teachings of Chu Hsi, particularly on the need to "clarify 
genealogy, group members of the clan together, and institute a 
system of heads of descent"59, p'ungsok has, indeed, been the 
ultimate barometer for the maintenance of the moral and political 
code in Korea.
This attachment by the people, especially the common people, to 
p'ungsok, however, was often abused by nationalists, such as for 
the revival of monarchical absolutism. The ruling elite in the 
Great Han Empire (1897-1905), for example, propagated the overall 
nationalist ideology known as the 'Puguk kangbyong-juui (ideology 
to enlighten and strengthen the nation)'. At the same time they 
were divided into the Conservatives and the Progressives, of whom 
the Conservatives followed the doctrine known as Tongdo sogiron 
(see below) which posited that cultural revivalism relied 
essentially upon the people's emotional and social attachment to 
their traditional p'ungsok.
Tongdo sogiron, developed in the early 1880s, advocated two 
political measures: that Korea should adopt a policy which 
accepted only Western technology, so that Korea could establish a 
modernized economic structure as well as modern military 
equipment; but that at the same time Korea should maintain 
exclusively its Confucian feudal structure (expressed as "The
Oriental Way"-Tongdo), and oppose the entry of any Western 
liberal ideologies. In regard to these measures, Yun Son-hak, in 
his memorial to the King (Kojong) on December 1882, wrote:
"Things such as ships, wagons, military equipment, which 
serve the convenience of people and benefit the nation, are 
all from external sources. Hence what I humbly beg to change 
is not the mode of ethics or morality, but the mode of 
technology which produces these instruments."60
The introduction of a national ideology to maintain the Oriental 
Way and to adopt Western technology, was a political measure 
aimed not only at preventing foreign domination, but also and 
more importantly, at securing the existing structure of feudal 
monarchical absolutism under the guise of traditional values. 
Similar conflicting policies, as political measures for 
modernization, were also adopted by China and Japan: the former 
was known as the 'zhong ti xi yong'; and the latter the 'wa kon 
yo sai'.
In the process of economic and technological modernization, 
however, the ruling elite faced the predicament that there could 
not be any modernization either economically or militarily, 
unless the population's perceptions were modernized and 
government was supportive of that modernization. Hence, in 
reality, the implementation of this ideology, based on the 
approach of the oriental Confucian ruling structure with the 
adoption of Western technologies, failed to save Korea either 
from foreign domination or from the dismantling of Confucian
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feudalism.
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Cultural revivalism also called for an awakening of the Korean 
people's spirit, that is, of the Korean people's nationalist 
consciousness in preparedness for revolution or social 
renovation. Sin Ch'ae-ho (1880-1936), a revolutionary nationalist 
during Japanese colonization, pronounced that the most effective 
way to combat the Japanese colonial empire in the cause of 
national independence, would be through a 'direct revolution of 
the people'(minjung chikjob hyongmyong) " . In his article, 
"Declaration of Korean Revolution (Choson Hyongmyong Sonon)" of 
1923, Sin wrote:
"... if our revolution of the 'people in the East(Korea) does
not develop rapidly, they will all lose their own identity..
. . "61
The solution to overcoming the danger of losing national 
identity, he continued, was to awaken the minds and hearts of the 
people, which would be "the first step of our [Korean people's] 
revolution."62 It was clear that a people's militant revolution, 
in Sin's view, would be the only option "to discover the 
uniqueness of Korea".63 Hence the people's revolution aiming "to 
destroy the alien ruling structure of the nation"64 was seen as a 
necessary process to maintaining the nationhood of Korea. Sin's 
argument, which focussed solely on the criterion of national 
independence, was inspirational to the awakening of the Korean 
people. Sin's tunnel-vision approach to nationalism, however, 
reflected a distinct tendency amongst Korean intellectuals (when 
he defined as, 'the people who are already awakened'), 
particularly in regard to their attitude towards internal issues 
such as the Confucian feudal structure.
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Cultural revivalism, involved a reassessment of national history 
from the people's (minjung) viewpoint and was brought into effect 
at two different times: 1) during the era of Japanese occupation 
through the work of Ch'oe Nam-son (1890-1957), a leading Korean 
intellectual and nationalist; and 2) during the Minjung Movement 
in the 1980s. Ch'oe, however, has been perceived as personally 
inconsistent, having accepted a collaborative role with the 
Japanese. Despite his literary achievements and his leadership of 
the nationalist movement, his role as a nationalist ultimately 
became a source of controversy amongst Korean historians even to 
the present-day. Nevertheless, his analysis of the Tan'gun myth 
in his essay, 'Treatise of Tan'gun (Tan'gunnon) [1926])', has
provided the most conclusive and revolutionary vision of national 
identity to the Korean people to date. His view of the Tan'gun 
as "a Shaman ruler, a religio-political leader of ancient 
Korea”65 has not only been cited by Yi Ki-baek, a leading present 
-day historian, but also affirmed by the government, as the 
foundation of the nation. In analysing Ch'oe's view of history, 
Chisuko T. Allen draws the following conclusion:
"Thus Ch'oe's "Tan'gunnon" not only prompted other scholars 
to study the myth seriously but helped popularize the notion 
of Tan'gun. This, in turn, offered indirect reassurance to 
the popular movements, such as Taejonggyo, that revered 
Tan'gun as the ancient symbol of Korean nationalism."66
The min jung cultural movement of the 197 0s, which was propagated 
largely by poet Kim Chi-ha and other intellectuals (including 
university students and Christian groups), called for a revival 
of the mask dance (t 'alch'um) and court-yard play (madang-guk)
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that closely linked the Tan'gun myth and Korean culture to the 
lives of the minjung. And at the same time, the movement also 
called for a reassessment of national history from the people's 
perspective. Irrespective of the changed directions and 
objectives of the Minjung Movement during the late 1980s (when it 
moved towards extreme radicalism), the impact of this Movement on 
the process of democratisation cannot be overstated in Korean 
history.
Nationalism Based on Resistance
As I have already indicated, Korean nationalism had been 
substantially motivated by 'resistance'. The consequent 
ideological inadequacies and contradictions of Korean nationalism 
were thus continuously exposed in the struggle to achieve 
national aspirations and objectives. As early as the Koryo 
kingdom, according to Professor Yi Yong-hui, resistance had been 
fundamental to the nationalist tradition.67 It is, of course, a 
natural reaction to resist foreign forces, and in this respect, 
Korean nationalism based on such an elemental reaction is not 
unusual. The proliferation of nationalist ideologies from the 
late 1920s, from communist, socialist, gradualist, and liberal 
variants to terrorism, however, exhibited the fundamental 
inadequacies of Korean nationalism, particularly in terms of a 
lack of political pluralism and tolerance, a weak ideological 
base (founded on sentiment and resistance) and obscurity of 
purpose and direction.
Obsessed with the ideals of a single and thus exclusionary 
political and moral standpoint, the activities of most 
nationalists confused and misled the people's aspirations and
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nationalistic perspectives. Moreover, the overrated criterion of 
resistance was readily abused by the leaders of government for 
their own political legitimacy and power. President Syngman 
Rhee's (Yi Sung-man) national slogan of "Myolgong Chongsin 
(Anti-Communist Spirit)", or the "Pan'gong (Anti-Communism)" of 
Presidents Pak Chong-hui (Park Chung Hee) and Chon Tu-hwan (Chun 
Doo Hwan), were very cleverly manipulated forms of nationalistic 
rhetoric which served them well in the elimination of their 
personal enemies and political obstacles.
Nationalism Based on Intellectualism
Historically, the Korean people had long been taught that 
intellectual achievement was a privilege which not only provided 
qualification for entry to officialdom, but also provided the 
means for joining the ruling class (yangban kyegub). To most 
Koreans, education was a compulsory requirement for linking one's 
own opportunities closely to those offered by both public and 
private authorities. Korean society, as a result of the civil 
examination system, had predominently been ruled by the 
intellectual class, and shaped by their thoughts, ideals and 
politics. In this cultural environment, nationalism has been "the 
drive of a relatively thin stratum of intellectuals who absorbed 
the skills and values of advanced countries, towards rapid 
modernization in opposition to the aristocracy and independently 
of the colonial industrial powers."68
This is because, according to A.D. Smith, "... they 
[intellectuals] are now under-employed and culturally displaced 
in their traditional societies."69 Smith's description is very 
relevant to Korean intellectuals since the late 1800s, and
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continues to be relevant to writers, students, officials and 
ultimately also the educated workers of modern times.
Intellectuals as the vanguard of Korean nationalism, however, had 
always separated themselves from the mainstream of the people not 
only in terms of the origin of their intellectual and social 
identities, but also in terms of their beliefs and approaches 
which were often contradictory to those of the people.
An example of this dichotomy between intellectuals and commoners 
was the coexistence of the Tonghak peasant movement and the elite 
of the Independence Club in the late 1800s. Ch'oe Che-u, the 
founder of the Tonghak religion, proclaimed that "My doctrine is 
similar to Confucianism, ...[and] is based on the incarnation of 
God in man.70 On the basis of this doctrine, Chon Pong-jun, one 
of the leaders of the Tonghak Rebellion in 1894, termed the 
masses as "the root of the nation"71 and declared:
"Minjung who are oppressed by the yangban and the wealthy 
people, and who are menial workers in offices, subject to 
humiliation by the 'provincial governors and 'local mayors', 
just as we peasants and farmers, have deep rooted grudges 
(han) against oppressors. Therefore, minjung, don't hesitate 
and stand up against them now!"72
In regard to this belief and the notions held by peasants, the 
elite of the Independence Club (Tongnip hyophoe) were genuinely 
convinced that these ideas of Eastern Learning (Tonghak) were the 
main cause of the nation's fall from grace.73 Yi Chong-sik, 
author of "The Politics of Korean Nationalism" strongly argues 
that if only the intellectuals of the Independence Club sought
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alliance with the Tonghaks who were, by then, well established 
and numerous, "...a revolution or at least a stronger pressure 
group could have been produced."74
Ideological friction in Korea has certainly generated 
intellectual debate on the nature of nationalism, but the 
arguments, as elsewhere, have lacked academic rigour.In addition, 
nationalistic intellectualism, as in other spheres, lacked unity 
in Korea and therefore was an additional source for division 
rather than national solidarity.
Overview Of Korean Nationalism
I have reviewed the various strands of Korean nationalism because 
their characteristics are closely intertwined with minjung 
thought. As has been demonstrated, a minjung approach to the 
formation and character of nationalism is common amongst writers 
on Korea's past.
My approach has been to examine Korean nationalism in terms of 
its historical and cultural links with the common people, and its 
impact on the Minjung Movement of the 1980s, outlining what is 
peculiar to the nationalist experience. I have not, therefore, 
dealt with Korean nationalism as a theoretical entity, for Korean 
nationalism is not a single thing capable of a single definition. 
History has simply provided the context upon which local 
circumstances have been brought to bear to generate elements of 
nationalism, which different groups have attempted to rationalise 
into disparate sets of ideas. I would argue, however, that in 
Korea such ideas were often a convenient mechanism in the 
political agendas of these different groups, including radical
groups and the Minjung Movement.
Early this century, much of Korea's nationalism, in so far as it 
went, was based on an awakening consciousness on the part of the 
people, that the Korean nation was a homogeneous people living 
within its own natural boundaries. Japanese colonisation 
consequently represented the rape of the motherland and aroused 
severe resentment in the nature of a political grievance, 
contributing significantly to the psychology of early Korean 
nationalism. As in nearly all cases of nationalism, Korea found 
itself in a relationship of being the weaker to the much stronger 
Japan. The consequent feeling of resistance was further 
cultivated in combination with the sense of grievance (han) . This 
combination, generated externally, provided a ready explanation 
to Koreans why they had failed to attain nationhood, but to some 
extent it was also a convenient distortion of the real cause of 
failure, which was as much to be found within, in internal 
factionalism, parochialism, poor political infra-structure, and a 
lack of strong leadership.
These political and sociological foundations, however, should be 
seem as inevitable in the path to nationhood. Modern society, 
according to Ernest Gellner 75, is characterized by developed 
industry which effects social modernisation through the creation 
of factors such as increased communication, education and 
economic wealth, thus forcing society to come to terms with its 
internal and external ideological boundaries, leading ultimately 
to a more pluralistic democratic environment internally, and a 
more non-xenophobic approach internationally.
Korea's rapid industrial development, especially after 1962, 
provided the common people with increasing opportunities for 
relocation and changing occupations with the hope of improved 
personal income. An awakening of national consciousness occurred 
progressively from this point with the emergence of the Korean 
Minjung Movement. A greater awareness of Korean culture also 
emerged, incorporating a mode for communication, a genuine Korean 
identity and a new focus on the Korean Language.
The axiom that 'exile is the nursery of nationalism' was 
demonstrated in many respects in Korea, for when many workers 
became 'exiles' from their traditional communities in major 
industrial centres such as Seoul and Pusan, their 'exile' led to 
nationalism in Gellner's terms of forging a modern nation where 
its members had to communicate and be technically competent. In 
Particular, the Korean system of education was substantially 
expanded under the regime of Pak Chong-hui and became a major 
factor in the modernisation and democratisation of Korea.
In a sense, Korea had been a 'nation' for thousands of years, and 
its entrance to the modern world represented the awakening of 
Korea to its identity in the modern era. In another sense, 
however, Korea had not existed as a nation for 39 years and its 
re-emergence created complex social circumstances through which 
the Korean brand of nationalism is intelligible. The necessity to 
fight for nationhood was, in part, driven by a range of 
circumstances which made social and political life, unmodified, 
intolerable to those who lived it.
The problem inherent in Korean nationalism, however, has been 
that the foundations of group consciousness have been variously
regional, traditional, religious, and political. Such groups have 
found the rhetoric of nationalism useful but at the same time 
have remained very factional in their approach towards the 
achievement of nationhood. Korean political figures, in 
Particular over the past 40 years or so, have found it very 
convenient to exploit nationalist sentiment in order to protect 
their own position and to justify extreme measures of political 
control. Throughout these processes, however, a consistent 
pervading nationalist ideology as such has not been formed, not 
even as a set of ideas which might be said to comprise, not a 
theory, but a rhetoric by which a unified political sentiment can 
be communicated from the ruling elite to the masses. The elements 
for such a rhetoric are all there, such as homogeneity, cultural 
unity, xenophobia, reunification etc, but have not been combined 
to form a set of national ideals.
In this context, one is compelled to conclude that paradox is at 
the core of Korean nationalism and thus, given the nationalist 
content of the Minjung Movement, of minjung theory as well. 
Korea's political and historical consciousness of its own 
identity as a nation was both stimulated by an external power 
(Japan) and put into effect by an external power (the USA). This 
left the peninsula with a totally inadequate internal basis for 
nationhood in 1945, ultimately leading to civil war in 1950, and 
the establishment of a partitioned national entity. The Korean 
nationalist process is seen, therefore, as a condition of civil 
war which, on the one hand, represents the people's revolution 
towards social, political and economic reform, namely a single 
class society; but on the other, sets the stage where foreigners, 
especially the USA, are depicted as major obstacles to national
independence and unification. This depiction, linking national 
humiliation and grievances with foreign influences such as 
Japanese colonialism and American capitalism, ultimately 
convinced the Korean people to view nationalism in terms of class 
struggle. As George E. Ogle stated:
"Korea is tired of being subservient in a world of big 
nations like the U.S.A., Japan, and the Soviet Union. It is 
now time to exert its independence by cutting loose from its 
old dependencies —  which primarily means the U.S.A.
Likewise, it is time for the people to exert themselves 
against a ruling class that has too long kept them as second 
class citizens, and in the case of workers, even as serfs."76
Today, however, little account is given by Koreans to outside 
nations as the main source for the solution to interna 1 conflict 
and division. Outside nations are seen as having a crucial role 
in Korea's economic development through investment and trade, and 
more importantly, in international cross-recognition of the two 
Koreas.77 This perception has required sophisticated 
international cooperation and diplomacy both in the world of 
commerce and that of politics. Nationalistic rhetoric, 
nevertheless, continues to be a strong stimulus for movements 
such as the Minjung Movement aimed at the achievement of national 
determination and unification, but at the same time, Koreans are 
being brought from out of their parochial traditional outlook to 
recognize the global issues confronting all of Korea. Even the 
unification of Korea clearly depends upon international factors, 
at least in so far as international capital will be required to 
finance important elements of that unification. To this extent,
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the national exclusivism of the minjung ideology appears no 
longer to accord with Korea's circumstances.
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Chapter Two
MINJUNG HISTORIOGRAPHY
Introduction
Nothing has influenced the mind of the Korean people more during 
the last thirty years of struggle for democracy than the role of 
history and its interpretation.
To understand modern minjung consciousness as it has developed in 
recent decades, and its mode of expression in the philosophy and 
activities of the Minjung Movement, it is important to examine 
Korea's history, particularly in terms of its historiographical 
interpretation. The formation of a Korean mass consciousness took 
many centuries to emerge. The nature of this consciousness, as 
construed by the Minjung Movement, is based on the character of 
the Korean people, their unique 'Koreanness', which can only be 
understood in terms of their history and culture.
While the role of the minjung as a political force did not emerge 
until the 1960s, when viewed more broadly as 'the ruled common 
people', it is arguable that the minjung have not been without 
political impact throughout history. Yi Ki-baek, a prominent 
historian, writes:
"Throughout the long history of Korea, the minjung have been 
regarded as only the subjects of the ruling force. 
Consequently, the minjung have not been recorded in the front 
pages of history, and for this reason it has become nearly 
impossible to trace their past through historical records. 
However, minjung as subjects can not be disregarded entirely
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in the history of Korea because no one will be able to 
understand Korea's history without understanding the role of 
the min jung."1
Recorded history in its traditional form pays little attention to 
the minjung as such, but tends to focus on politics, the court, 
the military, colonial exploits and various other events without 
regard to the common people. This view of history was first 
challenged in Korea when the nation was forced to accept colonial 
submission to Japan, and a national movement arose which 
confronted the colonialist view of history. A greater 
consciousness subsequently developed concerning the role of the 
minjung in history and how this role has been operative in 
shaping the socio-political framework.
This chapter examines the historiography of ”minjung history". 
According to minjung proponents the development of this 
historical view, "has been accomplished largely through the 
method of socio-economic history"2, the understanding of which 
was essential if the general public were to grasp the "reality of 
the minjung and their corporate spirit".3 This new historiography 
of the 1970s emphasized important elements of populist socio­
political consciousness, not only stimulating a 'historical view 
of minjung-nationalism' (people oriented nationalism), but also 
inspiring the people to rise up against oppression and ultimately 
sparking the phenomenon of the Minjung Movement in the 1980s. It 
also provided a basis for the people to identify the common 
factors underlying their existence and struggle, thereby giving 
their solidarity a purpose. So Nam-dong, leading minjung 
theologian (died 1984), argued as follows:
"Minjung history and theology testify to the fact that the 
min jung overcome with their own power the external conditions 
which determine and confine them, and become the subjects who 
determine their own social situation and destiny....[Through] 
Korean history from a minjung perspective, we will now trace 
the genealogy of the Minjung Movement in which the minjung 
define themselves and struggle for their own liberation. The 
minjung movement originated in Korean history only with the 
establishment of Ancient Choson [Korea]."4
It is noteworthy, however, that the overall tendency of minjung 
proponents in regard to their historical claims, is to rely on 
the 1970's interpretation of the prominent historian, Yi Ki-baek. 
In doing so they generally draw on popular perceptions of already 
well publicised historical themes, such as social oppression 
under Ancient Choson and the homogeneity of nationalist 
sentiments particularly under Japanese occupation.
The two major themes of the interpretation of Korean history by 
minjung proponents which I will examine in this chapter are: 1) 
the Yi dynasty: "the womb of the people's han" ; and 2) the 
nationalist reaction to Japanese interference and late control 
(1876-1945). I will concentrate on the nature of minjung history 
with a focus on social and political conditions, and the people's 
reaction to and resistance against those conditions.
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1. The Role of History
The Yi Dynasty: "The Womb Of The People's Han"
In 1392, General Yi Song-gye became the first ruler of the Yi 
dynasty (as King T'aejo, 1392-1398) after a successful coup 
against the rulers of the Koryo kingdom» He named the new kingdom 
'Choson'. The founding of the Yi dynasty was entirely dependent 
upon the collaboration of Confucian literati who designated 
themselves as the lords of the "Yangban (literati) Bureaucratic 
State".5 The literati established their personal wealth by 
backing Yi Song-gye's land reforms (Kwajonbob), which enabled 
them, as the 'Dynastic Foundation Merit Subjects', to receive 
land according to their rank. The land law in its implementation, 
however, generated an extremely oppressive social system which 
entrapped the peasants into a vicious cycle of poverty.
Although the power of the yangban fluctuated from time to time, 
mainly due to their own factionalism, their authority as the 
rulers of the yangban bureaucratic state was unchallenged, as 
was the social system which the yangban literati modelled on the 
Confucian distinction between 'the rulers and the ruled.' This 
philosophical position was universally accepted as proper and 
necessary to maintain the social order. Mencius justified this 
philosophy as follows, "Some labour with their minds, and some 
labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds 
govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed 
by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those 
who govern others are supported by them."6
Neo-Confucianism, of the school of Chu Hsi(1130-1200) , had thus 
been given official government endorsement from the beginning of
the Yi dynasty as a counter-culture against the former social 
power of Buddhism, with the objective of strengthening state 
protection and patronage. However, its influence progressively 
broadened over time to dominate political and intellectual 
education, social culture and ethical behaviour.
Class Structures Under The Yi Dynasty
Chu Hsi's 'doctrine of the mean' taught that opposites required 
balance to form the perfect circle, as expressed in the notion of 
the yin (urn) and yang (yang). Social philosophy thus saw reality 
in terms of the positive and negative, light and dark, male and 
female, good and evil, ruler and ruled, not just as opposites, 
but in terms of their harmonious relationship to form the perfect 
whole. Apart from the king, whose authority was absolute and 
hereditary on the grounds that he brought about harmony between 
divine and human activities, there were four major social strata, 
yangban, chungin, sangmin and ch 'onmin, which played key roles in 
the ruler-ruled relationship.
The yangban originally were officers of the tongban (East 
Division), civil officers of high rank, and the soban (West 
Division), military officers. However, 'yangban' soon denoted 
nobility in general. "Economically yangban were landlords, 
politically they were government officials or reserve forces for 
the officials, and socially they were the rulers of the local 
community."7 "They [the yangban] do not plough fields 
themselves, nor do they engage in trade to earn a living....The 
hongp'ae [red board], gained through the civil examination, is 
merely two measures long, but is worth a wealth of goods....No 
one could openly bear a grudge against a yangban, even if the 
yangban poured ash into one's nose and pulled one's beard while
holding down one's head by the hair."8
The yangban factions, as a matter of course, fought over the 
limited available positions in the central administration. Power 
shifts mainly occurred as a result of alliances with the dominant 
claimants to the throne, and factions were often the result of 
arguments over issues related to the throne. Those factions that 
were unable to access political dominance, were forced to retreat 
to the countryside, often downgrading their status to "fallen 
yangban "9 because of financial and social ruin. Many became 
farmers or tenant-farmers of the peasant class (sangmin).
Yangban acknowledged only their own faction, clan, academy and so 
on, according to their own interpretation of Confucian kinship 
ethics, and subsequently the entire state was turned into a 
Multitude of lineages and factions plotting against each other.
In this social and political climate, a 'zero-sum' game became 
the most viable tactic of Korean political life.
Next to the yangban, the chungin ( ) were the second stratum
of society, a small group mainly comprised of professionals and 
clerks, and the illegitimate offspring of yangban. The chungin 
were trained in medicine, foreign languages, accounting, law, 
meteorology, calligraphy, and other sciences. Although the 
chungin class was not specified as hereditary by law, in 
practice, most professional and clerical positions were inherited 
by their descendants, for the secrets of each profession could 
only be taught on a one to one basis. Most chungin, as the term 
indicates, were 'middle people' and lived in the middle area of 
Seoul. According to Yi Chong-sik (Chong-sik, Lee), the chungin, 
especially official clerks and military officers were, just as
corrupt as the yangban, tyrannizing the common people through 
their role in public services.10
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The third stratum, the sangmin, were the greater majority of the 
population and were largely farmers (either free-landholders or 
tenant farmers), merchants including artisans, craftsmen and 
traders, who together bore the entire burden of taxation and 
military service. Whilst the sangmin carried out the major role 
of providing the resources for the state, the farmers, the 
largest and most important group within the commoner class, were 
particularly exploited and oppressed. Merchants and artisans in 
the sangmin class had an insignificant role in the early years of 
the Yi dynasty and were a relatively small group. Artisans were 
attached to public agencies, producing whatever goods they were 
assigned. Yi Ki-baek notes :
"In many instances these artisans were government slaves and
their social status was that of the low-born...."11
Trading was considered an immoral and undignified way of making a 
living, as it was seen as extracting profit from others. 
Nevertheless, the role of wholesale merchants, known as kongin, 
developed over time and their commercial activities became 
organized and more prominent, particularly after the 
promulgation of the Uniform Land Tax Law (taedongbob) in 1708.
The ch’onmin were made up of government and family slaves whose 
social status was strictly hereditary and who were readily bought 
and sold at an officially set price. Of these, slaves who were 
'out-resident' and public slaves managed their own households and 
lived separately within designated districts. The recorded number
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of the government slaves in the fifteenth century was between 
350,000 to 400,000.12 In addition to slaves, the ch'onmin 
included performing artists (kwangdae and sadang), shaman 
priests (mudang), certain categories of peasant farm labourers as 
well as slaughterers and butchers (paekjong: "... the term 
originally used to designate peasant farmers in general"13). The 
social status of these groups was also hereditary. On the 
political level, the formal ruler-ruled relationship was broadly 
that between the yangban-chungin alliance, and the other two 
levels.
Three Key Sources Of Social Control
Prominent minjung historian Y Ki-baek, in discussing the social 
and economic structure of the ' Yangban Bureaucratic State of the 
Yi Dynasty‘14, refers three key features which oppressed the 
peasantry and entrenched their social immobility. Firstly,
'hop'ae' legislation (a tag identification system) fixed peasants 
permanently within the land of their residential area. Those of 
the sangmin class were required to carry the 'hop'ae' at all 
times, and could not abandon their land or migrate to another 
province. After several rebellions 15 the social immobility of 
the sangmin was further tightened through the 'Oga-jakt ’ongbob ', 
a law which organised the sangmin into groups of five households 
with collective responsibility for the behaviour, debts, and 
taxes of their group.
This 'watchdog-system' of mutual espionage secured the total 
control of the peasantry. Its intention was to establish and fix 
a reliable labour force in every area of the nation regardless of 
social change. In that sense, the sangmin who were officially 
freeborn peasants, were in reality not very different to the
53
ch'onmin of the lowest social stratum.
The second key feature was the land-tax system, which had 
developed from the kwajonbob land reforms (the Rank Land Law) 
promulgated in 1391 by Yi Song-gye and his Confucian literati as 
a socio-political reform. In principle, this system acknowledged 
no private land ownership, for the State officially owned all the 
nation's land. Therefore, the 'tenant system' was the only viable 
method of farming, and only farmers (most likely peasants, but 
never yangban) were the tenants of either 'public land (kongjon)' 
or 'private land (sajon)'. The State collected rent directly from 
tenants of 'public land'. 'Private land', on the other hand, was 
allocated to officials according to their rank with the right to 
collect rent from tenants, but without ownership rights. 'Rank' 
land was inherited and in effect converted over time into 
outright ownership. Thus, from the beginning of the Yi dynasty, 
yangban landlords established the trend of building up their 
private estates, termed agricultural estates (nongjang), despite 
the formal principle of state ownership.
The yangban bureaucrats not only possessed 'rank land' as well as 
large amounts of 'merit subject land', both allocated by 
government, but also expanded their landholdings by using their 
political and financial power through methods such as purchase, 
outright seizure, and reclamation. Thus they progressively 
acquired every available land holding, particularly "the abundant 
state owned lands in the three provinces (Ch'ungch'ong, Cholla, 
and Kyongsang) of the fertile southern third of the country 
...."16 Han U-kun, Professor of History at Seoul National 
University, comments on the social impact of this phenomenon as 
follows :
"Perhaps the most ominous trend in the expansion of the 
nongjang was the removal from the tax rolls of the tenant 
farmers on them. Just as during the Koryo dynasty, government 
revenues shrank as the nongjang grew, and nongjang tenants 
were also withdrawn from corvee labor and military service. 
This led many farmers to enter the service of the landlords 
to escape taxes and corvee."17
The Rank Land Law was revised through the introduction of the 
Tribute Tax Law (kongbob) in 1444, when the formerly one tenth 
state rent rate was lowered to one-twentieth of the harvest 
supposedly to ease the burden of the peasantry. Tenant-farmers, 
however, continued to be obliged to share their crops on a 50-50 
basis with their landowners under a practice called 'crop 
sharing', and the state rent was now payed only by the 
landowners. This heavy burden on tenant farmers led to their 
massive dispossession and impoverishment, and the expansion of 
nongjang by the yangban landlords inevitably resulted in a 
reduction of government tax revenue.
The tribute tax, also known as 'local tribute' (t'okong), was 
even more detrimental to farmers, for levies placed on 
specialised local products and craft goods were more expensive 
to provide than the land tax. An 'indirect payment'(pangnab) 
system, introduced by yangban bureaucrats, through which they 
delivered tribute goods to the State and collected the cost of 
the goods from peasant farmers, led to farmers paying increased 
tribute tax, and further exploitation by the yangban. By the end 
of the 16th century, the abuse of the tribute tax forced farmers 
to opt out of their tenancies, passing their debt to those who 
remained. This merely exacerbated the problem, forcing even more
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farmers to flee the land.
The social epidemic of 'runaway-farmers' was one of the 
contributing factors to the government introducing the 'Uniform 
Land Tax Law'(taedongbob) in 1708. The taedongbob, also referred 
to as the 'rice payment law', was a mandatory payment system 
under which farmers were liable to pay directly to a newly 
established government agency, Sonhyech ' ong. Payment of the new 
tax could be also made from the harvest, or with coins (taedong- 
jon) or cotton cloth (taedongp'o) . This system was aimed at 
protecting peasant farmers from the abuses of the landlords.
The government revenue agency, being in receipt mainly of farm 
produce, money and cotton cloth, appointed special purchasing 
officers from merchants (or the kongin group) of the sangmin 
(commoner) class to purchase government requirements. The 
appointment of these officers, called 'tribute men' (kongin) , was 
a key factor in the creation of an entirely new class of 
merchants, and ironically progressively eroded the feudalism that 
had necessitated their appointment. The taedongbob was also a 
desperate government measure to raise State funds. After the 
Japanese Invasion in 1592, the dynasty, known as 'the 
agricultural State', was devastated and was facing a financial 
crisis. The State had not only wasted farm land while engaged in 
war, but had also lost land registers. Three other critical 
factors which had led the State into the fiscal crisis were: 
factional strife amongst the yangban class; the continuing 
increase of the yangban population as a result of the 
deregulation of State examinations both in terms of their 
frequency and the number of successful candidates selected 18; 
and most crucially, the increase of tax-free land owned by royal
in-law families.17
The third key feature of the feudal social system which oppressed 
with peasantry was the military and its corvee system, which was 
structured to provide governments (central and local) with 
military personnel and corvee labour. Every male was subject to 
conscription into national service as long as he was assessed as 
being in sound physical condition. In theory, military duty was 
required on a rotational basis, and corvee labour could be 
required for a fixed limited period, but no more than six days in 
a single year. In practice, however, the corvee labour system had 
no restrictions on either the period or frequency of call up. 
Furthermore, changes in the military duty system led many 
peasants to become landless tenants on nongjang owned by yangban 
(in some cases peasants preferred to become slaves of yangban in 
order to avoid both military and corvee labour duties), or simply 
wanderers.
Originally the military service and corvee labour obligations 
were quite distinct. The military roster system, however, was 
expanded when the 'paired provisioner system' was introduced, 
which required conscripted soldiers not only to keep standard 
duty, but also to support 'paired duty'. This expansion of 
military rosters drew on local manpower resources and led to 
severe difficulties in filling corvee labour quotas. As a result, 
soldiers were required to provide corvee duty themselves. The 
soldiers, in turn, hired stand-in-labourers with the resources at 
their disposal from their 'provisioners'(poin) and thus 
substituted their corvee obligation. This unofficial expense for 
substitute corvee labourers, however, became a social issue when 
the soldiers began to be forced to make payment directly to
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government officials. The payment was excessively burdensome and, 
as a consequence, there arose a mass exodus of soldiers. Not only 
were the military ranks deserted by soldiers, but villages were 
also left without working males.
The military service duty system was changed again during the 
Japanese invasion of 1592, after which the government began to 
establish the Five Army Garrisons (Oyongch'ong) . Their formation 
was completed during the reign of King Sukjong (1674-1720), and 
constituted the foundation of the Yi army. ’The system of paid 
recruits' which developed over time was, in fact, a natural 
outcome of the Five Army Garrisons' disorganisation, and lack of 
policy and consistency. The duty system was adopted, in the 
beginning, by peasant-soldiers who, desperate to avoid going to 
Seoul for their rotational garrison duty, paid levies to others 
to take their place. The system soon became standard practice 
when all peasant farmers were obliged to pay two bolts (p'il : 
about 30 square metres) of cotton cloth annually instead of being 
conscripted for military duty. Generally, particularly during the 
late Yi dynasty, the law endorsed the notion that all privileges 
belonged to the yangban class, and all duties had to be carried 
out by the practical slaves of society, the majority of whom were 
of the sangmin and ch’onmin class.
The Yi Dynasty in Minjung Historiography
According to minjung historians, under these social, political 
and economic conditions, the enmity of the people towards the 
State which patronized the tyranny of the yangban class, was 
fundamental, as was their misery (han) derived from its despotic 
system. The State, including its officials, was regarded as the 
core of social-evil. Thus the people frequently fought against it
58
to achieve their own ends. For example, the Hong Kyong-nae 
Rebellion (P'yongan Province in the north west) in 1811, which 
inspired many small-scale outbreaks that "...continued almost 
uninterruptedly throughout the whole country"20, was a typical 
illustration of the people's struggle against the corrupt system. 
The Chinju Uprising (in the south east) in 1862 was also similar 
in nature and "the most serious of these."21
Minjung historians also argue that the evil of the system 
extended beyond the characteristics of Korean social structure to 
to the minds of the Korean people because it dictated social and 
cultural ethics as well as the aspirations of society. Built 
entirely on the moral principles of the Confucian Five 
Relationships, the system monitored the interpersonal 
relationships of the people according to the "symbols of the 
patriarchal hierarchy that were used to define relationships 
within the kinship villages or within society as a whole...."22 
Hence, the relationship between the people were arbitrarily 
structured, and bound to result in many forms of interpersonal 
han, such as that of son towards father, wife towards husband, 
sisters towards brothers, youth towards elders and friends 
towards friends. Under these circumstances, it was only natural 
to perceive the images of the dynasty as the 'womb of the 
people's han ' and of Korea's han-culture.
So Nam-dong interpretes the nature of han as follows:
"1. Koreans have suffered numerous invasions by surrounding 
powerful nations so that the very existence of the Korean 
nation has come to be understood as han. 2. Koreans have 
continually suffered the tyranny of the rulers so that they
think of their existence as paeksong. 3. Also, under 
Confucianism's strict imposition of laws and customs 
discriminating against women, the existence of women was han 
itself. 4. At a certain point in Korean history, about half 
of the population was registered as hereditary slaves, and 
were treated as property rather than as people of the nation. 
These thought of their lives as han. These four may be called 
the 'fourfold han of Korean people'. Indeed, as the poet Ko 
Eun exclaims, "We Koreans were born from the womb of han and 
brought up in the womb of han."23
2. The Nationalist Reaction To Japanese Interference
And Late Control, 1876-1945
Overview
From the min jung perspective, Korean nationalism and the people's 
consciousness of themselves as possessing a distinct socio­
political identity were not only born out of their han against 
the oppression imposed on them by the Confucian feudal system, 
but also out of opposition to the role of foreign powers (and 
Particularly Japan) in Korea. Nationalism in this context may be 
defined as "a consciousness, on the part of individuals or 
groups, of membership in a nation, or a desire to forward the 
strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation...."24
In 1876, Korea failed to control Japanese violation of its 
territorial waters, and was compelled to open her ports to Japan 
by concluding the 'Treaty of Kanghwa'. The opening of ports had 
conflicting significance in Korean history: on the one hand,
Korea officially entered into the international political system 
and its intellectual, technological and cultural milieu; on the
other hand, she was left wide open to external influence and to 
intervention from Japan and the West.
Similarly, spreading social discontent motivated the Korean 
people to turn to religion. The creed of egalitarian ethics in 
Catholicism, most of all, attracted many people, especially the 
Southerner bureaucratic faction (Namin), which had been excluded 
from the political domain for many decades by the royal in-law 
families and which had followed the teachings of Sirhak 
(Practical Learning) since the seventeenth century. According to 
Ch'on Kwan-u, Korea had already developed a national 
consciousness or self-realization as a nation during the latter 
phases of the Sirhak movement under the reigns of Kings Yongjo 
(1724-1776) and Chongjo (1776-1800).25 However, Yi Chong-sik, 
points out that "Modern nationalism in Korea was to begin as a 
movement against the regime rather than in defense of it"26, 
because elitism amongst Korean royalty and nobility persisted to 
provide a source of national division.
Han Pae-ho, Professor of Political Science at Koryo University, 
argued that the development of a Korean nationalist movement, or 
nationalist ideals, consisted of three distinct phases: the 
first, the Period of Enlightenment” (kaehwa sidae) from when the 
West and Japan demanded the opening of the ports to the March 
First Movement (1876- 1919); the second, the colonial period from 
the March First Movement to liberation (1919-1945); and the 
third, the 'divided period' of Korea from the partition of the 
Korean peninsula to the present (which will be examined, in this 
work, under the separate heading of the 'Opposition Movement 
During the Authoritarian Politics, 1948-1987'.)27 The 
characteristics of these respective phases have been "to guard
the nation's sovereignty in the Great Han Empire [kaehwa sidae], 
to recover sovereignty in the colonial period, and to establish 
one unified nation following the partition of the Korean 
peninsula."28
The First Phase : Early Nationalist Ideals, 1876-1919.
The characteristics of the people during the reform period were 
best represented by two distinct social groups. The first of 
these social groups comprised the instigators of the Peasant 
Tonghak Rebellion of 1894-1895 (Tonghang'nan) , which started as a 
xenophobic movement and focused on rejecting foreign powers, 
emphasising 'Eastern Learning (Tonghak) ' to guard national 
sovereignty. The second group was the Independence Club (Tcngnip 
Hyophoe) of the elite, "the only progressive movement in Korea 
under the old regime... (and) the first of the reformist 
nationalist type"29, inspired by foreign ideas or Western 
Learning (Sohak) which in turn had been inspired by Catholicism. 
Western liberalism was the dominant ideology of the Independence 
Club and its leaders.
Eastern Learning (Tonghak)
Tonghak (Eastern Learning) was initially a religious movement 
which opposed the decadence of the mismanaged Choson kingdom, and 
the increasing influence of foreign powers. Founded by Ch'oe 
Che-u in 1860, Tonghak contained, from the beginning, an element 
of political dynamism which gradually generated a nation-wide 
rebellion of the peasants (1894) and became a real threat to the 
long surviving Yi dynasty (1392-1910). The main doctrine of the 
Tonghak religion was human equality, based on a fundamental 
belief that man and God are one being (In nae ch’on).30 Tonghak 
sought to distinguish and separate Korean religion from all forms
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of Western influence, and to establish an independent national 
spiritual identity, based on Korea's cultural tradition. Hence, 
the name Tonghak referred to the teaching of 'the heavenly way'
(Ch ’on-dogyo) and was essentially different to Western Learning 
(Sohak), mainly Catholicism. The Tonghak formula appealed 
immensely to low class Korean peasants, mainly farmers, because 
it was seen in magical terms, promising ch’on'guk (heaven on 
earth, or utopia) and freedom from all suffering and oppression 
for all its followers. Tonghak was perceived as the only road to 
salvation and provided immediate hope and a vision for a new 
social system.
The Tonghak movement reached its climax in the Rebellion of 1894. 
Led by Chon Pong-jun in Kobu, Cholla Province, the rebels 
demanded that the King rectify the national situation by 
destroying the yangban class, the centre of official corruption. 
The Revolt, with enormous support and response from the rank and 
file, grew too strong for the government to control with its own 
army. Eventually, the government saw it necessary to invite a 
force from Japan with which the revolt was eventually overcome in 
November 1894.
Despite the revolt's failure in military terms, and the 
elimination of its leaders who were all captured and executed, 
the government's decision to seek foreign intervention trapped 
it in an untenable position. The entry of Chinese and Japanese 
troops into the peninsula, at the request of the Choson 
government, provided the pretext for Japan's ambition over Choson 
and, as Japan triumphed in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) this 
ambition was confirmed. Finally, it led Japan to establish a 
protectorate (1905) under the Japanese Resident-General
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{t'ong'gam) before formally annexing Korea as a colony in 1910.
No doubt, Japan's strategy (military and diplomatic), by 
strengthening and expanding its power in stages, worked 
brilliantly.
The Reform of 1894 (Kabo Kyongjang) which followed the Rebellion 
brought revolutionary structural change to Choson society, 
particularly to oppressed and helpless people. It established a 
cabinet system headed by a premier; officially recognised no 
social class status system, so that all officialdom was open to 
all persons with talent; abolished slavery; prohibited the 
practice of early marriage and allowed the remarriage of widows. 
However, cabinet members chosen under the provisions of the 
Reform were sympathetic to Japan, thus securing a greater level 
of Japanese influence. Japan also enjoyed enhanced international 
status, including the diplomatic success of obtaining the 
acquiescence of Britain for an increased role in Choson's 
affairs. Therefore, Japan readily secured international 
recognition for its domination over Choson when she won the war 
with Russia in 1904, thus displacing her chief competitor for 
hegemony in Korea.
The Independence Club (Tongnip Hyophoe)
The Tongnip Hyophoe was founded in 1896 by American educated Dr 
So Chae-p'il (Philip Jason), with initial membership drawn from 
the Kongyang Club organised by Yu Kil-jun and other leading 
figures from the 1894 reforms, and from the Chongdong Club led by 
Yun Ch'i-ho and Yi Sang-jae who were actively engaged in the 
nation's diplomatic affairs. The Club was a political 
organisation with progressive ideas and thinking through which 
they sought to reconstruct Choson society into a new social and
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political order. Its aim was to achieve national independence 
because "...the restoration of a nation which had fallen from 
grace depended on the ethical and spiritual renewal of 
individuals."31 Tongnip Hyophoe was an elite organization which 
embraced the ideology of Western Liberalism based on 
egalitarianism, and provided a new intellectual channel for 
political and educational development. In addition, the Tongnip 
Hyophoe provided, with the help of American missionaries, a 
sanctuary for nationalists and intellectuals who were in need of 
help either physically or spiritually. In this regard, the role 
of Christian churches, particularly Protestant (the first 
missionary arrived in 1884), was as eminent as the role of Yun 
Ch'i-ho.
The influence of the Independence Club was largely exercised 
through its publication, the Tongnip Sinmun (The Independent), 
and a series of public debates (Manmin Kondonghoe) , both of which 
substantially advanced public awareness and understanding of 
Western liberal ideas. Moreover, it produced the first vernacular 
script (han'gul) newspaper and, for the first time in Korean 
history, provided a medium for delivering opposition views. The 
Club made strong calls for a constitutional government with a 
parliamentary system, and the rule of law. These calls, however, 
were symptomatic of the dilemma experienced by its members, as 
they had no structure or strategy, based on experience of 
liberalism in a Korean context, with which to pursue their 
objectives.
When the government perceived that the Club's intentions were to 
establish a republic with an elected president, it ordered the 
Club's dissolution and the arrest of its key members. However,
its influence had been inspirational and exemplary to the 
modernisation movement, particularly to the growth in 
consciousness of building a 'nation-state'. Many former members 
of the Tongnip Hyophoe became prominent leaders of the First 
Republic of Korea, such as, Syngman Rhee, and other leaders of 
the nationalist movement during the last phases of Japanese 
colonial rule.
The Second Phase : Nationalist Developments During
Colonial Period, 1920-1945
March First Movement
The foremost objective of the nationalist elite during the 
Japanese colonial period, more specifically from 1920 to 1945, 
was to recover the nation's sovereignty from Japan and to 
establish a liberated nation-state. This collective purpose, was 
initiated by the public proclamation of the Korean 'Declaration 
of Independence' at Pagoda Park in Seoul on 1 March, 1919, known 
as the March First Movement. Inspired by the principle 
established by the President of the United States of America, 
Woodrow Wilson, the principle of national self-determination, the 
March First Movement led a nationwide protest and independence 
movement against Japanese military rule, known as the 
'gendarmerie police rule'(mudan chongch’i). The Movement involved 
over two million people within a two month period 32 following 
the proclamation of the 'Declaration of Independence'.
Organized by religious leaders and educational bodies, largely 
Christian and those belonging to Ch'ondo-gyo (Religion of the 
Heavenly Way- the renamed Tonghak religion), the Movement 
demonstrated unprecedented solidarity among all Koreans. The 
Movement was entirely non-violent. The thirty-three signatories
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to the Declaration of Independence voluntarily informed the 
authorities of their action soon after their proclamation and 
were all arrested. The impact of the March First Movement was 
profound on the fundamentals of socio-political development in 
the emergent Korean society, and on the national consciousness of 
the Korean minjung.
Internally, the Movement ignited a self-realisation among the 
Korean people of their homogeneous ethnicity. In addition, the 
Movement forced the Japanese government to change its colonial 
policy from gendarmerie police rule (mudan chongch'i) to a 
so-called 'enlightened administration (munhwa chongch'i)', 
allowing less stringent controls on nationalist activities 
including the press and other expressions of freedom. It also 
expanded the educational provisions for Koreans. The March First 
Movement also drew out the egalitarian spirit of the Christian 
churches and their commitment to people in need by providing 
leadership for the Movement and providing shelter to political 
and social-intellectual fugitives.33
Externally, the Movement provided the impetus for many expatriate 
Korean nationalist associations to amalgamate, with the formation 
of 'provisional' governments in Manchuria, Shanghai and Seoul, 
which were later incorporated into the Provisional Government of 
the Republic of Korea (Taehan Min’guk Imsi Chonghu) located in 
Shanghai under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. In addition, the 
Movement also served as a propaganda initiative, promoting 
internationally the Korean people’s determination and solidarity 
in their desire for independence, and drawing world attention to 
the cruelty of the Japanese colonial ruler. This message was 
further promulgated by special envoys despatched by the Movement
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as its representatives to a number of world organisations. These 
developments were actively publicised in the Independence News 
(Tongnip Sinmun), also a product of the March First Movement.
Factional Divisions And The Emergence Of
Communist/Socialist Movements
Ideological and factional divisions, however, continued to be the 
most detrimental feature of nationalist movements after the March 
First Movement, particularly after the 1930’s. Internally and 
externally various groups sought alternative strategems to fight 
the Japanese. They soon realised, however, that the West, and 
specifically America's Wilsonian theory of self-determination, 
was not exactly "...Good News from Heaven"34 or of any practical 
use for the Korean independence movement. Their excessively 
ideological approach to the need to combat the Japanese, led to 
disillusionment and division. Some, such as Yi Tong-hwi, became 
convinced of the need to militarize and rely on socialism or 
Marxism, some followed Syngman Rhee's belief that greater 
emphasis had to be placed on diplomacy, whilst others turned to 
An Ch'ang-ho's gradualism. The disintegration of Korean 
nationalists was one of the most distinct outcomes of Japanese 
colonisation, dividing not only the people but the entire nation 
into irreconcilable divisions. Both right-wing nationalists, and 
the left-wing communists or socialists were seen by many as focal 
points for opposition to Japan and as potential founders of a new 
Korean society.
The Japanese 'enlightened administration policy', which appeared 
to relax political repression, had effectively set up 'a 
splitting manoeuvre', ruthlessly and deliberately pitting one 
Korean against the other, particularly nationalist against
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communist or socialist. And although the 'gendarmerie police 
force policy' was abolished, local police numbers increased 
substantially. Factions proliferated amongst both the communists 
and the nationalists. The notable Communist groups were the 
Korean Communist Party (Koryo Kongsandang) and the Choson 
Communist Party.
The New Stem Association (Sin'ganhoe)
Despite their differences the nationalists and Communists in late 
1926 succeeded in negotiating a common view and, in February 
1927, formed a united nationalist organisation, The New Stem 
Association (Sin 'ganhoe) under the presidency of Yi Sang-jae who 
was known as a 'moderate nationalist of the left'. The Sin'ganhoe 
obtained legal approval for its formation relatively smoothly 
because the so-called 'enlightened administration policy' was 
still operative. Its members engaged themselves actively, as a 
nationalist organisation, in the various issues confronting 
Korean people at that time, such as education, Korean language 
teaching in schools, exploitation of Korean workers by Japanese 
agencies such as the Oriental Development Company, and industry 
policies which had forced many Koreans to emigrate to Manchuria 
and Japan.
This alliance of Communists with nationalists in 1927 had been 
largely influenced by developments in Japan where the Comintern 
position was that Communism should work towards a broad coalition 
of progressive multi-class forces as well as to struggle to gain 
power. Korean Marxists, returning from Japan in 1926, had urged 
that a broad united front of Korean people be established. The 
move towards unity continued with the establishment of the 
People's Prosperity Society {Minhunghoe) and a nationalist party
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preparation committee in Vladivostok. The impact of the 
Sin 'ganhoe was exemplary and inspirational to all Koreans, 
particularly to those who fought against the Japanese. Membership 
of the organisation increased to nearly 30,000 throughout the 
country.
The Communists had been happy to combine with the moderates and 
non-Communist radicals, as they had been subject to close police 
attention and found it more convenient to work through the 
alliance. Moreover, in contrast with nationalists abroad, leaders 
of Sin 'ganhoe in Korea were conscious of potential police 
reprisals on their members and thus had to work within legitimate 
organisations and activities to achieve their ends, but without a 
unified ideological base their unity failed to develop 
sustainable philosophical content. The constant Japanese 
crackdown on Korean Communists weakened the left wing of the 
Sin'ganhoe, whose elected officers became increasingly right 
wing, concerned about its future as a legal organisation. 
Consequently, many Communists began to argue for the dissolution 
of the Sin'ganhoe and were further encouraged in their position 
by the Comintern which in December 1929 stated:
"...the Communists of Korea must strictly preserve the full 
independence of the revolutionary labour movement which must 
be definitely dissociated from all the revolutionary struggle 
demands, temporary collaboration, and under some conditions 
even a temporary alliance of the Communist Party and 
national-revolutionary movement."35
By the time the Kwangju student demonstration broke out in 1929, 
however, the Shin'ganhoe had reached its limits. It failed to
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overcome the obstacles that had arisen internally and externally, 
including factional strife within the Communist wing, pressure 
from the Japanese authorities, and the organisation's own 
disintegration. It appeared to the Communists that the 
revolutionary labour movement was about to be absorbed into the 
bourgeois nationalist movement. A national conference of the 
Sin’ganhoe in May 1931 formally dissolved 'the national coalition 
of the Korean people'.
After 1931, the ascendancy of the military in Japanese politics 
altered the relative tolerance that the Japanese Government had 
displayed in the 1920s. The Japanese demanded that the Koreans 
support their cause in Manchuria and elsewhere. Japan's obvious 
international might influenced Koreans to compromise their 
situation rather than challenge this world power. Communists and 
traditional nationalists had therefore little room to manoeuvre 
after 1933. Many leading Japanese Communists abandoned Communism 
and swore allegiance to the Emperor and many Korean Communists 
followed suit. They saw the Japanese military as liberating Asia. 
But not all went in this direction, for some recognised signs of 
weakness in the Japanese Empire, especially its withdrawal from 
the League of Nations and internal political conflict.
The victory in the marathon at the Berlin Olympics in 1936 by Son 
Ki-jong (participating as a member of the Japanese national team) 
certainly revived nationalist spirit. The event was well 
exploited by the press to boost Korean pride and the superiority 
of the Korean people. However, even this event brought police 
reprisals as the Tonga Ilbo and Choson Chungang Ilbo had deleted 
the Japanese emblem from Son's uniform in the photograph 
promoting a newsreel film of the race.
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Continued economic exploitation sustained the hatred of Koreans 
for the Japanese, but the nationalist movement, under the 
stringent assimilation policy of General Minami after 1936, came 
to a virtual halt. The Japanese cleverly pressured many 
nationalists into becoming collaborators, but others believed in 
the need to strengthen the nation in terms of economy, education 
and politics if a hope for independence was to be sustained. This 
theme had its forerunners in the Independence Club and the New 
People's Association (Sinminhoe). Nationalist Yi Kwang-su wrote, 
"The only way to cultivate the strength of the nation was through 
strengthening individuals and organising them ...a revolutionary 
movement in a sovereign nation is easier abroad, but a similar 
movement for a people without sovereignty is easier within the 
country."36 He called for greater morality, acquisition of 
modern knowledge, improved personal and social life, and the 
accumulation of wealth.
With this nationalistic objective, many native industries were 
established. Slogans promoting Korean products (Mulsan Changryo 
Undong) were popularised and Japanese products were boycotted as 
much as possible. Marxists, however, considered that such a 
gradualist 'strengthening Korea' policy was designed to enrich 
the rich and exploit the poor. Being more directly relevant in 
their aims to the aspirations of common workers, Marxist groups 
were more influential in farmer and labour organisations.
When the Sino-Japanese war commenced in 1937, Korea became a 
military depot with drastic implications for Korea. Everything 
had to be dedicated to the war effort. To suppress increased 
popular discontent the police force was augmented, newpapers were 
shut down, and The Korean Federation of the Japanese 'Movement
for the general Mobilization of the National Spirit' was 
established (September 1937 in Japan, July 1938 in Korea) with an 
elaborate network of han (squads), kimi (teams) and cho (streets) 
in each administrative unit. As food rationing was controlled 
through this network, it was very effective.
Koreans also, for the first time, were now conscripted into the 
Japanese military. This action was the final step in an 
accelerated assimilation policy. Korean language teaching in 
schools was replaced with Japanese and students were forbidden 
even to converse in Korean. Totalitarian rule after 1937 left 
little scope for nationalist activity. Some nationalists were in 
fact so impressed by Japanese strength that they collaborated 
with the Regime, hoping Korea would share in Japanese expansion. 
Students, however, retained a "national revolutionary 
consciousness... they promote opposition between Japanese and 
Koreans... and lately the students have been resorting to the most 
cunning and skillful methods."37 Their degree of nationalism was 
surprising considering their intensive indoctrination through 
Japanese education. Many developed their national consciousness 
by reading Yi Kwang-su's works and those of other nationalist 
leaders. Many became underground communists when they became 
convinced that only massive class warfare could achieve results.
3. Anti-Japanese Nationalism as a Source for 
Minjung Historiography
The people's positive attitude towards the nationalist movement 
during the Japanese colonial period is abundantly evident, if 
only because it was maintained for over forty years. However, the 
Korean nationalist movement, as a socio-political anti-colonial 
movement seeking the liberation of an oppressed people, lacked
73
any coherence or rationale to effectively accommodate the 
aspirations of the nation and the people. Korean nationalism, in 
this regard, was fragmentary and without sound foundation (See 
Chapter 2 for further discussion on nationalism). Furthermore, 
most leaders (as well as most intellectuals) were basically 
frustrated individuals who, on the one hand, aspired to ideals of 
liberation but, on the other, supported only uncompromising 
authoritarian factionalism and parochialism based on Confucian 
traditions.
Examples of factionalism were numerous and all too consistent: 
viewed chronologically they were manifest in the divisions 
between Confucians and the Westernisers; Tonghaks and the 
'Independence Club'; the pro-and anti-Japanese groups; post 1919 
divisions (gradualists, socialists, nationalists and the 
divisions within the ’Provisional Government'); the brief history 
of the 'Sin’ganhoe', a (particularly telling illustration); and 
factions in the Korean Communist Party.
The minjung historiography of the 1970s interpreted the tactics 
of Communism of the colonial period, in particular, as the 
"tactics of liberation of the oppressed people...."38 This 
interpretation has attracted many intellectuals and students and 
has provided a new philosophical and ideological base for 
nationalist (viewed by some as communist) rhetoric, such as 
'people's democracy'(minjung minju-juui), 'people's nationalism'
(minjung minjok-juui), and 'national liberation' (minjok 
haebang) . Prominent examples of this new approach to history were 
the two university factions, "Committee for Struggles against 
Imperialism and Fascism and for the People and Democracy"
(Minmint ’u) and "Committee for Anti-US and Anti-Fascist
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Struggles, Independence and Democratisation" (Chamint’u) of the 
late 1980s. Their members were convinced that Korea's 
contemporary leftist movements, as those of the colonial period, 
genuinely aimed to achieve the liberation of the Korean people. 
Kang Man-gil, former Professor of Sociology at Koryo University, 
argued this point, reiterating a statement by historian, Cho 
Chi-h'un, as follows:
"The socialist movement under the colonial period was also 
part of the resistance movement, independence movement and 
nation-building movement. And depending on circumstances it 
often also followed the same direction as the rightist 
nationalist movement... the "Communist movement until 
liberation, can not be excluded from the history of the 
nationalist movement because of its tendency, from its early 
stages, towards nationalist-socialism or socialist- 
nationalism, and because these approaches mutually affected 
one another.""39
4. Conclusion
Despite the logical flaws prevalent in concepts of min jung, the 
historiographical interpretation of history reinstated national 
aspirations to transform Korea's political system into a 
'participatory democracy' and to achieve national reunification 
through a revival and expansion of minjung culture. To this end, 
nationalist sentiment, hinged on culture and history, became the 
most significant impetus of minjung historiography and set a new 
direction for Korea's identity, both as a nation and as a people. 
In this sense, minjung historiography was a restatement of the 
Korean people's aspirations.
My assessment of the impact of historiography led to a complex 
question: to what extent was min jung historiography a restatement 
of the Korean people's aspirations; what were the key elements of 
these aspirations; and how did these aspirations relate to the 
aspirations of the state? In order to answer these questions, it 
was vital to delineate the historiographical characteristics that 
aroused the aspirations of the Korean people, reinstated their 
corporate spirit and ultimately forged them into an opposition 
force.
Three main aspects of Korea and her people were manifest in this 
historiography: historical continuity, a single nationality, and 
a corporate spirit. In regard to the first, minjung proponents 
held that Korea had continued as a unified country since the 
seventh century A.D. until partition in 1945, an event seen by 
the minjung proponents as the outcome of inevitably malign 
foreign influence. Secondly, the Korean nation as a homogeneous 
race, according to minjung historians, has been indestructible. 
The minjung view was that the ethnic tradition of the Korean 
people has been sustained for over a millennium, despite numerous 
foreign invasions and occupations. On this basis, the Korean 
people identify themselves as the "Han minjok", which indicates 
both "Korean nation" and "Korean race"40 Thirdly, the corporate 
spirit of the Korean people, according to minjung historians, is 
two-fold: on the one hand, it is rooted in socio-political 
oppression, especially the 'tyranny of the rulers' under the Yi 
dynasty (thus the spirit of grievances, or han); on the other, it 
has historically been the source of energy which has enabled the 
"minjung to overcome with their own power the external conditions 
which determine and confine them, and become the subjects who 
determine their own social situation and destiny."41 This
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corporate spirit of the Korean people, according to the minjung 
proponents, has also been root of the Korean 'min jung- 
nationalism', the people's historical struggle for defending the 
nation, and can be traced through historical records such as 
Samguk Yusa (a collection of historical stories edited by Il-yon 
in A. D. 1281) of the Koryo Kingdom.42
The development of Korean history, according to the minjung view, 
was therefore maintained due to the historical continuity of the 
people's struggle and aspirations for liberation. So Nam-dong, 
who professed minjung history as the means to express and relieve 
"the reality of the minjung and their corporate spirit"43, 
summarises the characteristics of minjung history as interpreted 
by Yi Ki-baek, as follows:
"To summarise this [Korea's] historical development: first, 
for a long time, the minjung were the objects of the ruling 
power. Second, the minjung did not attempt to become the 
ruling power through a revolutionary process, but prepared 
the way to bring about a historical transformation. Third, 
step by step, the minjung prepared the ground to become the 
ruling power.
This is a meaningful paradigm for minjung theology which 
shows that the minjung gradually liberate themselves from the 
position of being a historical object and become a historical 
subject. Minjung history and theology testify to the fact 
that the minjung overcome with their own power the external 
conditions which determine and confine them, and become the 
subjects who determine their own social situation and 
destiny."44
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It is evident that min jung history, centring upon the people's 
aspiration, has been the history of whatever popular social base 
has existed for political power. At the same time, the voice of 
the minjung has historically been the barometer for political 
stability. These characteristics of minjung historiography were 
pivotal to the Minjung Movement of the 1970s and 1980s when an 
extremely authoritarian social order, the Yushin system, was 
imposed upon the people. Moreover, the timing of the Movement's 
new interpretation of history coincided with economic development 
which when combined with the popular impact of minjung 
historiography enhanced both the consciousness and the power of 
the people. Kim Chong-p'il, Prime Minister at the time of the 
introduction of the Yushin system in 1972, postulated economic 
growth as the precondition of democracy. Kim said, "When per 
capita GNP becomes one thousand dollars, the spectrum of the 
people's freedom will accordingly be widened."45 On the other 
hand, the breathtaking transformation of Korea's economic status 
from "a per capita GNP of about $100 in 1963 ... [to] nearly 
$5,000 as the year 1990 began...." was widely regarded, 
especially by minjung proponents, to be nothing but "the miracle 
of the [people's] han."46
Chapter Three
MINJUNG BACKGROUND TO
POLITICAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT AND RADICALISM
1. Opposition Movement During the Authoritarian Politics,
1948-1987
The development of Korea's political system from 1948 provided 
impetus to the development of the Minjung Movement. The doubtful 
legitimacy of the Syngman Rhee regime, the seizure of power by 
the military, and the heightened authoritarianism of the 1970s 
and 1980s, all encouraged an atmosphere of total rejection of 
official regime politics. This atmosphere was further stimulated 
by the perceived connection of foreigners, and especially the US, 
in these episodes. Amongst critics of the government, and indeed 
most citizens interested in political affairs, an attitude of 
utter resistance became common. Opposition to the government thus 
emerged almost as an end in itself. In this atmosphere, the 
minjung idea readily took on a political form. Informed by a 
comprehensive and non-compromising moral view, and seeking to 
mobilize the common people into an upsurge of social and 
political renewal, minjung proponents became leading actors in 
the resistance to the government, and opposition figures adopted 
minjung rhetoric to justify their manoeuvres. Kim Tae-jung (Kim 
Dae Jung), opposition leader of the Party for Peace and Democracy 
(PPD) wrote:
"From a political and social standpoint, the twentieth 
century might be deemed the beginning of the era of the 
masses. If we are to overcome the greatest crises in our 
history, that is, the division of our fatherland and the
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threat of communism, and attain genuine security, economic 
growth, and unification, the masses must be seen as the major 
force of destiny and must be treated as the master. They must 
rise to the challenge of controlling their own destiny."l
These words closely reflected those of the most militant 
opposition group, the student anti-government movement, which as 
early as October 1973, stated:
"We stood up today because we could not bear to be idle 
spectators to the realities which threaten the right to 
survival of masses of our people. Corruption, injustice, 
oppression and poverty have driven the whole of the populace 
into terrible despair. Those who exploit the Minjung [people] 
arrogantly perpetuate injustice."2
'Minjung' and 'han', the pivotal rhetoric of 'social injustice', 
thus became the most influential and popular themes of the 
opposition movement.
The Syngman Rhee Regime
The partitioning of Korea in 1945, according to most Koreans, was 
both a mistake and a tragedy. It reflected the national interests 
of the great powers but failed in any way to consider the 
consequences for the Korean people. The Cairo Communique of 1943 
stated, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, (the 
US, Great Britain and China) are determined that in due course 
Korea shall become free and independent."3 Naively, it was 
thought that the partition would be "purely a temporary one to 
facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops in that country."4 
Its motivation had little to do with Korea or its people, but was
rather founded on US and Soviet political objectives. Whilst the 
Korean people at all levels had developed a strong national 
consciousness focussed for more than thirty years of colonial 
rule on independence, they were totally unprepared for 
independence and the state building that was urgently required 
when it came.Many Koreans returned from Japan, China and 
elsewhere to participate in the Committee for the Preparation of 
Korean Independence (CPKI). One particular branch of this 
Committee, the 'people's committees' (inmin wiwonhoe) was 
especially popular in parts of the countryside and had expanded 
to a total of 145 committees by September 1945. The Korean 
People's Republic (KPR), which was totally ignored by the 
American occupation forces led by General John R. Hodge, was, in 
fact, the body of representatives of the 'people's committees.'
Although the history of the post war period is very complex, the 
revisionist account of these years offered by Bruce Cumings has 
gained enormous popularity in Korea. Those of minjung sympathies 
often quote his work in order to reject the legitimacy of the 
South Korean political order established in 1948. The decisions 
made by the US forces during its occupation, according to Bruce 
Cumings, "determined the fundamental political structure of 
postwar South Korea."5 Moreover, political dependency on the 
United States led to "critical choices...that shaped the 
conditions in which rightist autocracy could emerge 
triumphant..." 6 not only in the confusing years of the postwar 
period (1945-1948), but also throughout Korean politics since. 
The US forces chose "the classical instruments of rule: army, 
police, bureaucracy, judiciary"7 of Korean authoritarian 
politics, and eradicated any organization, such as the KPR which 
existed "with its allied people's committees, labor unions, and
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peasant organizations throughout the peninsula...."8 The task of 
the US forces after their entry into Korea in 1945, according to 
Cumings, was:
"...seeking a separate force to displace, or to provide a 
counterforce to, the organizations of the Left. Their goal 
was to build a bulwark to stem the tide of Soviet-inspired 
and domestic revolution."9
The people's loyalties, however, were divided between the 
nationalists and communists with many being members of both 
groupings. Their loyalties pre-dated independence and partition, 
but after 1945 the conservative wing of the nationalists created 
the political system of South Korea, and the communists and some 
nationalists created the North Korean system. Whilst in the North 
Kim Il-song's (Kim II Sung) faction gradually eliminated all 
rivals, in the South there was bitter rivalry between left and 
right nationalists. The right conservative leaders returning from 
exile and those who had gained status and administrative skills 
under the Japanese, won the support of US forces.
In this political climate, Syngman Rhee, the President of the 
First Republic, found his power-base as well as his political 
legitimacy in the cause of anti-Communism. Furthermore, the 
National security Law (NSL), which Rhee introduced in November 
1948, became the greatest weapon in Rhee's consolidation of his 
one-man rule. The Law was quite legal, for the 1948 constitution 
prohibited "any restrictions on freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association 'except as specified by law.'"10 
Rhee's rule was characterised by ad hoc resolutions, corruption 
and favoritism, and represented a marked antithesis to his claim
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to be creating a democratic political order along American lines. 
His style was arbitrary and authoritarian, even amending the 
Constitution (twice, in 1952 and 1954) to allow himself to be 
reelected. In this regard, the Liberal Party, which had been 
established by Rhee in late 1951, was his perfect tool because 
its members were largely an "assortment of opportunists...
[driven] by a desire for power and loyalty to Rhee..."11 and, 
therefore, provided unlimited support to Rhee's personal wishes.
By late 1950, especially after the Korean war (1950-1953), Korea 
had no leadership that could maintain an opposition movement, let 
alone contest Rhee's authority. Most of the potential competitors 
of Rhee were either 'eliminated' or assassinated, or had moved to 
the North as a result of the partition. Rhee also eliminated by 
execution the popular socialist candidate for presidency in 1952 
and 1956, Cho Pong-am, for violating the NSL. In this regard, 
America's self-interest in preserving a "bulwark against 
communism"12 in the Korean peninsula helped Rhee to establish his 
legitimacy and to justify stifling his opponents through the NSL.
The Rhee regime abruptly came to an end after rigging the 
elections of March 15 1960. The people, especially students, 
poured out into the streets of Masan (a port city in Kyongsang 
province) on April 11, when they discovered that a seventeen-year 
old youth, who had been killed during a street demonstration 
against the rigging, had been dumped in a bay near Masan by the 
police. The April Student Revolution, at its peak on April 19 
1960, ended Syngman Rhee's First Republic and led to the 
acceptance of the new President, Chang Myon and his Democratic 
Party which succeeded the interim government of Ho Chong. The 
fact that Rhee's rule was only made possible by foreign
intervention, and was ultimately brought down by mass action, is 
often used by minjung proponents to argue that the political 
foundation laid for the republic by his rule should be wholly 
rejected. Song Kon-ho, prominent minjung author, for example, 
wrote as follows:
On examinination, the twelve years of the political history 
of the Syngman Rhee regime....[show that he was] a terrifying 
destroyer of democracy.... In order to extend his power, he 
never hesitated to commit crime, ignoring law, order, 
principle and integrity, and perpetuated his rule by being 
re-elected as president.... The twelve years of the Rhee 
regime became increasingly chaotic because it became 
obssessed with maintaining the regime and wasted time 
destroying freedom and democracy. As the saying goes, any 
political system which distrusts or is hostile towards its 
own people will inevitably depend on foreign powers. The 
regime led by the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) was a typical 
example of this. Syngman Rhee who had earlier stressed 
’reduction of foreign aid', including in his inaugural 
address, had in fact depended on American aid from the 
beginning of his rule to the time he was dismissed from the 
Presidency in 1960.M13
The Pak Chong-hui Regime
On May 16 1961, however, the Chang government was subject to a 
military coup led by Major General Pak Chong-hui. The Second 
Republic had survived less than a year whilst the nation was 
embroiled in factional conflict, not only within the ruling 
Democratic Party, but also within almost every political and 
social institution, including the military. In this respect, the
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emergence of the Pak regime was the outcome of social and 
political chaos which had resulted from factional conflict and 
the failure to clean up the corruption bequeathed by the Rhee 
era. The cleaning-up of corruption, particularly of politicians 
and bureaucrats was, therefore, the initial justification for the 
coup. Again the process of democratisation was interrupted. 
Political parties were suspended, elections prohibited, civil 
rights suspended and 'old' politicians banned from activity. More 
than 4,000 former politicians were banned from political activity 
for a period of six years under the 'purification law.'
Authoritarian rule by the military thus began in Korea and from 
then on Pak's virtual one-man show took various forms (until his 
assassination in 1979): his military regime led by the Supreme 
Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) (1961-1963); a quasi- 
competitive political system (1963-1972); and his dictatorial 
system (1972-1979). Of these, the dictatorial system (also known 
as the Yushin system) became the focus of the people's opposition 
movement throughout the 1970s.
The most distinct characteristic of the Pak regime was its 
determination to build national wealth and power. Pak was aware 
that, in the longer term, his political power was based on his 
ability to achieve economic development and modernization. As 
much as Pak was driven by this determination, he concentrated on 
eliminating potential political threats, gathering domestic 
intelligence through his creation of the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) (established in June 1961), and 
developing both national wealth and his personal power-base. By 
1971, Korea was economically wealthier than it had ever been
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(annual exports reached one billion dollars) and Pak's power-base 
also looked solid. However, Pak experienced a personal ordeal in 
the Presidential election of April 1971, which he barely won with 
a narrow margin: only 946,928 votes ahead of Kim Tae-jung. 
Moreover, changes in international politics irked Pak, for he 
felt threatened by such regional developments as the US-China 
rapprochements of 1971-72, the normalization of relations between 
Japan and China (PRC), and the relaxation of tension between the 
US and Soviet Union. Pak reacted with avid use of martial law and 
'Emergency Measures.'
On 17 October 1972, Pak Chong-hui declared martial law, 
suspending the constitution, dissolving the National Assembly and 
restricting freedom of speech. He then announced a new political 
order termed the 'Yushin' system (or 'revitalizing reform') 
which, according to Pak, was a 'Korean-style democracy.' He 
argued that the Korean people must accept this 'Korean-style 
democracy' because, without it, Korea could not achieve the 
national aspirations of unification and prosperity. Pak argued 
that the declaration of the Yushin system was:
"in response to the ardent aspirations of the Korean people 
for peace, unification and prosperity of our fatherland... 
(and to) readjust...political institutions in order that the 
difficult but invaluable North-South dialogue can most 
effectively be backed up by these elements of vigour and 
vitality."14
The introduction of the Yushin system, however, rocked the 
nation, and subsequently there emerged an instant coalition of 
opposition groups comprised of students, politicians,
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intellectuals, as well as Christian groups. They argued that the 
Yushin system amounted to nothing more than dictatorship, and 
that the government's gestures in regard to inter-Korean dialogue 
about unification were "...merely a pretext for prolonging 
authoritarian power."15 The opposition argued:
"Democracy is the national aim of the Republic of Korea.
Hence the legitimacy of the ROK lies in democracy. Therefore, 
democracy cannot be restricted for any reason.... [Democracy 
is] is the attitude and belief that aims at promoting the 
interests, rights and happiness of every member of society, 
creating and continuously improving the best in society in 
accordance with the will of those who constitute the society 
as its members."16
The Yushin Constitution (promulgated on 27 December 1972) 
empowered the President as "constitutionally the national leader" 
positioned "above the three branches of executive, legislative 
and judiciary"17, to suspend basic civil and political rights, to 
be exempt from judicial review and to control internal, foreign, 
defence, economic, financial and judicial affairs. The Yushin 
Constitution, therefore, was not only the "attempt to vest most 
government power in the president..."18, but also the political 
machinery for changing Korea's structure into the authoritarian 
regime of Pak's government.
Furthermore, 'Emergency Measures' were designed to repress any 
dissent. Emergency Measure No.4 (April 3, 1974) focussed on the 
student activist movement, the National Democratic Youth and 
Student Federation. The proclamation of the Presidential 
Emergency Measure (PEM) No.9 in May 13, 1975, outlawed political
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action, all forms of criticism, student political activities, and 
spreading 'false rumours', all in the so-called interest of 
national unity and in defence against North Korea. Under the 
'Emergency Measures', 203 individuals were tried and 8 sentenced 
to death and executed in April 1975. The opposition movement, 
particularly the Korean Christian movement for human rights, 
emerged as a force challenging the ruling hegemony, in order to 
fight for democratic processes and the rights of citizens. The 
movement demanded: firstly, a restoration of the constitution 
which guaranteed the power of the three arms of government, 
namely, the legislature, the judiciary, and the administration; 
and secondly, the preservation of citizens' rights, individual 
persons' rights, and the rights of workers.
The 'March First Declaration for the Salvation of the Nation', in 
1976, was the most significant political protest against the 
Yushin system, articulating the theoretical basis for the 
opposition, especially the anti-government movement and thus the 
Minjung Movement. It argued that a democratic state must be 
founded on "the principles of the separation of powers and 
provision for [the people's] political participation."19 It also 
demanded that the democratic concept of people power denoted by 
the phrase, 'from the people', should take priority over concepts 
of the public good 'for the people' in a democracy. This min jung 
logic provided students with the rationale for their denunciation 
of Yushin policy which they saw as "degrading all state apparatus 
into mere embellishments of fascist rule by making the 
legislative and judicial branches handmaids of the executive 
branch."20 It is noteworthy that this 'from the people' notion 
was progressively developed into the radical minjung ideology 
(minjung minju-jui) of the 1980s.
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The Declaration, signed by twelve prominent civil rights leaders, 
including Kim Tae-jung, Mun Ik-hwan and Yun Po-son, demonstrated 
most forcefully their concerns about issues of freedom, equality, 
human rights and the future of democratic institutions of 
government. The opposition rejected the legitimacy of the Yushin 
system on the basis that the system had been "accepted in a 
national referendum under martial law."21 Moreover, the 
opposition, through Kim Tae-jung and other human rights leaders, 
argued that Pak's claims of firstly linking Yushin with 
unification, and subsequently with national security, were false, 
as Yushin was simply a means of perpetuating his power. Kim Tae- 
jung claimed:
"The government said that the Yushin Constitution was 
essential for unification instituting the National Conference 
for Unification as supreme organ of the state [namely, the 
depository of national sovereignty]. President Park [Pak] 
then threatened the people that if they did not support this 
Constitution, he would consider that they also did not want 
unification.... Within less than a year, the rationale has 
been changed so that the Yushin system is now necessary for 
national security. Nobody says it is required for unification 
any more....In other words, its object lay in perpetuating 
power, not in unificaion."22
Henceforth, the opposition movement was no longer restricted to 
students and church groups, but also included intellectuals, 
journalists, professors, workers, farmers and labourers.
Kim Chi-ha, one of the most active member of the Christian 
movement for human rights in the 1970s, condemned the regime
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through his poem, 'Cry of the People' (1974) . Kim wrote :
"Hear our cry! Hear our cry! Crying out of aching hunger. 
Patience quickly running out! Can we long believe this ruler?
"Bodies weary from low wages now are dying of high prices. 
Will we see "Abundant Eighties", or first be downed by 
gnawing hunger?
"Modernization! Nation-building! Nicknames of foreign power's 
yoke.
Korea's treaty with Japan swung wide the door of treason. 
Foreign capital seduced us; our economy was raped.
"A privileged few acquire wealth, corruption surpassing that 
of old.
"Ceaseless progress! The law is scrapped for a dynasty's 
perpetuation.
Development's main purpose: to rationalize dictatorship;
"Abundant Seventies" never found except in propaganda's 
prattle.
Profiteering by foreign industry cannot go without 
restriction!
"To improve the investment environment, compradors appear; 
Tax exemptions, transfer rights, offered like ancestral 
gifts;
But rights of labor brutally suppressed, special laws are
written;
"Industrial zones, export centers, create only regional 
gaps; The logic of capital growth favors only big business; 
Small businesses go bankrupt; monopoly is rampant."23
The publication of this poem, which was intended to stimulate and 
express the people's rage over foreign domination, political 
represssion, corruption and the exploitation of labour, led Kim 
to his second imprisonment (April 1974) and to a death sentence 
(never executed) in the same year in July. Kim's literary works, 
including 'Five Thieves', 'Groundless Rumours', 'Malttuk',
'Sacred Place' and 'Chang Il-dam" (which will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Six), had a powerful impact on the human 
rights movement of the 1970s, and ultimately sparked the 
phenomenon of the Minjung Movement of the 1980s.
The Chon Tu-hwan Regime
Chon Tu-hwan emerged as the leader of the new military junta 
established after President Pak's assassination on October 26, 
1979. As military coup leader, Chon seized power ruthlessly by 
eliminating his enemies and opposition (both politically and 
militarily) with the help of two key conspirators, No T'ae-u (Roh 
Tae Woo) and Chong Ho-yong. Although President Ch'oe Kyu-ha, who 
took over the acting Presidency immediately after Pak's 
assassination, remained in this chair until his resignation on 
August 16 1980, the real power was entirely with the Military 
Civilian Standing Committee headed by General Chon.
Chon and his clique arrested numerous opposition leaders while, 
at the same time, restricting civil liberties. All these actions 
were carried out under the Emergency Measures which had been 
introduced by the struggling interim government through Martial
Law Decree No. 10 on 17 May 1980. As with Pak before him, Chon 
ruled through "coercive instruments and by monopolizing the state 
apparatus."24 The Korean people reacted with a passion. In 
particular, Kim Tae-jung's arrest led to the Kwangju riots, where 
the people of that region actually forced the military to abandon 
the city, but were ultimately put down in a bloody battle in the 
streets of Kwangju (Kwangju Hangjaeng) .25 Within ten months,
Chon not only took total control of the army, but also acceded to 
the Presidency. Chon was elected president by the National 
Council for Unification (NCU) on 30 August 1980, only two weeks 
after President Ch'ae's resignation. Although Korea was now 
rated as one of the 'newly industrialised countries (NICs)' and 
an 'advanced developing country (ADC)', socio-economic 
modernisation had failed to produce political democracy.
The opposition political parties in the 1980s, however, became 
fragmented and lacking the right leadership, showed no 
inclination to form a coalition. The Chon government rather 
feared an alliance between students and labour, or between labour 
and Christian groups. New Labour Laws in 1980-81 attempted to 
prevent Christian groups from organising and mobilizing unions. 
Public reaction to Chon was negative. He was seen as aligned to 
and dependent upon the US, so much so that an anti-Chon stance 
was also seen as anti-US. Anti-US sentiment found expression in 
the burning of the US Cultural Centre in Pusan (March 1982), 
followed by the burning of another US Cultural Centre in Taegu in 
1983.
Many groups and intellectuals continued to criticize Chon, and 
the popular base for this criticism became better organised, 
better- informed and more effectively mobilised. Many college
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professors, journalists, civic leaders and Protestant and 
Catholic Church leaders associated themselves with the inequities 
and injustices suffered by the masses, and became more vocal and 
persistent in their criticism. Anti-American sentiment which had 
increased rapidly among students and intellectuals, had hit its 
peak when the Korean people became familiar with the details of 
the Kwangju Incident which involved the 20th Division of the 
military, indirectly under the command of the US/Korean Combined 
Forces Command (CFC) located in Seoul.26 "The suppression of 
Kwangju city was part of a coup... which had started in December 
1979 and continued to August the following year when Chon Tu-hwan 
became President."27 The public was convinced that the Incident 
had been entirely orchestrated by Chon and his military clique.
Most Koreans, particularly middle class intellectuals and 
students, believed that the Kwangju Incident would never have 
been possible if the US had not played such an 'active role' in 
supporting General Chon.28 They were convinced that the US 
deliberately supported the 'puppet government' of Chon's regime, 
which had not only been deceitful in establishing its legitimacy, 
but was also seen as a perpetuation of the Yushin dictatorship. 
The people's hatred towards Chon and his regime deepened the more 
their animosity towards the US grew. America's perceived 
involvement in the Kwangju Incident, therefore, drove many 
Koreans to turn against the US and also inclined them to accept 
radical ideologies of national liberalization, unification and 
democratization. Stronger than ever before, the opposition 
movement, now equipped with a new set of "people-oriented" 
ideologies (minjung minju~juui), spread throughout the nation via 
the Minjung Movement.
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Although most Koreans regarded students as radical extremists 
before 1987, they nevertheless had some sympathy for the student 
activists and their leading role in the Minjung Movement, because 
they, particularly the middle class, were determined to end 
Chun's military dictatorship. The 'June Democratic Struggle'
(Yuwol Hangjaeng) in 1987 was, in fact, the most vivid evidence 
of this public support. At this time Chon, having reneged on his 
promise to oversee a democratic revision of the constitution, was 
forced after weeks of mass protest to accept the transition to 
democratic elections. However, students as the leading agents of 
the opposition movement reached something of an impasse when, 
following the democratic victory achieved in that struggle, their 
factional conflicts deepened, radical ideologies intensified and 
unity as a political force finally disintegrated. Their 
disintegration was particularly evident during the presidential 
election of December 1987. At the same time as the two main 
opposition leaders, Kim Tae-jung and Kim Yong-sam, failed to 
combine their forces to run against No T'ae-u, the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) candidate, students were 
themselves divided into the following three groups:
"1. Leaders of the Chondaehyop [who] were willing to give 
qualified ("critical bipanchok”) support to Kim Dae-jung, as 
they were impressed with his record of anti-dictatorial 
struggle;
2. Sodaehyop leaders [who] were in favor of the single 
candidacy of Kim Young-sam[Kim Yong-sam], as he was 
considered more winnable; and
3. The radical activists of the Minmintu and the Constituent
Assembly (CA) [who] at first demanded a boycott of the 
election, but later supported an independent Minzung 
(minjung) candidate such as Paek Ki-wan, who attempted to 
talk one of the two Kims [Kim Tae-jung or Kim Yong-sam] into 
dropping out of the race."29
The disintegration of the Minjung Movement (which had become the 
generic title for all opposition movements in the 1980s), was at 
its worst during this presidential election, so much so that the 
opposition as a "solidified force for democratic reform"30 no 
longer had the coherence or strength or, most of all, the 
influence to impact decisively on any of the activities of the 
democracy movement, let alone the crucial election at hand. Some 
15,000 students, according to the October 13 issue of the 
Chungang Ilbo, were recruited by the DJP for the prevention of 
any unwanted disruptions which could spoil the No T ’ae-u 
campaign.31 No T'ae'-u won the election with only about 37 
percent of the total vote, which was far less than that of the 
two Kims combined, 55 percent (28 percent for Kim Yong-sam and 27 
percent for Kim Tae-jung). By then, the role of the opposition 
movement, especially that of the students, was in question, for 
there was a general perception that Korea was already on the 
right track towards democratic reform and that no further social 
disorder such as student unrest was warranted.
It was ironic, however, that No T'ae-u, the man who finally rose 
to the Presidency in the name of democracy was the same man who 
was responsible for both the rise of the Chon Tu-hwan military 
regime and the tragedy of the Kwangju Incident. It was also 
ironic that the opposition movement, which had played such a 
strong role during authoritarian politics and seemed certain to
lead Korea's democracy movement, was disregarded by the majority 
at the pinnacle of its greatest achievement. The public had 
changed its view on the radical opposition movement to one that 
saw it as extreme and unwarranted.
2 Minjung Radicalism
The Role of Radicalism in Democratisation
The turning point in the democratisation of Korean politics was 
clearly the Declaration of June 29, 1987. This political change 
was largely achieved through people power, fostered by "the 
student centered [radical] activist sphere (undongkwon) and the 
middle class people who were united with it."32 The role of 
radical activists, especially students, in the course of Korea's 
democracy movement, has been distinct in two respects: in their 
role as the vanguard of mass mobilization; and as the advocates 
of national ideology. In both respects the minjung idea has been 
crucial.
In late 1985, a group of university students who named themselves 
the 'Sammint 'u'((Committee for People's Democracy and National 
Autonomy Struggles) adopted a 'people' based national ideology 
known as 'minjung ideology' or 'sammin ( ) ideology' founded
on the three-min (sam-min) principles. They claimed that the 
prime focus of this ideology was the minjung themselves, that is, 
"those who are politically, economically, socially and culturally 
oppressed and alienated by the existing system of society"33, and 
it was founded on the three-min principles, namely people, nation 
and democracy (minjung, minjok and minju).
The Sammint ’u also claimed that their ideology represented the
main flow of modern Korean history, which essentially was a 
history of min jung self-emancipation. As an ideology it was 
proclaimed, in the typical Korean mould of monolithic self­
rectitude, to be the only way to save Korea from ruin. Many 
Christians adopted this ideology as a basis for social ethics and 
political action, especially on behalf of farmers, workers and 
the poor. This ideology argued that since the 1950s Korea had 
become increasingly dependent on foreign capital (from grant-type 
aid capital to American monopoly capital) leading to a 
corresponding increase in the exploitation of the minjung based 
on low wages and subsistence living conditions. The capitalism 
thus generated was perceived as internally weak and externally 
subordinate. It was not founded on the base of the nation, the 
minjung, but on foreign powers. Moreover, it was extremely 
authoritarian in order to effectively exclude the collective 
power of the minjung, especially the collective bargaining power 
of workers.
Such anti-minjung fascism was considered by the Sammint 'u 
(including the Minjung Movement) as contradictory to the 
democratic will of the people. Minjung ideology squarely put the 
blame for fascism on the United States, which, in their view, had 
again divided the nation in 1953 and effectively made South Korea 
an American dependency in both a military and economic sense. 
Subsequent contamination by American culture was inevitable. The 
thoroughly contradictory nature of Korean society today was 
perceived by minjung ideology as incapable of being healed merely 
by greater liberal democracy. The proponents of minjung ideology 
interpreted events such as the April revolution of 1960, the 
anti-Yushin struggle, the Pusan-Masan protests of 1979 (which 
provided the context for the assassination of President Pak), the
Kwangju Incident in 1980, and so on, as symbols of the min jung 
struggle to realise the three-min principles. In particular, the 
Kwangju Incident had special significance, for the potential of a 
people-based uprising was seen as suppressed by an extremist 
right-wing military group, which existed on the basis of military 
and monopolistic conglomerates with US support.
A declaration issued by the students on 18 May 1982, at the time 
of the arson of the American Cultural Centre in Pusan, read:
"When we examine our past history, we realise that America's 
foreign policy in regard to Korea, since Liberation (1945) to 
the present time, has consistently had the sole purpose of 
economic exploitation. Under the name of so-called alliance, 
they have coerced us to abide by their principles of control 
whilst they established a comprador culture (on our soil) in 
collaboration with monopolistic capitalists in Korea. They 
tied up the peninsula's partition by supporting fascist 
military regimes which have denied, in reality, our people's 
prolonged desire for democratisation, social reform and 
unification. With a belief that we are solely responsible for 
our own future, we must now unfold our ceaseless fight 
against Americanism in order to remove it completely from our 
nation which is now dominated by its power. As a first step, 
we appeal to the national consciousness of the masses of 
Pusan city as we raise a torch for anti-Americanism by 
burning the American Cultural Centre which symbolises its 
culture."34
Sammint 'u thus characterised Korean society as a "dependency of 
the monopoly capitalists of the US and Japan"35 and, at the same
time, considered the Korean government to be a "dependent fascist 
government reliant on the US and Japan for providing a strong 
base in opposition to the Soviet Union."36 Sammint'u, therefore, 
argued that "national movements of the minjung in South Korea 
after 1953 must be characterised as leading the revolution of the 
anti-imperialists and anti-monopoly capitalists, to achieve 
people's democracy."37 The Sammint'u attempted also to expose the 
fundamental contradiction of the role of the government and US 
policy, particularly by focussing on the ring leaders of the 
Kwangju massacre and the US role vis-a-vis the will of the 
people. In terms of nation building, sammin ideology proposed 
that the minjung should be the main agent of history, with sammin 
ideology as the main basis for a new society. They argued:
"Overcoming contradictions in societies at particular points 
in time generally depends for resolution on that social 
stratum that has been most affected. Because Korean society 
has been structurally dependent on monopoly capitalists (who 
exploit the workers), the workers must be the leading force 
in resolving their contradictory position in Korean 
society."38
The influence of radicalism such as that inspired by sam-min 
ideology, however, has substantially declined since 1987, not 
only due to disputation between the radicals themselves, but also 
due to the disintegration of world Communism in recent years.
The Decline of Radicalism
Son Hak-gyu, Professor at Sogang University, argues that the 
collapse of radicalism, and thus the Minjung Movement (to the 
extent that it clung to radical ideologies) was due to the impact
of democratization on Korean political perceptions. Son posits 
that democratization requires two preconditions:
" (i) the right of citizens to protect themselves from 
arbitrary and illegal actions of the ruling power and (2) the 
extension of the right of citizenship to all without 
discrimination."39
Democratization may then be said to proceed in two phases:
"(1) liberalisation of attitude to criticism of the political 
system and (2) a change of power structures so that every 
citizen is treated equally."40
While Korea was in transition between these two phases, 
radicalism "encouraged the former kind of reformation to develop 
into the latter kind of phase."41 Korean radicals were quite 
content to place themselves under the protection of the moderates 
to foster phase (1), but it is the radical extent and speed with 
which they wished to proceed towards phase (2) which was their 
undoing.
In an emerging democracy, the influence of opposition forces is 
determined, according to Son, by three main factors: the dominant 
ideology of society; the social and economic conditions; and 
international circumstances. The main opposition party, rather 
than the radicals, was seen by the majority of Koreans as the 
main opposition force. As this party provided momentum to the 
dissident movement in effecting political change, especially the 
institutionalisation of democratic systems, political opposition 
hegemony remained with the moderates of the opposition party,
effectively emasculating the radicals in the process of 
democratization after 1987. The radicals, in contrast, sought 
fundamental change to existing power structures, despite the fact 
that this change did not have popular public acceptance, did not 
value prevailing socio-economic development, and was associated 
with an outdated ideology.
For many years after liberation and partition, concerns for 
democracy and social justice had generally been considered 
bourgeois liberal ideology, and it was not till the Kwangju 
Incident (1980) that concepts of class conflict and the anti­
imperialist struggle usually expressed in minjung form, had 
developed to an unequivocal standpoint amongst the radicals.
Under the earlier Yushin policy, the opposition movement, which 
even then had been categorized as the 'leftist radical movement', 
initially focussed quite moderately on the restoration of a 
democratic constitution guaranteeing the separation of the three 
powers of government. The focus had subsequently shifted to the 
issue of the reservation of the basic democratic rights of 
citizens. Inevitably, this change of focus led to concern about 
the rights of those most oppressed in the community, workers and 
farmers, including concern regarding the three basic rights of 
labour, and about the dignity of the life of workers.
The opposition movement was thus progressively radicalised, 
although it did not fully mature until the Fifth Republic (1980- 
1988). A significantly more radical element entered the 
opposition movement after the Kwangju Incident. Aspirations to 
liberal democracy changed into a desire for an 'anti-imperialist' 
and 'anti-fascist' revolution. The Korean state was seen as 
'military fascism', run by the military, supported by a
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bureaucratic state apparatus, in unholy alliance with monopoly 
capitalists. The revolution was conceived in terms of a 
fundamental structural change of society aimed at two objectives: 
firstly, the destruction of the state; and secondly, the 
construction of a proletarian socialist society. These objectives 
were quite consistent with Son's second phase of democratization 
(and evidently consistent with Kim Il-song style of 'democracy'), 
but exceeded the boundaries of change acceptable to the Korean 
people who were only too conscious of the emerging new role for 
Korea in the modern world of commerce. They saw change as needing 
to be consistent with the maintenance of their economic position. 
Having provided a focus for popular opposition to the government 
up to 1987, the minjung idea seems now to have lost its appeal as 
it has become perceived as inconsistent with the rising national 
standard of living.
Factional Divisions Amongst Radicals
This rejection of the minjung idea had its reflection in the 
politics of the radical movement. The radical trend initiated by 
the Sammint 'u led to the development of separate radical 
ideologies. The Chamint’u and Minmint'u, split mainly from the 
student opposition movement during the Fifth Republic in the 
Spring of 1986. They both referred to themselves as national 
democratic movements which incorporated anti-imperialism, 
national unification, anti-fascism and the construction of a 
socialist state. From an outside standpoint, there seems very 
little difference in theory between these two factions, because 
they both advocated a 'people's democratic revolution' based on 
ideals of Marxism, neo-Marxism, Leninism, and Kim Il-songism (the 
chuch'e (juch'e) ideology). Their division, however, seems 
largely to have occurred from the conflicts which arose from the
priority they gave to revolutionary theory, and to the sort of 
revolution that would suit Korean society best. This division 
ultimately resulted in their disintegration.
Chamint 'u (Committee for Anti—US and Anti-Fascist Struggles, 
Independence and Democratisation) focused on the issue of 
America's control over Korean society. According to its members, 
Korean society was "a colony of the US dominated by fascists 
subordinate to the US."42 Chamint 'u incorporated the earlier 
faction known as the 'chuch’e ideology faction' (Chusap’a) and 
dominated the 'National Association of the Representatives of 
Unversity Students' (Chondaehyop). Chamint 'u, also known as the 
NL', openly professed that, "Our only enemy is American 
Imperialism."43 The major protest events organized by Chamint 'u 
were the 'Pusan American Cultural Centre Seizure Incident' in May 
1986 and the 'Kon'guk University Seizure Incident' in October 
1986. Another major incident which received wide publicity was 
the imprisonment of university student Im Su-kyong, a member of 
the Chamint 'u, who made an unauthorised and illegal visit to 
North Korea in June 1989.
Minmint ’u (Committee for Struggles against Imperialism and 
Fasciam and for the People and Democracy) "...believed that the 
major conflict in Korean society was due to the power struggle 
between the conservatives and the capitalists. Therefore, to 
resolve this conflict, the student movement must concentrate all 
its energy on strengthening the power of the minjung by fighting 
to support them, rather than waste its energy on fighting 
reckless open-politics."44 Minmint 'u incorporated the earlier 
faction, 'people's democracy faction' (Minjung minju-p'a) or 'ML 
faction' (Marxist and Leninist Faction). Minmint'u , also known
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as 'PD' consolidated its strength by adopting the initial ideas 
of the 'Constitutional Assembly Group'(Chehon uihoe-p’a) and is 
therefore often called the CA Group.45 The major event organised 
by Minmint'u was the 'Inchon (city) Incident' in May 1986, in 
which anti-government demonstrators rioted in Seoul's port city.
By 1987, the disintegration of the radical student movement was 
so great that, according to government authorities, there were as 
many as "...186 known leftist student organizations and ... [it 
was] assumed that there [were] many more."46 Despite the 
government's severe restrictions on student activities, such as 
the 'Provision for Campus Stabilisation' (1985), radical 
movements, especially the student centred movement, had been well 
organized, individually dedicated and powerful enough for a time 
to forge public perceptions of national goals and objectives 
according to their own ideologies. Because of the energy 
generated by their radical standpoint, this movement provided a 
strong impetus to the Minjung Movement and the 1987 'June 
Democractic Revolution'.
Nevertheless, radicalism which adopted the people's revolution as 
the ultimate solution for Korea's future, was utterly rejected by 
the majority in the process of democratization. The public not 
only rejected radical minjung ideology, but also denounced those 
who continued to support this ideology. For example, when the 
demands by radical groups, especially in the area of labour 
rights, unification and anti-Americanism, resulted in chaotic 
social disorder after 1987, it was the public, particularly the 
fast growing middle class, who denounced these radical 
activities. The prime concern of the public was not to bring 
about a fundamental structural change to society, but to preserve
and promote democratic institutions. Moreover, the collapse of 
Communism destroyed any vestiges of a vision for an alternative 
social model.
In these circumstances, internal splits multiplied in the radical 
movement. These internal conflicts together with growing mass 
conservatism reflected the international trend amongst socialist 
states to question their capacity to remain viable and 
competitive in the modern world. As a consequence, the radical 
activists (especially the students) not only had their political 
influence reduced significantly, but also faced irreparable 
conflict among themselves and with the general public.
Radicalism led by students, in the eyes of the majority, had 
become far too extreme, exclusionary and unrealistic, losing 
touch with mainstream thinking at the grassroots. The changing 
world perception of Communism, especially in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, and a concomitant shift to the right, had 
isolated the Marxist elements and forged a refocussing on reform 
through social-democratic solutions.
3. Conclusion
Despite its failure after 1987 to maintain itself as the vanguard 
of Korea's democracy movement and as the leading agent 
representing the people's aspirations, the opposition movement's 
achievements against the state during the period of Korea's 
authoritarian politics were remarkable. Its strength and 
solidarity, with the support of the new middle class during the 
crucial months of the spring of 1987, had been effective in 
ending dictatorship, and will not be easily reproduced.
To determine the cause of the disintegration of the Minjung 
Movement, especially from mid 1987, single-factor analyses are 
insufficient. This disintegration illustrates the fundamental 
attitude of the Korean people to the delicate socio-economic 
balance of their society, involving political power, economic 
growth, national security, democracy, and individual civil 
rights, all of which continue to be interpreted by the public to 
a large extent in the Confucian mode.By 1987, Korea was no longer 
polarized into two dominant classes, the ruling and the ruled.
The rise of the new middle class through industrialization, was 
akin to a social revolution and led to the acquisition of the 
power of the majority by the middle class. The aspirations of the 
middle class thus became the most decisive factor in determining 
the conditions of Korean society in the transition from military 
control to a democratic system. After the presidential election 
of 1987, political protest and disorder, especially that 
motivated by ideological radicalism, came to be regarded as 
having no value but only a cause of public and industrial 
disruption which had the potential to interfere with the 
maintenance of national security.
Radicalism, however, has given substantial impetus to the 
opposition movement, and became inextricably linked to the 
Minjung Movement. While it had emerged partly as a defensive 
mechanism against the despotism of the state, it increasingly 
awoke Korean society to the seriousness of social issues and also 
provided progressive social policies. The government's anti­
communist ideology, often directed against the radicals, thus 
become less credible. Anti-Communism had played a key role "not 
only in maintaining the regime but also in shaping the political 
horizons within which both government and opposition parties
operated."47
The greatest failure of the opposition movement as a whole has 
been its lack of any structured rationale or strategy other than 
that of resistance. In this it reflects something of the 
deficiencies of the minjung idea. The opposition movement, in 
this regard, mainly relied on the incitation, initiative and 
communication channels of students and Christian churches, 
especially in terms of articulating and putting into action the 
movement’s ideological aspirations. The end of military 
authoritarian politics, in this context, ironically brought about 
the end of the opposition movement, including the Minjung 
Movement, because the opening of the Sixth Republic opened new 
P°iitical horizons which had been chosen by the majority. The 
opposition movement, which had not yet comprehended the full 
impact of the new political climate, therefore, had no principle 
to pursue in line with its old rhetoric based on nationalist 
radical sentiment.
The future of the opposition movement, as a whole, therefore, now 
depends entirely on the reassessment of its rationale, attitude 
and strategy in the new Korean political environment. At present, 
elements of democracy co-exist with remnants of feudalistic 
ethics, and the public evidence of the former military domination 
of politics is not quite so transparent. The lesson of min jung 
historiography, at the same time, is not necessarily diminished. 
From the minjung point of view, as democracy is progressively 
implemented, the changing condition of the majority will be 
reflected in the manner of their impact on history, but this will 
not change the fact that the people remain the subjects of 
history (as in So Nam-dong's argument, presented above).
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PART II ASPECTS OF THE MIN JUNG SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
Chapter Four
Minjung Thought: Socio-Economic Aspects
Introduction
One of the most controversial and yet influential issues for the 
Minjung Movement during the 1980s was that of self 
identification: providing a definition of the key concepts of 
minjung. Who are the minjung and under what conditions (social, 
P°lit.ical, economic, religious and cultural) is an individual 
person or group categorised as minjung ? In this ongoing debate, 
two prominent academics, Pak Hyon-ch'ae and Han Wan-sang, were 
regarded as the most eminent expositors of the "two types of 
concepts in regard to the minjung."1 The former, by Pak Hyon- 
ch'ae, regards the minjung as the social classes of labourers, 
farmers and urban poor who are the end-products of the capitalist 
system ; and the latter, by Han Wan-sang, regards the minjung as 
the various social groups who are largely excluded from the 
political, economic and cultural means of power in society. While 
neither theory satisfactorily characterises the minjung nor 
explains their specific motivation and their background, both 
have been prevalent in shaping general perceptions of the minjung 
in ideal terms. They have therefore had both an academic and a 
practical political impact. This chapter will examine each of 
these approaches in more detail and, in particular, will consider 
how they relate to minjung ideals as a whole, and their 
applicability to the Minjung Movement in practice.
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Korean Minjung Theory: A Social Class Approach
In his essay, "Examination of the Characteristics of Minjung in 
Terms of Social Class" (Minjung ui Kyegubjok Songgyok Kyumyong) , 
Pak Hyon-ch'ae, economic analyst, generally defines the 
components of minjung in terms of four classes: labourers (as the 
basic component); farmers (as small scale producers); small scale 
commercial groups and the urban poor; and certain progressive 
intellectuals.2 Pak stresses, however, that the labourer class 
makes up the basic constituent of the minjung, and refers to 
farmers and the urban poor as also being essential constituents. 
These three key groups are each the outcome of their own product 
which, while physically produced by them, is not owned by them, 
confronts them and forces them into submission.
This argument draws heavily (though generally without specific 
acknowledgement) on Karl Marx's theory of the alienation of 
labour in capitalist society. Pak argues, "the minjung are in 
effect composed of a single entity as they transmute into their 
various categories within a circulatory system through which they 
correlate to one another."3 He refers to this process involving 
the disintegration and specialisation of farmers (which occurred 
with the rise of capitalism); their alienation from their 
subsistence life style as a result of new production and 
distribution mechanisms; and their subsequent transformation from 
owners of capital (albeit poor) into either urban poor or 
labourers for wages. Through this circulatory process, farmers, 
labourers and the urban poor emerge together as the victims of 
capitalism. According to Pak, therefore, the notion of minjung 
is essentially dependent on economic variables, and the analysis 
of this notion in terms of its reality requires an examination of 
that social class which, in the process of the development of 
capitalism, is the poorest.
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Of the three groups, Pak firstly defines 'farmers', who are 
generally known as the 'agricultural producers (nongob saengsan- 
ja) ' of various farming products, as an 'entity in a transitional 
stage (kwadogi—jok chonjae)' in capitalist society. The 
theoretical basis for Pak's concept relies on two factors: 
firstly, farmers who self—manage their own means of production 
are initially encouraged and inpired by capitalist principles; 
and secondly, as small producers, whose means of production 
depends entirely on the strength of their capital, they are bound 
to react and respond to the demands of market conditions. Hence, 
farmers are forced either to specialize (and become petty 
capitalists) or to disintegrate into wage-labourers. Pak's theory 
is clearly identical with the Marxian notion of the position of 
peasants and handicraftsmen in capitalist society. Karl Marx 
stated:
"For it is also a law that economic development distributes 
functions among different persons; and the handicraftsman or 
peasant who produces with his own means of production will 
either gradually be transformed into a small capitalist who 
also exploits the labour of others, or he will suffer the 
loss of his means of production ... and be transformed into a 
wage-labourer. This is the tendency in the form of society in 
which the capitalist mode of production predominates...."4
Demands of the market condition and the strength of capital, 
therefore, change not only the basic production mode, but also 
the scale of production as well as the nature of products. These 
changes, resulting from the capitalist transformation of 
agriculture and the restructuring of productivity, however, 
gradually transform farmers into a different stratum or social
110
class. Such a transformation is inevitable because farmers are 
forced either to abandon their calling or to specialize due to 
the comprehensive penetration of commercial agricultural 
development, mechanized farming and the monetary economy. This 
emerging production process is significant to the composition of 
min jung, according to Pak, because through this process farmers, 
who suffer the loss of their means of production and thus abandon 
their livelihood, will be transformed either into the class of 
urban poor or labourers.
In brief, Pak's attempts to illustrate the conditions of petty 
farmers and their gradual disintegration in the process of 
capitalism also clearly reflects the Marxist view which states:
"The lower strata of the middle class - the small trades 
people, shop-keepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the 
handicraftsmen and peasants - all these sink gradually into 
the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does 
not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried 
on, and is swamped in competition with the large capitalists, 
partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless 
by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is 
recruited from all classes of the population."5
Secondly, Pak defines the 'labourer' class as the 'basic 
component of min jung' (kibonjok-in minjung kusong) . He also sees 
them as the basic class of capitalist society, which possesses 
the capacity of self reproduction, for they provide the key to 
the relationship between capital and wage-labour. Pak argues 
that, "labourers are the propertyless, [thus the proletariat] 
because... they don't own the means of income unless they sell 
their labour as a commodity."6 Pak sees labourers as an
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oppressed and exploited group, noting that labourers are mostly 
the labourers are mostly the ruined craftsmen and farmers who, in 
the relationship between wages and capital, are reduced to the 
class of wage-labourers either in capitalist farming or 
manufacturing industries. Furthermore, wage-labourers will 
gradually fall into the class of urban poor as they lose their 
labour power because of ill-health or of old age. This gradual 
degradation, however, does not merely depend on ill-health and 
old age, but rather on the structural contradictions of modern 
capitalist society. In regard to these structural contradictions, 
Pak points to two dominating social factors: 1) that modern 
capitalist society circulates around the production of 
commodities, and the relationship between capital and wage-labour 
in this context is entirely aimed at profit-making based on free- 
labour; and 2) that the control of reproduction [of labour power] 
in capitalist society is determined by the changing phases of the 
industrial cycle. It will therefore not only sustain the 
industrial 'reserve army' during the period of average 
prosperity, but also will result in masses of unemployment during 
the period of stagnation.7
Under this social structure, Pak argues, labourers become 
exploited and victimized both physically and phychologically: in 
the former, labourers are obliged to compromise their working 
hours or conditions inevitably leading to various barriers to 
employment (consequent upon accidents, illness, early retirement, 
etc.); and in the latter, they are under permanent uncertainty 
because of the precarious nature of their means of subsistence. 
Furthermore, Pak points out that, "their [labourers'] wage is 
valorized politically so that it does not exceed that of the 
reproduction cost of social labour power. Furthermore, this wage 
is determined extremely flexibly in order to satisfy the demand
which arises from the circulatory process of capitalist 
reproduction. Labourers are, overall, left in the condition of a 
casual work force or in a state of unemployment rather than in a 
usual state of employment."8 Nevertheless, labourers constitute 
the basis of capitalism and of the minjung as the alienated 
class in capitalist society, making up the majority of its 
population. Moreover, in Pak's view, minjung are the most 
progressive social stratum of today's society because they are 
the propertyless class who lead the struggle against modern 
capitalism.
Thirdly, Pak defines the class of urban poor as the lowest 
stratum (ch'imjonch'ung) in society, which is comprised of a 
variety of classes and consists of three categories: first, urban 
handicraftsmen (independent petty producers) and petty tradesmen; 
second, industrial wage-workers (labourers) and temporary casual 
workers with low-wages and precarious positions in small 
businesses; and third, the unemployed. Of the three categories, 
the unemployed, according to Pak, should be characterized into 
two groups, one able and willing to work and the other neither 
able or willing to work. The oppressed conditions of the urban 
poor, therefore, are designed to continue and be revived 
unjustly, and a relative surplus population of unemployed as an 
army of 'informal' labour is an inevitable outcome. In relating 
the capitalist production mode to the economic degradation of the 
components of the minjung, especially labourers, Pak writes:
"In a capitalist society, where the purpose of production 
does not depend on the satisfaction of demand as determined 
by the requirements of society, but on profit, capitalism of 
its very nature... seeks unpaid labour without any 
justification. Labourers are, therefore, expected to be paid
a low wage, to endure hard labour and to work extended 
hours; farmers are forced to apply low labour costs and to 
charge low prices for agricultural products so as to satisfy 
the requirement of cheap raw materials for industry; and the 
urban poor face the imposition of a huge burden, especially 
when the demand for (virtually) unpaid labour becomes 
excessive, even though their situation may be cyclical. This 
major separate antagonistic relationship between each minjung 
component and capitalism is the principal foundation which 
leads the minjung components to have uniformity of economic 
interest. And this common basis for economic interest also 
supports the historical fact that minjung components have 
represented different elements of the social system of 
circulation, which correlate to each other in the process of 
existence.”9
Of course, Pak's socio-economic perspective is, in reality, a 
very crude form of Marxism applied to an economy driven by a 
unique Korean style of bureaucratic authoritarianism.
Relevance Of Class Approach
Much of Pak's thought is based on his analysis of 
proletarianization defined "as an increase in the number of 
people who lack control over the means of production and survive 
by selling their labour power."10 Although much sociological 
understanding of industrialisation is based on the European 
experience, in recent times this has been countered by 
dependency, world-systems and bureaucratic authoritarianism 
theories. Pak's analysis attempts to focus on the causes and 
effects of proletarianisation expressed in industrialisation 
theory in the Korean context.
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While proletarianization is regarded as "the single most 
far-reaching social change that has occurred in the Western world 
over the past few hundred years"ll, nowhere has this occurred 
more dramatically than in Korea where comprehensive 
proletarianization commenced only in the early 1960's and changed 
Korea from a predominantly peasant society to a dynamic 
industrial nation in less than thirty years.12 The rapid economic 
pace of Korea has, in fact, not only brought the 'curtailment of 
history' in terms of national productivity and industrialization, 
but also the reshuffling of social structures regarding social 
stratification and the dynamics of the ruling elite.
Ip Europe there had been a strong articulate artisan culture 
and, through industrialization, artisans and their culture had
victim to capitalists, leaving major resentment. The main 
cause of resentment by workers in newly industrialized countries, 
however, has been the inability of the economy to absorb the 
rapidly growing labour force into full-time employment at 
adequate wage levels over much shorter time frames, leaving many 
workers in casual employment without contracts or government 
labour protection. In world-systems theory, it is argued that 
this informal sector of the economy subsidizes formal capitalist 
enterprises by generating low cost materials and services for 
their workers to enable them to subsist on low wages. Pak and 
others refer to "semi-proletarianization" which posits that the 
expansion of world capitalism was essentially a search for a
f
low-cost labour force and that, therefore, a capitalist would 
"prefer to have his wage-workers located in semi-proletarian 
rather than proletarian households."13
The Korean experience, however, contradicts the semi­
proletarianization thesis put forward by world-systems theorists.
It is also very different to the European experience of 
proletarianization, especially in terms of its rapid development, 
its political-economic form, and its socio-cultural dynamics. 
While Korea experienced quite significant proletarianization 
during Japanese colonization, the end of World War 11 abruptly 
ended that process, with Korean industry virtually coming to a 
complete halt from 1945 to 1953. Import-substitution policies, 
reliant on US aid, achieved little by way of industrialisation 
during the next 8 or 9 years (till 1961). Pak Chong—hui's 
decision to pursue export-oriented industrialisation after 1962, 
Particularly through his Yushin program of heavy 
industrialization after 1972, however, led to a phenomenal 
increase in production for both domestic and overseas markets. 
Production which initially focussed on light manufacturing goods, 
shifted gradually to higher value-added items, and the labour 
force changed its structure accordingly. By the late 1980s the 
majority of industrial workers were employed in heavy and 
chemical industries such as automobile, steel, ship building, 
machinery and petrochemicals.14 In one generation a sophisticated 
dynamic industrial society was created, but ironically such 
society also fell into a "crisis of unbalanced development"15 
which forced a reshuffling not only the scale of Korean 
proletarianization but also of the characteristics of social 
conditions.
Korean proletarianization, for example, generated massive 
migration from the rural sector and, despite the largely 
unsophisticated background of these immigrants, rapidly created a 
workforce of manual production workers and white-collar salaried 
workers, with a substantial increase in female participation, 
especially in clerical fields. "Because of this compressed 
industrial transformation, the Korean population has greater
heterogeneity and internal status differentiation than its 
European counterparts - a numerically significant white-collar 
stratum exists alongside a large industrial proletariat."16 As 
elsewhere, Korean capitalists have pursued a strategy for 
ensuring a cheap and flexible workforce, but due to the absence 
of protective labour laws and government support for the 
maintenance of both low wages and low cost raw materials, have 
not had any disincentive to operate within a formal wage system. 
In this environment labour unions have not been able (at least 
until 1987) to exert any real influence on wage fixing. Wages, in 
Korea, are thus largely a product of supply and demand in a 
labour market where the repression of labour action has not only 
given the capitalist the upper hand, but "has facilitated the 
uninhibited absorption of labour into formal, capitalist 
enterprises." 17
It should be noted that Pak's comments on the circulatory nature 
of the economic role of the three key components of the 
proletariat, labourers, small-scale producers (including farmers) 
and the urban poor, incorporate the capitalists' need for both 
cheap raw material and cheap labour. Government pricing policies, 
to illustrate this point, have not only forced millions of 
Koreans to migrate to urban centres in search of more secure 
incomes, but have also stabilized urban consumer prices, allowing 
urban workers to survive on low wages and thus reducing the 
pressure on capitalists for wage increases. The lack of capacity 
in the rural sector to provide economic support to those who have 
migrated to urban centres and the full (not casual) commitment to 
urban industrial work, greatly facilitated the massive 
proletarianization that is evident. This phenemenon has been 
further reinforced by the establishment of industrial towns such 
Ulsan, Ch'angwon, Okpo, Kuro and Kumi, which now have
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sophisticated working-class communities and min jung solidarity.
How is it that Korean workers have so readily adapted to 
industrialisation? Hagan Koo (Ku Hae-gun) identifies a number of 
key factors: a high level of urbanization and formal education; a 
large volume of geographic and social mobility, which has 
occurred continuously since the colonial period; and compulsory 
military service for men, which taught them time orientation and 
subjugation to formal authority.18 Perhaps an even greater 
factor was the absence of any cultural inhibitions to 
proletarianization. The absence of any significant artisan 
culture, and the low ranking afforded by the Korean Confucian 
system to artisans and merchants, and accepted by them readily, 
meant that workers experienced proletarianization "without any 
proud working-class cultural heritage."19
Historically, the position of the labour movement had been 
weakened by the fact that, after liberation from Japan, the 
movement had been embroiled in extreme political conflict between 
the left and right, and that subsequently the mobilization of 
labour had been equated with Communism.20 This factor was all 
too easily exploited by both the government and capitalist 
enterprises. Workers, therefore, responded and adapted to their 
new role as individuals, basically putting up with long hours, 
hazardous conditions, low wages and authoritarian management. The 
extremist interventionist authoritarianism of Korean governments 
suppressed the formation of any effective labour movement, kept 
labour unorganized and prevented it from linking up with other 
sectors from the time of the Syngman Rhee government (except 
during the Chang Myon administration of 1960-1961). During the 
1980s, however, Korean workers attracted substantial support from 
religious and intellectual communities which struggled for human
rights and democratization.
In summary, industrialization in Korea is characterized by 
proletarianization, not semi-proletarianization, and has placed 
the prototypical industrial proletariat and modern white-collar 
workers side by side. The government's role has probably been 
the single most important determinant in this process, and its 
agricultural pricing policies have ensured it developed as an 
urban phenomenon which, by drawing on rural workers of the lowest 
class, facilitated a smooth adaptation of the industrial work 
pattern and authority structure. The lack of an effective 
counter-ideology in the early phases of proletarianization led to 
extremely low levels of industrial conflict, but during the 
1980s, with a reduced capacity to supply additional labour 
commensurate with continued industrial growth, a strong union 
movement developed. This development reflects in part "the 
density of proletarian experiences among Korean workers"21, which 
in the late 1980s combined with other minjung elements to force 
democratic reforms and has progressively obtained improved 
salaries and conditions for workers.
Korean Minjung Theory: An Alienation Approach
Han Wan-sang, Professor of Sociology at Seoul National 
University, conceives the notion of minjung in terms of the 
relationship between 'rulers' and 'subordinates' or the 'ruling' 
and the 'ruled' in modern Korean society.22 He reiterates an 
argument from "The Politics of Mass Society" by William 
Kornhauser suggesting that Korea is a "naked society" where two 
social groups, the 'ruling elite' and the masses, stand against 
one another. This is so because "there isn't any particular 
(intermediate) pressure group which struggles for the development 
of democratic institutions while, at the same time, representing
the masses (minjung) who are subject to the ruling elite".23 The 
existence of the min jung, in Han’s view, therefore, is based on 
the premise that possession of power which determines social 
stratification or groupings not only characterises social order, 
but also creates inequality in that order. Furthermore, the 
people with no power within this order become excluded from the 
essential three means of power, namely political, economic and 
social means.
On this basis, Han defines the notion of minjung as "the people 
who are in the 'ruled' position even though they make up the 
majority. They co-exist as an united group who are never from one 
single stratum, but from many groups and strata. Minjung are 
the resistance force who boldly struggle against the unjust 
P°l^tical power."24 Han categorises minjung, however, into three 
types. Firstly, he identifies the 'politically ruled people' 
(chongch 'i-jok minjung) who are excluded from the means of ruling 
power consisting of the power to command, mobilize, and also to 
suppress. Hence, those with ruling power are identified as the 
'political ruling group' in contrast to those without power who 
are identified either as the 'politically ruled group' or the 
'political m i n j u n g Han regards the 'political minjung ' as the 
central dynamic of the minjung component of modern society.
Han's view is very similar to the Weberian notion that, "... 
bureaucractic organization is technically the most highly 
developed means of power in the hands of the man who controls 
it".25 He argues that this has been particulary so under the 
authoritarian ruling structure of Korea.
Secondly, Han refers to the 'economically ruled people' (kyongje- 
jok minjung) who are excluded from the means of production which 
controls the entire array of activities and functions related to
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production, consumption and distribution. Hence, those who are 
excluded from the means of production become the minjung of the 
economic dimension and are identified as 'economic minjung'. The 
economic minjung, who are exploited and controlled by the ruling 
groups (in this case, capitalists), are of necessity taken more 
seriously in modern society because their population share is 
growing rapidly.
Thirdly, Han identifies the 'culturally ruled people' (munhwa-jok 
minjung) who are excluded from the means of public recognition in 
the form of honour and prestige. Honour and prestige, which 
enable certain individual persons or groups to enjoy public 
recognition and the privileges of status in society while they 
influence social values, are monopolized by these 'culturally 
ruling groups'. In general, they are the receivers of a high 
education which provides them with the necessary requirements for 
a privileged life style, including opportunities to obtain 
knowledge, social contact, skills, qualifications, and so on.
They are also the engineers of 'high culture' which reveals
I
certain typical features of cultural sophistication, and thus 
they become not only the trend-setters of the privileged life 
style, but also a separate group which, in the words of Weber, 
"rests upon distance and exclusiveness"26 from, what Han terms, 
the "popular culture"(taejung munhwa)27 of the masses. This 
perception is particularly important to understanding Han's 
concept of minjung, which rests basically on the antithesis 
of the Weberian theory of the 'status stratum' or 'status groups' 
which Max Weber defined as follows:
"In contrast to classes, status groups are normally
communities. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind.
In contrast to the purely economically determined 'class
situation' we wish to designate as 'status situation' every 
typical component of the life fate of men that is determined 
by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of 
honour. This honour may be connected with any quality shared 
by a plurality, and, of course, it can knit to a class 
situation: class distinctions are linked in the most varied 
ways with status distinctions.”28
In his discussion of the concept of the minjung and the classes, 
Han himself refers to the Weberian theory on social 
stratification based on the multi-dimensional 'status situation' 
of society.29 In Han's view, the 'cultural minjung', in contrast 
to the 'culturally ruling groups' and thus the 'status groups' , 
are the victims of deprived opportunities for honour and 
prestige. Conflict between the ruling and the ruled groups 
within the society is, therefore, serious, particularly when the 
opportunities for a higher education are concentrated 
predominantly in the ruling groups [of the status stratum]. What 
Han focusses on here is the bureaucracy as a social phenomenon 
which, according to Weber, created a new channel of power and 
rose as a social stratum based predominantly on the educational 
certificate:
"Differences of education, in contrast to the class-forming 
elements of property and economic function, are nowadays 
undoubtedly the most important factor in the creation of 
status difference. It is essentially the social prestige of 
education...that the modern official owes his position to in 
society. Whether one likes it or not, education is one of the 
strongest social barriers ...."30
Access to education was not only available exclusively for the
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ruling class [yangban kyegup] throughout the Yi dynasty, but also 
"...the civil examination system (restricted in any case to 
candidates of yangban status) gave the authorities the machinery 
with which to control entry to the ruling class"31 Therefore, 
polarization of the 'status groups' and the ordinary people 
(minjung) based on educational qualification created a 
fundamental barrier in Korean society.
In examining the history of societies, argues Han, the structural 
inequality emerging from power structures is a universal 
phenomenon regardless of system, time or place. The 
characteristics of both groups (the ruling and the ruled) are, 
therefore, entirely determined according to each social order, 
such as feudal or capitalist or Communist, or means of power such 
as the 'three means' discussed above and other means such as 
religion or ethnicity, etc. The question is, which of these 
orders or means will dominate society as the most powerful? The 
nature of society thus changes automatically once the 
characteristics of the two juxtaposed social groups are changed. 
In this regard, Han emphasizes the Weberian view of the 
"structure of power" which consists of various strata resulting 
from "all those having vested interests in the political 
structure...."32
With reference to the consciousness of the minjung, particularly 
their self-awareness and acceptance of their life fate, Han 
distinguishes the minjung into two types: 1) the sleeping minjung 
(chukja-jok minjung); and 2) the awakened minjung (taeja-jok 
minjung). Here Han applies to Korean society the Marxist 
distinction between a class "for itself" and a class "in itself"; 
the latter is a social and economic unity which lacks self- 
consciousness, the former is such a unity the members of which
share a common viewpoint and act together. According to this 
view, the sleeping minjung are a single identity in terms of 
their role in the economy and society, but do not recognize their 
unitary identity. The awakened minjung, however, understand 
themselves as such, and are moved to political and social action 
to further their common interests.33 The sleeping minjung are 
those who are not aware precisely of their social stratum as the 
excluded 'ruled people', despite the fact that they are 
politically excluded, economically alienated and culturally 
ignored by both intellectuals and the ruling elite.
In general, the sleeping minjung are "not capable of observing 
themselves and their social conditions critically from an 
objective perspective".34 They are a people with a passive 
character who are 'uneducated' and "do not attempt to resist 
[the dictates of the ruling groups] but rather obey them like a 
herd of sheep."35 Therefore, in Han's view, the sleeping minjung 
are "most obedient and convenient servants" of the ruling 
groups, "helplessly manipulated" by the ruling elite's 
pretensions, "just like morphine addicts are intoxicated by 
morphine."36 The sleeping minjung tend to be "deceived by the 
ruling elite's false propaganda and are deceived as if they might 
accomplish something", argues Han, "because the ruling elite 
exercise a special leverage decorated in appealing rhetoric 
designed especially for their effective control."37 Nevertheless, 
Han concludes that blame should not be laid on the sleeping 
mingjung for their passiveness and lack of self-awareness, 
because "they are not voluntarily sleeping, but are conditioned 
to be So indefinitely."38
The awakened minjung, on the other hand, understand their 
existence in the context of prevailing social structures,
particularly power structures, as the 'ruled people'. They are 
the intelligentsia who are fully aware of the social imposition 
under which they suffer not only social and political injustice 
and economic disadvantage, but also alienation from the means of 
ruling power. Nevertheless, in Han's view, intellectuals have the 
social and moral responsibility to educate the sleeping minjung 
to develop their self-consciousness, so that they "...can also be 
the independent variables who determine [the factors of] history 
and the structure [of society]."39 Conscientization, says Han , 
is a "thought process of the minjung whereby they transform 
themselves from the historical object to the historical 
subject."40
In regard to these people's self-awareness of their life fate as 
the minjung, however, Han distinguishes three phases: in the 
first phase, the awakened minjung possess a 'structural thought'
(kujojok sago) which Han refers to as the concept of 
"sociological political imagination" quoting A. Fasola-Bologna 
who refers to C. Wright Mills.41 Han argues that this notion 
differentiates 'personal trouble' and 'public issues', and 
provides evidence for his theory that structural thought by the 
awakened minjung is possible through 'sociological imagination'. 
Furthermore, through this structural thought, the minjung in the 
first phase build their self-consciousness in response to social 
injustice.
In the second phase, the awakened minjung become critical of 
their ruling structure, they are the 'critical people'. They 
understand fully the falsehood of the ruling groups and willingly 
criticise them. The nature of their criticism, however, does not 
seek a kind of 'touch up' of the existing system, but stands for 
a "fundamental exposure of the ulterior motives of the ruling
dynamics, and of the ideology of the ruling groups."42
In the third phase, the awakened minjung transform themselves 
into a people of action, into (anti-government) activists. They 
do not merely think structurally and expose the falsehood of the 
ruling groups, but take more direct action which aims to promote 
fundamental change of the existing social order, especially of 
structural inequality. Therefore, the action employed by these 
minjung, according to Han, represents a concrete development of 
an 'anti-government movement'. The most ideal and radical type of 
minjung engage themselves in this movement because they 
genuinely believe in their cause as a struggle for justice and 
humanity. Therefore, they are prepared to sacrifice themselves in 
a spirit of martyrdom based on religious belief and hope, and 
challenge the ruling order for their cause.43
Relevance of Alienation Approach
To understand Han's theory of minjung, it is important to note 
his views on who exactly were the members of the ruling groups 
while Korea went through industrialization from the early 1960s 
to the mid-1980s. One should also note the changes in political, 
social and cultural environments in Korean society, particularly 
since the promulgation of the dictatorial Yushin constitution in 
1972, because through this constitution the ruling regime 
transformed two main structures of the ruling order: firstly, it 
consolidated the industrialization strategy from one of import 
substitution (of the 1950s) to an export-oriented one commencing 
in the 1960s; secondly, it established the dictatorial 
bureaucratic authoritarian state, thus showing that it "is clear 
that intrinsic to the development process itself is the creation 
of groups and strata with an interest in industrialization".44 
James Cotton, in his study of "Understanding The State In South
Korea", writes:
"Throughout this period [from the early 1960s to the mid- 
1980s], bureaucratic direction was one of the most 
significant features of state policy and capability. Though 
the character and membership of those who commanded the upper 
reaches of the state varied from a military clique to 
bureaucractic-security-business coalition, the mechanisms of 
the state remained insulated from wider popular forces for 
more than two decades. Business remained subordinated, labor 
was corporatized, and political forms were manipulated (on 
occasions, forcibly) to prevent effective institutional 
challenges to the prevailing order."45
The creation of this bureaucratic authoritarian state, as 
described above, brought two major social changes: firstly, a 
resuffling of social stratification, and secondly, new social and 
cultural values. There arose a newly created 'status stratum' 
known as the 'newly-rising ruling group'(sinhung yangban) . They 
consisted of three groups, namely, technocrats, a coalition group 
from the military and bureaucrats, and newly established 
conglomerates. In addition, the prevailing social trend in values 
reflected the overall beliefs and values of the sinhung yangban, 
which predominantly focussed on educational qualifications, 
efficiency and quick thinking salesmanship.
Such a tendency, according to Han Wan-sang, is an outcome of the 
"overheated competition" 46 experienced in everyday life, which 
not only drives society to seek a 'short cut method' (based on 
expediency and effectiveness), but also confuses society's moral 
standpoint. Han argues:
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"[The people's] sense of value, developed after the birth of 
the Third Republic of Korea, May 1961, mainly focused on 
'short cut method policy' {p ’yonbob-juui) . This method is also 
the system which underlies all kinds of criminal activities 
and, thus, fundamentally destroys human quality, humanity, as 
well as the roots of social order."47
As already mentioned, Han's approach was based on the Weberian 
theory of social stratification. Han, particularly, focused on 
the social collision of the 'status stratum' and the rest of the 
social strata. However, in the Korean context, due to the 
historical role of the state in a rigid Confucianist culture 
(with its tradition of bureaucratic order) and the extreme 
authoritarianism since liberation, the political dimension has 
had a greater impact on one's 'status-situation' than in the 
European context to which Weber refers. Han is eager to point 
this out, for otherwise the tendency might be to associate class 
with status without reference to the dominant influence of 
political power on both, when such power has traditionally been a 
stepping stone to the acquisition of wealth (class) and social 
honour and prestige (status).
In contrast to Pak, Han does not focus on class only, but 
broadens his analysis to 'bases for communal action' rather than 
to physical 'communities', and is thus able to identify a broader 
range of factors affecting social conflict in Korea. Economic 
class and status stratum are separate determinants to the extent 
to which a people will seek radical ideals as a strategy to 
combat the ruling structure for access to power and thus to 
status, as long as the strategy is perceived to be serving a 
specific purpose, such as socialism, Marxism or the Chuch'e 
ideology of Kim Il-song. Exponents of the Minjung Movement in the
1980s, in fact, made significant headway through such radical 
ideals until the collapse of the military dictatorship of Chon 
Tu-hwan. They had proved that such an ideological strategy, 
applied strictly to an illegitimate and undemocratic political 
system, not only generated a powerful energy for the mobilization 
of the masses {minjung) , but also created an opportunity for a 
major shake-up of the socio-political perspectives of the ruling 
elite, whether in power or in opposition. In this regard, the 
theories of Han, as well as Pak, were particularly fundamental to 
the formation of min jung thought in the 1980s.
Participatory Democracy : Response of Opposition
Although making no claims to be an intellectual in his own right, 
Kim Tae-jung (Kim Dae Jung) has been pre-eminent amongst 
politicians prepared to use minjung rhetoric in appealing for 
support. It is therefore useful to consider Kim's employment of 
the term 'minjung' as an example of attempts to link minjung 
theory with political practice before analysing the likely fate 
of the minjung political movement.
In their co-authorship of "Kim Dae Jung Conscience In Action" 
Kim's spokesman, Ch'oe Won-sang, and his co-author, Han Hwa-gap, 
focus on the extent to which minjung energy had been generated 
and the national potential this power represented. They outline 
the basic standpoint of Kim and his Party, the Democratic Party 
(DP) in regard to the masses as follows:
"...the power of the masses {minjung) will be a great factor 
in Korean society as well... the masses will become, with 
their firmly established values, the engine of national 
progress in politics, the economy, society and culture; no 
national leader will be able to ignore their role and expect
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to preserve internal political and social stability. In the 
process of building up and further developing their power, it 
may seem that the masses have followed the existing national 
leadership. However, as their power consolidates, they might 
even brush-aside the leadership that is now in position. 
Therefore, the present leaders must humbly accept the advice 
that they faithfully serve the masses as they would serve 
'Heaven.'"48
Kim Tae-jung, recognized as the "leader of the democratic 
opposition to a whole sequence of authoritarian regimes..."49 
since the early 1960s, and who narrowly avoided the death 
sentence during the regimes of both Pak and Chon, writes:
"...the masses have consistently been the motivating force in 
History. We have survived because of their vision, their 
yearning for what is right and just which, though flickering, 
is not yet extinguished. When we consider the rise and fall 
of the Silla, Koryo, and Yi dynasties, no matter who played 
the clown, only those who had the support of the masses, who 
were squirming in the gutters of society and seemingly 
powerless and ignorant, were the ones to prosper. Those who 
did not have the support of the masses fell. From a long- 
range perspective, the mind of the masses was the mind of 
heaven."50
Therefore, it is no suprise how Kim in common with other minjung 
proponents, advanced their concept of minjung. What is more 
notable about his political stance is that he not only criticised 
the conduct of the United States "...in most Third World 
nations"51 including Korea, but also alerted the US to improving 
its understanding and attitudes toward these countries'
political, social and economic conditions. In the case of Korea, 
Kim argued, an alternative economic program was the only way to 
rectify the evils of the social system and to achieve an 
industrial democracy which had been systematically abused by the 
government in the process of industrialization. According to Kim, 
his program known as the "Mass-Participatory Economy" provided an 
alternative for Korea, and a necessary condition for democracy. 
Kim stated:
"The goal of my program [Mass-Participatory Economy] was, and 
sbill remains, a proper balance among three major objectives: 
growth (efficiency), equitable distribution of income, and 
price stability. These three objectives often conflict with 
one another. Because a unilateral imposition of one leader's 
preference can only result in public discontent, the three 
objectives must be balanced by full participation of the 
masses. That is the goal of my program for Mass 
Participatory Economy."52
The full operation of pluralism in all aspects of political, 
social and economic decision making is what Kim promulgated to 
his constituents, the nation and to neighbouring countries, 
including the United States. People power was passionately 
pursued by Kim:
"Today, in advanced countries, where there is industrial 
democracy, the masses have freed themselves by their own 
power from the traditional exploited status and have acquired 
a solid position of equality with the capitalists in such 
fields as politics, economy, and culture. A clear example of 
this popular phenomenon is seen in the fact that labor 
parties and social democratic parties in many countries are
now in power."53
However, what will happen to such a strategy if it is applied to 
a political order which is legitimate and democratic? How will 
the masses respond to the collective struggles of the Minjung 
Movement, if their economic position and lifestyle are improved 
and they are thus no longer identified as the 'propertyless 
class' or the 'alienated people' in a politically oppressed 
society ? Will the masses continue their fight against the 
ruling groups as they have done for nearly two decades under 
dictatorship, and will they continue their support for the 
Minjung Movement in the 1990s, which ultimately aimed, according 
to Han, to transform Korean society into a "World of Love"(sarang 
ui segye) 54 as per Christian doctrine? These issues are perhaps 
explanatory in indicating the theoretical limitations of 
Han's alienation approach.
The Changing Socio-Economic Environment
Firstly, dramatic changes in the political environment followed 
by the collapse of Chon's dictatorship changed the entire outlook 
of the Minjung Movement: the political system, on the one hand, 
has now acknowledged and reintroduced the principle of democracy, 
although little has changed as far as the membership of the 
'status stratum' and their personal loyalties are concerned; and, 
on the other hand, the majority of the populace, including 
exponents of the Minjung Movement, no longer seek the support of 
the Movement or its ideology in regard to conflicts arising from 
political, economic and cultural alienation. They are content 
with the new regime which, in principle, has adhered to the 
procedures prescribed by democracy. This turnabout in minjung 
attitudes, however, came about despite whatever level of minjung 
consciousness was prevalent at the time. Han's distinction
between the sleeping minjung and the awakened minjung is 
therefore quite irrelevant. The overwhelming majority of the 
masses, contrary to Han's argument, have come to share the same 
position on the fundamental principles of democracy in recent 
years, regardless of their intellectual and educational 
differences.
Secondly, the vast improvement in the economic circumstances of 
Korean workers has resulted in a wide spread upgrading of their 
status . This has been accompanied by a change in the market 
situation of many workers, the adoption of a non-proletarian 
lifestyle, and the development of relationships with the 
established middle class, leading to what Weber calls 
'anticipatory socialization' and the emergence of a self 
conscious middle group with bourgeois status.
Factors identified by Han and other minjung activists in this 
dynamic process included not only the work situation, but also 
the location of one's domicile, one's rise in the hierarchy of 
the community or enterprise, marriage, education and aspirations. 
I would suggest that given the role of each of these factors in 
contemporary Korea, the continued rise of workers by way of 
wealth acquisition to the status of the middle class will ensure 
that the rampant socialist ideals of earlier decades, especially 
of the mid 1980s, will become more and more remote. Furthermore, 
it would seem that those who were most active as minjung in the 
1980s, namely students and intellectuals, have discovered that 
their radical strategy of the 1980s can not provide either energy 
or purpose for the mobilization of the masses, as long as the 
state observes the democratic process. Minjung, on the other 
hand, are left without the leadership of students and 
intellectuals, as a minority with no class, status or power, but
perhaps with a socio-economic system that can lift them closer to 
their aspirations.
Conclusion
Despite each having distinct criteria and premises, the two 
theories by Pak and Han, bear similarities in their conclusions, 
namely, that the components of the min jung are the end-products 
of exclusion from society. The minjung, according to Pak, are the 
economically alienated proletariat class. Han, on the other hand, 
identifies the min jung as those people ’excluded' from that 
ruling power which controls various opportunities in society. 
Hence, the min jung, whether the 'alienated people' or the 
'excluded people' are the victims of the social and economic 
structure.
Similarly, the thinking of both Pak and Han is based on the 
polarization of Korean society into the ruling group and the 
min jung. This polarization is seen as the cause of two major 
types of social conflict, political conflict and economic 
conflict. Economic conflict, as analysed by Pak, is exacerbated 
by the ruling group's tendency to be dependent on foreign 
capital, a tendency which has continued allegedly since 
liberation. This dependence is, according to Pak, strongly 
opposed by the nationalistic consciousness of the minjung. He 
argues that internal class conflict is the outcome of social 
conditions which, in a broader context, are linked to national 
conflict, national partition and national dependence. Each of 
these forms of national disintegration he sees as the result of 
dependent politics, a dependent economy and a dependent culture. 
Therefore, according to Pak, the labourers, farmers and urban 
poor of the minjung, who actively struggle against these 
conflicts, in effect not only lead the people's movement towards
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social reform, but also the nationalist movement and the movement 
for national unification. These movements, in his view, all have 
an interdependence based essentially on class conflict resulting 
from differences in socio-economic status.
I would argue, however, that Pak's theory of min jung has a number 
of major flaws. In the first place, it contradicts the Korean 
national ideal of fraternity, for by defining the minjung as the 
proletariat he leaves no room for reconciliation with capitalists 
and intrinsically rejects the possibility of national unity, 
creating merely an exclusionary proletarianism. Moreover, the 
notion of minjung which represented a mixture of social strata 
and classes during and since the 1970s, and which emerged largely 
in response to the authoritarian ruling structure of the Yushin 
regime and its policies (which excluded the minjung from 
political participation), was much more complex than that 
outlined in Pak's definition. The development of minjung as a 
conscious and active force was clearly as much based on political 
conflict as on economic concerns.
In addition, the notion of minjung as the proletariat, the 
propertyless class, who would lead the nationalist movement, 
including the movement for national unification, is not founded 
on any sound rationale other than nationalistic sentiment, for as 
Professor Han Sang-jin argues 55, the cause and effect of class 
conflict do not necessarily amount to the national and 
international determinants of partition and political power.
I would suggest that in view of Pak's narrow perspective of the 
notion of minjung, his theory is not applicable in any sense. It 
would seem that his motivation for applying 'minjung' to the 
Korean proletariat is to take advantage of the nationalistic
Sentiment associated with the term in the 1980s, but without 
wishing to look beyond Marxian ideologies.
In the case of Han, although his theory attempts to accommodate a 
wider range of social strata and groups with an equally broad 
range of social, political, economic and cultural issues, it 
should be recognised that minjung as a whole can never be 
grasped as an entity. Furthermore, the basis of its existence is 
a Utopian dream which captivates man's imagination, thus bringing 
hope and expectation to those people who feel victimized by 
power. However, it is hardly achievable without a leadership, 
just as Christianity is hardly conceivable without Christ.
In summary, theories of minjung, whether they refer to the 
proletariat (Pak's view), or a collection of various social 
groups and strata, which do not necessarily exclude the once 
privileged ruling elite (Han's view), do not fully explain or 
indentify the min jung within their specified boundaries. This 
conclusion is inevitable because "Minjung is not a real entity.
It is an abstract concept referring to the collection of a 
variety of classes, mostly underprivileged ones... which 
constitute the mainstay of Korean society."56 It is an ironic, 
however, that, given the claims that others have made about the 
unique 'Koreanness' of the min jung, theorists of the 1970s should 
again have relied almost exclusively upon Western social theory 
for their analyses.
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Chapter Five
Minjung As A Cultural Concept 
Usage Of Traditional Symbolism.
Minjung theories, based on the tradition, customs and national 
pride of the Korean people, are largely derived from the belief 
that only the "spiritual revival" and the "self-awakening"l of 
the people through a cultural revolution, can "...create a 
unifisd Korea based on freedom, democracy, self-reliance and 
peace."2 The industrialization and economic miracle of Korea 
since the early 1970s, according to one commentator sympathetic 
to the minjung school, were solely "built upon a labour policy 
that violated the human rights of workers..."3 and the principles 
of democracy. The cultural theories of the minjung are therefore 
linked very closely with two major anti-authoritarian struggles: 
first, the democracy movement (embracing the Korean Christian 
movement for human rights in the 1970s and the Minjung Movement 
of the 1980s); and second, the labour movement which had to 
contend with the corporatist labour policies pursued by 
successive Korean governments.4
Cultural theories of the minjung consist of a vast range of 
views and examples that are all very relevant to prevailing 
minjung theories. There are few aspects of Korean culture that 
have not been influenced in some respect by minjung theory, 
especially during the last twenty years (1970s-1980s) . However, 
in order to contain this thesis to a sharper focus, this chapter 
will examine only two specific aspects of culture that have given 
rise to the Korean people's self-awakening, especially in respect 
of the ordinary workers. Firstly, an extended discussion will be
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devoted to the min jung cultural movement (minjung munhwa undong) , 
particularly in the performance of mask dance play (t'alch'um 
nori) and court-yard play (madang-guk), both of which represent 
symbols of the solidarity of the ruled people, the minjung, and 
encapsulate the ideals of the people and their nationalistic 
sentiments. Secondly, the influence of Kim Chi-ha will be 
considered. Kim may be regarded as the exemplary advocate of 
democracy and human rights of his time, who not only acted as 
"the transmitter of han..."5, but also developed the feelings of 
han "into a revolutionary consciousness..."6 of the minjung, and 
ultimately set aflame the phenomenon of the Minjung Movement of 
the 1980s.
Origin Of Korean Mask Drama.
What is the nature of Korean mask dance drama in terms of Korean 
history and culture? Historically, mask dance plays (t'alch'um 
nori) had been dismissed as "a collection of banal and 
unsophisticated folk [dance] plays" ; and culturally, were 
denigrated as "the product of the lower classes, of mainly 
illiterate artisans and relatives of mudang (shaman witch 
doctors) [who were] despised by yangban (upper class) scholars."7 
In addition, the symbolism of the plays, as representing the 
people's han, rested on the socio-political objectives of the 
performance which aimed "to expose, ridicule, curse and attack... 
those who prey on common folk, and to satirize the social 
structures which entrap them."8
As indicated above, Korean mask dance plays (originally known as 
sandae) grew out of a historical, political, social and religious 
environment in which the common people sought to express those 
feelings suppressed in everyday life. In their earliest forms
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(the word ’sandae ' appeared for the first time in the historical 
record, Koryosa, 1451 A.D., in the Koryo dynasty), they consisted 
of a varied repertoire of song, dance and jest and had their 
origins in the court rituals and amusements of the Koryo dynasty. 
Buddhist and Confucian influences had an impact on the form and 
content of the drama as it developed in subsequent centuries 
until the late Yi dynasty, but Shamanism remained its dominant 
ethos.
In recent centuries, mask dance actors (in the case of Yangju 
Pyolsandae) were mainly mudang and their relatives, such as 
butchers and bier-carriers. Moreover, satire and rusticity came 
to dominate this form of drama when it ceased to be connected 
with official court rituals, and instead concentrated on the 
preferences of the common people. Performers of sandae had been 
released from official control after the reign of King Injo (1623 
A.D.-1649 A.D) when the dynasty underwent economic crisis, having 
fought wars against Japan (1592, 1597-8 A .D .) and the Manchus 
(1636 A .D .).
Unlike the original masks which exclusively depicted spirits, 
Korean masks in this dance form have come to depict both the 
images of spirits (although limited to certain characters) as 
well as characters who symbolize power, authority, honour and 
wealth, and thus the ruling class. Mask drama has been maintained 
by oral tradition for centuries until modern times (until 
documented in the 1930s by scholars) and may have four to eleven 
scenes (kwajang), each of which has a flexible structure.
Mask dance originally had no formal stage. In more recent times, 
however, the play has been performed in the courtyard (madang)
(in any environment, such as government buildings, Confucian
schools, village play grounds or even private residences). 
Performances were usually held on festive occasions and were 
therefore celebrated with much ceremony and colour, normally 
through the night till dawn. Sometimes, however, depending on the 
circumstances or local conditions, the performance was shortened 
to 4 hours or even less. No special stage props or scenery, other 
than a few musical instruments (such as the two-headed drum 
(changgo), cymbals and gong) were used for performances, the 
audience were simply seated in a semi-circle in an open place. 
This traditional open method has been particularly well adapted 
by university students who, in the early 1970s, initiated a 
revival of nationalist feeling (disguised in their presentation 
of mask plays) not only throughout campuses, but also in 
communities throughout the nation.
The character that best symbolizes the typical minjung spirit in 
protest drama is Malttugi. He is depicted as being of low birth, 
an anti-hero, who with pun and satire ridicules authority, 
hypocrisy, Confucian and Buddhist morality, and the incompetence 
and ignorance of the ruling class. Taking this character as their 
symbol, a folk theatre group, called the Malttugi Association, 
was formed in 1967. This name was chosen as "a political 
statement... [symbolising] the subordinate people triumphing over 
the dominant, oppressive class and becoming the masters of 
society... the culmination of the minjung movement."9 Cho Tong- 
il, a former member of this group and, presently, Professor of 
Folk Arts at Seoul University, considered that, "the aesthetics 
of min jung' s humour and satire in mask drama lies in its power 
to detonate minjung energy to confront the dominant and subvert 
the hierarchical social order."10
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Origins Of Madang-guk
Closely related to mask drama is madang-guk (court-yard play), 
which derives its mystery and impact from its link with folk 
belief,(madang)kut. Kut, literally denotes a form of ancient 
shaman ritual, the unique form of Korean worship not only of 
supernatural beings, but also of the spirits of all things in the 
universe, including rivers, mountains, rocks, wind and even the 
tiniest creatures. However, according to the traditional notion, 
kut also incorporated all kinds of dance, games, and plays.
Madang, on the other hand, denotes mainly the court-yard, but, 
according to the traditional notion, it denoted any available 
open space where people could gather and enjoy nori (performance 
and plays) . Therefore, the symbolism of madang-gut bears a dual 
meaning: in strictly religious terms, it means a ritual ceremony 
and, in broad traditional terms, it represents joyous productive 
activities of all kinds. In other words, the terms nori and kut 
had much in common.
The term nori, derived from 'nol ', includes the notions of "... 
desire and sorrow of mind” and was "...originally aimed at 
bringing about comfort and pleasure."11 Nori formed a necessary 
part of every element of minjung life, whether work, leisure or 
religious ritual. This intrinsic link reflected the recognition 
within Korean society of the productive value of nori. For 
example, people, through nori activities, developed an open 
spirit of unity and a team spirit (tanch'e chongsin) in their 
lives, socially and politically. This was so, because, by meeting 
one another through nori, Korean people opened themselves not 
only to find the true "face"12 of others, but also to reveal 
their own true "face" before others. They expressed their 
aspirations and individual opinions (particularly in regard to 
the socio-political issues) which did not have any place in a
society where social 'approval' was crucial. Approval for such 
expression could only be given by rulers to subjects, fathers to 
sons, elders to youths, men to women, haves to have nots and so 
on, through the hierarchical relations founded on the 'Five 
Relationships'13 of Confucianism. In other words, through dance 
nori, Korean people found themselves equal to each other, and 
thus enjoyed a common oneness, regardless of their origin or 
condition. It also acted as a socio-political pressure valve, 
giving expression to min jung disapproval of their rulers or 
giving vent to their own political frustrations.
In analysing both the nature of the dance nori and the link 
between the people and dance, Professor Yi He-gu, a prominent 
traditional musicologist, comments:
"The essential nature of the Korean dance is that it has 
always been a part of the people's daily lives. As an 
excellent example to illustrate the point, we can cite our 
farmers' dances which have, indeed, been an inherent part of 
the daily life of the Korean farmer.... The rural dance 
offered young men of Korea an opportunity to express their 
feelings without any restrictions imposed by convention or 
ethics."14
The performance of nori in the madang environment (madang nori) , 
is especially significant to most Koreans if nori is performed 
for a ritual purpose. Shaman beliefs pervade the Korean psyche 
and spirit, especially as Shaman spirits are seen as able to 
bring about harmony in one's life, bringing prosperity and good 
health.
These spirits are reached through 'kut'r in which a mudang
becomes entranced, possessed in mystical but very obvious union 
with the spirit world. A spirit is received, entertained, 
communicated, worshipped, consoled, thanked and sent away. Even 
this particular spirit/god that is received becomes involved in 
the nori which, in this case, has both a vertical and horizontal 
structure. The point here is, that the lack of harmony in one's 
lifs, an imbalance of the yin and yang (um and yang) , is 
addressed through play(nori) wherein the dead (spirits/gods 
normally representing deceased people), and the living, act 
together to restore and/or maintain harmony. Generally, Korean 
commoners believed in life which involved a threefold process, 
namely total communication, exorcism, and purification of spirit, 
providing the harmony of yin and yang, and revitalising each 
individual's fundamental energy (ki) .
Therefore, madang-gut, in this sense represents both a communal 
nori through which Korean people communicate with each other, 
exorcize all evil and revitalize their spirit, and a 'common 
prayer' for the unity and prosperity of all nature, particularly 
of the Korean people (including the dead). Kim Chi-ha writes 
about the meaning of spirit (kuishin) of madang-gut in his poem, 
'The Rainy Cloud In These Drought Times':
"The spirit is precisely me 
Therefore the spirit is life.
Heaven and earth are the spirit 
And the spirit is heaven and earth.
All things in heaven and earth, therefore,
Are the one body of the same life."15
These elements of minjung culture are, according to Kim,
thousands of years old and in the context of today's world must 
be seen as immutable characteristics of the heart and spirit of 
Korea. The Korean way of thinking and doing is distinguishable as 
extremely powerful and sagacious, so much so that 
industrialisation and Westernisation should only be seen as a 
transitional phase within the cultural history of the Korean 
character. It is a culture of the masses which acknowledges that 
"the human body can do so much, then the heart and spirit must 
take over."16
From the viewpoint of min jung exponents, therefore, the 
oppressive socio-political environment of the Yi dynasty, in 
which mask plays and madang—gut were prevalent, should be used as 
an analogy for contemporary Korean society under military 
dictatorship. They have declared:
"[We] insist on a total revival of our [traditional] kut for 
it represents the people's organization, recreation and 
ritual means ; and, at the same time, the means for their 
struggle to break off the chains of anti-national and anti­
democratic oppression."17
Cultural Impact Of Mask Drama.
In his essay, " A Theological Look at Mask Dance in Korea," Hyon 
Yong-hak, Professor of Religion and Culture at Ewha Women's 
University, argues that the performance of Korean mask dance/ 
drama not only provides the minjung with a means of self- 
expression, but also enables them to transcend their thoughts far 
beyond their immediate reality. Hence the minjung, in Hyon's 
view, become not only physically "conscientized", but also 
spiritually enlightened and revitalized. Hyon writes:
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"In and through mask dance, the Minjung [minjung], the 
ordinary folk, experience and express a critical 
transcendence over this world and laugh at its absurdity. By 
satirizing the aristocrats [the ruling elite] they stand over 
against the aristocrats. By laughing at the old monk 
[character symbolizing 'authority'] they stand above him. The 
concern of the younger generation in Korea, who are fond of 
and participate in the performance of the mask dance, is 
centered around these two stories."18
The images of mask drama, which represent the self-expression of 
the ordinary people, and thus.act as their voice, as well as 
expressing their collective han, become metaphysical, as Hyon 
argues above, and also become heroic, revolutionary, and above 
all, symbolic. For example, the characters of plays, such as 
'Malttuk' and 'Chang Il-dam'(See Ch. 6) of the literary works 
created by Kim Chi-ha during the early 1970s, are clearly 
revolutionaries who fight against "injustice and misgovernment" 
and who in the case of the character Chang Il-dam), "brings... the 
human rights movement”19 to Korea when he is resurrected three 
days after his death. Therefore, these characters are symbols of 
justice, equality and humanity.
In regard to the role of mask dance in transcending the people's 
han and revitalizing their energy, Ch'ae Hui-wan, Professor of 
Arts at Pusan University, argues that mask drama has been 
integral to Korean life for centuries, and that the traditional 
origins of mask drama emanate from 'ture', the collective social 
and economic activity unit of each farming community. In this 
environment, the community together performed ritual and 
experienced spiritual possession. According to Ch'ae :
"through this collective ecstasy (chipdan sinmyong), members 
of the community achieve not only a sense of communal 
solidarity but also the energy to combat together the harsh 
realities imposed by the ruling class."20
The symbolism of mask drama reaches its height when these images 
are perceived to correlate directly to feelings of han and 
cultural historical roots. So Nam-dong declares:
"In fact,...heroes Maltuk [Malttuk] and...Chang Il-dam are 
incarnations of han ."21
The thinking of So, particularly on the imagery of han from a 
theological perspective, which was conclusive in shaping general 
perceptions of the minjung during the 1970s, is linked heavily to 
the philosophy of Kim Chi-ha and is often a reiteration of Kim's 
own thought. So, in his essay, "Towards a Theology of Han," 
states :
"Let us first see how han was sublimated dynamically in the 
sketches of 'Sacred Place' and 'Maltuk', works to which he 
[Kim] refers as examples of the art of political imagination 
....The term "Sacred Place" is more than simply a paradoxical 
word for prison. Kim Chi-ha believes that prison is a real 
place with potential for revolution (Exodus) and that true 
humanity can be found among the prisoners. "A prison is an 
oppression of oppressions and a contradiction of reality 
itself. At the same time one finds collective han expressing 
itself spatially in a Sacred Place. This massive han shines 
in a tension of silence like a shadow which is waiting to 
explode. Its symbolic place of manifestation is the prison."
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Maltuk, who is a servant-slave, appears in traditional mask 
dances as the embodiment of satire, jocularity and humour. 
These expressions also function as protests against the 
yangban, the ruling class. Therefore, Kim sees them as 
pervasive phenomena of han. Being beaten by the yangban, 
Maltuk finally gets his revenge by beating the yangban with 
his quick wit and brave actions. This leads to an ecstasy of 
dances and songs where real humanity, i.e. koinonia, is 
realized, which the author calls God's involvement in 
history.
Han is an accumulation of suppressed and condensed 
experiences of oppression. Thus "accumulated han is inherited 
and transmitted, boiling in the blood of the people," which 
is also defined as the "emotional core of anti-regime 
action." This is the genesis of han ; and the author [Kim] 
goes further to grasp and express the structure, contents, 
development and explosion of han. He ends with a climatic 
description of han as a people-eating monster."22
The significance of these theories and approaches, regardless of 
their credibility (in regard to historical references) or 
methodological appropriateness, lies in their social impact as 
well as the social trend which followed. In the case of social 
impact, they ultimately created a myth among the Korean people, 
particularly the workers, who were convinced that performance of 
the mask play was the voice of the people and symbolized worker 
solidarity. And in the case of social trend, they brought a 
revival of mask dance (including many other folk arts) throughout 
the nation and, more importantly, established a new symbolism 
that a performance of mask dance (and other folk arts) is a 
ritual for the Minjung Movement. This trend was especially
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fashionable around university campuses and towns. In his essay, 
"Growth And Limitations Of Minjung Christianity In South Korea", 
Donald N Clark states:
"University students in the minjung movement love to act out 
ethnic themes in music, dance, and drama. No matter what the 
season at Yonsei [University], for example, there are 
students in the woods by the amphitheatre practising nong'ak 
rhythms [Korean farmers' folk music] on the changgo [two- 
headed drum] and clanging cymbals and gongs while others 
practise farmers' dances, often in costume. When there are 
demonstrations on the campus they are often led by bands of 
nong'ak musicians and dancers carrying banners which 
paraphrase the banners of the farmers' dance: "Democracy is 
the root of all!"23
It is also noteworthy that, because of these approaches, for the 
first time in the history of Korean Christianity, the church 
(although a minor group) openly acknowledged the validity of 
Korean Shamanism as the root of the Korean people and thus the 
national religion. So Nam-dong writes:
"Han is a common dominant feeling of powerless Korean people. 
It is the feeling of women, despised slaves, common people 
etc., all of whom commonly resort to shamanistic rites. The 
shaman thus becomes a kind of national priest."24
Cultural Impact Of Madang-guk
Ch'ae Hui-wan, who has been widely acknowledged as one of three 
leading intellectuals with Kim Chi-ha and Im Chin-t'aek involved 
in the revival of the minjung cultural movement, particularly in 
the field of Minjung-guk (people's drama), proposes a new
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definition of madang as follows:
"According to the prevailing interpretation, madang 
symbolizes a range of environments: it means an "open space" 
for work and rest, communication and meeting; it also means 
an actual current affair that requires urgent attention...; 
and, at the same time, it means a feast scene. The 
performance, for example, of song and dance fits into such a 
feast scene. And this scene especially represents a potential 
'spot performance' or a 'stage for the feast' which is 
spontaneous, inevitable and on-going."25
This interpretation of madang as an "on-the-spot performance" or 
a "stage for the feast" has been particularly significant and 
influential in respect of the Minjung Movement from the early 
1970s. Through this interpretation, university students, as 
soldiers of democracy and the human rights movement, proliferated 
madang-gut activities. On the same basis, workers also 
established their organizational system for a nation-wide protest 
movement. As far as the minjung were concerned, any space, 
whether a factory, garage, or rice field, or even a gambling 
place, was their madang and there their feast [protest] had to 
take place.
At the same time, church leaders, including Buddhist monks, and 
their believers, adhered to this interpretation from a religious 
perspective. In the eyes of the church, madang-gut was the 
Christian koinonia, the on-the-spot or field church (hyonjang 
church). This hyonjang church, according to most minjung 
theologians, including So Nam-dong, was the "third form of the 
church, besides the Catholic and the Protestant churches; and it 
is similar to the people's church referred to by Gutierrez and
Moltmann."26 In summary, madang-gut, in the performance of mask 
dance, became a "ritual disguise"27 not only for the students' 
and workers' protest movement, but also for members of religious 
communities and the intelligentsia. Madang-gut, in other words, 
was to become the heart of the Minjung Movement (then referred to 
as Korean Christian movement for human rights) among the Korean 
people.
How could kut have had this impact? What in kut motivates Korean 
people to generate such an energy ultimately capable of bringing 
down dictatorship, and of imposing a decisive political blow ? 
According to Ch'ae, mask dance (in the performance of madang-gut) 
and Korean folk music (nong'ak) "consist of a certain ideological 
base comprising a cultural movement."28 They symbolise a movement 
of "proud self-affirmation, arising from the 'heart and body' in 
the 'calling of blood (patriotism)' from their ancestors."29 
Ch'ae also argued that the intrinsic strength of mask drama lay 
in its universality, or more specifically, in the socio-political 
commonality prevailing throughout Third World countries.
Ch'ae writes on the "Ideology of Minjung-guk" as follows:
"The newly adapted Minjung-guk is variously named madang-guk, 
madang-gut and taedong-nori. Madang-guk, which transformed 
the madang [court-yard] to represent actual scenes of the 
lives of the minjung, was adapted by Minjung-guk, and aspires 
to an artistic victory of the people's collective social 
consciousness, and also functions as a means of uniting 
social issues and the arts. In so doing, madang-guk aims to 
establish itself as a feast of contemporary life, by 
unravelling, in the public interest, major contradictions and 
troubles that are intrinsic in today’s society, as well as
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practising the social consciousness that is developed through 
this unravelling "30
Ch'ae continues:
" [The characteristics of Minjung-guk in contemporary 
societies] have changed their focus from those of a straight 
theatrical cultural movement to those of the current social 
movement. This is so because Minjung-guk claims to stand for 
solidarity consciousness in Third World countries [on behalf] 
of those who are confronted by issues such as race (internal 
and external); agricultural problems; worker and urban poor 
problems; social and current topics; and reinterpretation of 
historical matters."31
Whilst the above argument hinges heavily on the universal nature 
of socio-political conflict in contemporary society, it is 
largely motivated by nationalistic aspirations, particularly 
their ideals of national harmony and unity. Kim Chi-ha, Ch'ae 
Hui-wan and other theorists of minjung culture believed that 
Shaman ritual incorporated reconciliation (especially where 
disharmony is evident) and transformation. They also believed 
that capitalism had brought about disharmony between work and 
play, between production and consumption, between conscience and 
behaviour, and between the haves and have nots. The evil of this 
disharmony had to be exorcised. Ancient Korean religions, as well 
as the spirits of the Tonghak Religion (originating in 1860), had 
a major influence of these people's, especially Kim's, thinking.
Kim prophesized the coming of the second perfect cycle of the 
world (huch'on kaebyok - comparable to the Christian belief in 
Christ's second coming), and that the underclass people, the 
minjung, would then become the real life force of the world, 
based on man's enlightenment evolving from the harmony of yin and
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yang. Furthermore, these ideals of exorcising disharmony and 
developing a new life cycle (of re-birth, became the major theme 
of cultural theories. Kim Chi-ha's epic poem, 'The World of Chang 
Il-dam', for example, illustrates a typical dramatization of 
these ideals. (See Ch.6 for detail)
However, the ideals of the people, in terms of achieving national 
unity and self-reliance, are only possible, according to Kim Chi- 
ha, if and when the Korean people wake-up and realize the need 
for and suitability of kut, and the importance of achieving 'the 
second perfect cycle of the world,' which is obtainable only 
through an understanding of the role of k'ung-gut (big 
performance). K'ung-gut or taedong-gut, according to Kim, is the 
path through which work and dance (nori) are unified. At the same 
time, this k'ung-gut can provide the necessary means by which the 
dance of the kwangdae (the performer, and thus minjung activists 
such as Kim himself), and the struggle of the minjung, are 
brought together in collective ecstasy, actualizing the original 
natural shape of the unity of dance and work. Here, the k'ung-gut 
to which Kim refers is clearly a fundamental revolution both in 
physical and psychological terms. Kim Chi-ha states :
"When an individual frees his ego, not merely by focussing 
his gaze whilst sitting in an oratory or whilst starving on 
the peak of a mountain, but by freeing himself in a wider 
sense, by renouncing his own attachment to himself, the 
vitality of life as a fundamental force flows within him. One 
must allow that life, in its wider sense, to flow within 
oneself. Kut, in fact, is that which allows life in its 
fullest sense to flow in all its vitality."32
His examples are very illustrative:
"The following examples picture in concrete terms the kind of 
life-characteristics that are utterly devitalised and are 
opposed to the min jung character: purchasing a packet of 
ingredients such as ' Miwon ' [msg]; approving political 
dictatorship; giving in to and acquiescing in the partition 
of the Korean peninsula; yielding to the hegemony of a 
powerful country; accepting indiscriminate and continuous 
manipulation indoctrinated by institutionalised education and 
mass communication; and being brainwashed by 
industrialisation to believe that 'progress is good', or 'it 
is wise to follow America', etc.... Only when one denounces 
one's attachment to such aspects of life, or boycotts them,
... or performs a 'k'ung-gut' - a positive practical 
accomplishment of the Sabbath — will that certain vitality 
generated by the fundamental force of life surge within the 
entire min jung.”33
Kim is aware of his apparent extremism and qualifies his views,
saying,
"I am not suggesting that we should live without food, but I 
am asking that we work together, share together, and fight 
together against those who exploit us. I am appealing that we 
get rid of evil spirits and perform the 'salp 'uli (exorcism) ' 
to shake off the illness which is blocking harmony within the 
whole system, and that we resist that illness by performing 
the Okwi-gut (exorcism)."34
Kim further adds:
"Madang-gut would seem to be the most appropriate example of 
min jung in action. The entire process of the relationship 
between actors and the audience, and their relationship with 
the place of performance and the court-stage, generate 
spontaneous interaction in an amorphous body of movement, 
like an amoeba."35
Overall, cultural theories of the minjung , which aimed to raise 
the people's consciousness against oppressive government, not 
only restored the people's determination and energy for the 
revival of tradition, but also, created a trend to inventing new 
theories of and approaches to Korean culture and tradition. 
Examples of these developments are numerous, led by reproductions 
of mask dance, farmers' music and madang—gut. The interpretation 
of madang-gut as an 'on-the-spot performance' of 'ritual 
disguise' for expressing protest was an innovation characteristic 
of modern Korean society.
Minjung : Kim Chi-ha's Perception
Kim's thinking has always been a complex mixture of Marxism, 
Tonghak religion, Buddhism, Christianity and plain revolution.
His expositions of minjung theory in the past 30 years (1960- 
1990) consist of two distinct phases: the first, mainly in the 
1970s, was centred upon the idea of revolution which, according 
to Kim, represented "the ultimate sanction against misrule that 
enables the people to defend themselves from oppression and 
exploitation".36 He argued that revolution, as the means of the 
minjung struggle, was necessary to "create a unified Korea based 
on freedom, democracy, self-reliance and peace."37 Following 
Park's assassination, however, (that is, in the early 1980s) his 
thinking on the minjung struggle began to change to a less 
radical, more philosophical and forgiving approach, as evidenced
in his writings of the early 1980s. The second distinct phase of 
Kim’s thinking emerged after the collapse of dictatorship in 
1987, but will not be discussed in this chapter, because it 
focussed on a sophisticated life philosophy rather than on the 
concerns of the minjung struggle which, to some extent, Kim has 
now transcended.
In view of his role in the Minjung Movement, Kim's views on who 
constitute the min jung are very relevant. He states:
"So far, when one speaks of the 'main group'(chuch'e) or 'the 
minjung', these people were not very evident as such in the 
fuedal period, for they existed as entities alienated from 
the results of their production and labour; or they existed 
as skilled forces who fought against all sorts of disaster 
(war, revolution, national crisis, foreign invasions and 
natural disaster) : they were called the min jung. In other 
words, the people as the carriers of life, who took the major 
part in producing the necessities for daily living, 
establishing culture and developing civilisation, were named 
the minjung."38
Kim, however, asserts that it would be too difficult to identify 
the minjung as a whole, without refering to a "certain type" (of 
minjung) . If one solely relied on "historical perceptions of the 
minjung,...[then] the minjung are those active lives who are 
mobile and continually vibrant with life."39 Minjung, in Kim's 
view, are "living entities(saengmyong-ch ’e)" and must be 
identified "with a living method (not fixed or stagnant) because 
the "minjung are active in the midst of a lively advancing 
movement."40 Furthermore, Kim stresses the importance of 
recognizing current needs and issues when identifying the concept
of min jung. Kim writes:
”•••the phase, which is necessary now for the development of 
history, is one which demands the coming of the second 
perfect cycle of the world [huch'on kaebyok - cf. Christian 
belief in Christ's second coming]; and because of this 
[necessity]... the concept of min jung, in regard to the 
perceptions that have so far prevailed, must be based on 
comprehensive and universal 'conceptual characteristics'
[chong kaenyom], including a variety of 'conceptual types' 
[ryu k a e n y o m ] 41
On this theoretical basis, Kim further expounds his concept of 
min jung:
Min jung are those universal people who are most concretely 
active in their lives or support others to be active; they, 
on the one hand, create the system which produces rulers who, 
with evil tendencies, become the core of obstacles; and, on 
the other hand, resist against those obstacles even though 
they are oppressed and ultimately overcome the obstacles. 
Hence, the minjung are those who guarantee taintless 
activities of life.”42
In his essay, 'A World View Of Life- About Problematic Points And 
Subjects Concerning Kim Chi-ha's Thought', Park In-song argues 
that the core of Kim Chi-ha's thought lies in his concept of 
'life'.43 Pak notes that, "above anything else, he (Kim) 
interprets minjung as life."44 To Kim, the Minjung Movement is, 
therefore, a "movement for life".44 Kim's relentless struggle 
for life, through the Minjung Movement, however, was largely 
based on "his comprehension of social change" which was "...
embodied in his concept of the 'curse'[han]."45 Han, in Kim's 
view, not only filled the entire Korean peninsula, but also 
filled every Korean's heart and life. Therefore, han was 
collective and needed to be dealt within and by a collective 
strategy in a collective sense.
On this basis, Kim believed that the purpose of his writings, 
Par"ticularly of his poems, was "to be the transmitter of the 
[collective] han and to communicate a sharp awareness of our 
[Korean people's] historical tragedy."46 As the "poet of han"47 
Kim not only translated the concept of han into a "metaphor for 
everyman's struggle against evil forces"48, but also convinced 
the min jung to struggle directly against these evil forces. His 
literary works such as "Five Bandits", "Groundless Rumors",
"Chang Il-dam" and "Malttuk", in this sense, are particularly 
crucial both in terms of understanding his thinking in regard to 
the min jung struggle, and in terms of the means through which the 
minjung sought to achieve their objectives. In his "Declaration 
of Conscience" (1975), Kim establishes the link between his 
basic motivation (love for mankind), minjung oppression, and this 
violent strugle:
"I want to identify with the oppressed, the exploited, the 
troubled, and the despised. I want that love to be dedicated, 
passionate, and manifested in practical ways. This is the 
totality of my self-imposed task for humanity, the alpha and 
the omega of my intellectual search. I hope that my odyssey 
will be understood as a love for mankind. My desire to love 
the brotherhood of man makes me hate the oppression and 
exploitation that dehumanizes him. He who exploits others 
corrupts himself. Thus I fight against oppression and 
exploitation; the struggle is my existence."49
Kim, through these ideals of the collective struggle, influenced 
significantly the awakening of the minjung to the "violence of 
resistance" as a necessary means for the betterment of life. He 
argued that,
"When the violence of authority sustains oppression, the 
people's will is crushed, their best leaders are killed, and 
the rest are cowed into submission. The 'silence of law and 
order' settles grimly across the land. Then an antithetical 
situation exists where violence must shatter this macabre 
order. To a degree, I approve of this kind of violence. No, 
that is not strong enough. I must approve of it. I reject the 
violence of oppression and accept the violence of resistance. 
I reject dehumanizing violence and accept the violence that 
restores human dignity. It could justly be called a 'violence 
of love.'"50
Kim was fully aware of the consequences and predicament of 
applying violence and destruction as a means against oppression. 
He, however, drew the conclusion that only the people who are 
truly courageous, non-violent and unselfish will commit them­
selves to violence for the minjung struggle, because the 
consequence of violence may be the ultimate sacrifice as in the 
case of his heroes. His emotional statement below clarified his 
unshakeable belief in the application of violence :
"When the people must be awakened and sent resolutely off to 
battle, violence is unavoidable. Gandhi and Franz Fanon 
agonized over this dilemma. Father Camilo Torres took a rifle 
and joined the people. He died with them, the weapon never 
fired. The fallen priest with his rifle epitomized godliness. 
I do not know if his beliefs and methods were correct or not,
but the purity of his love always moves me to tears....He was 
prepared to commit a sin out of love for others. He was not 
afraid to burn in the depths of eternal hell."51
Kim Chi-ha's Influence
Kim Chi-ha's influence on min jung thinking, through both his 
personal suffering and his writings has been significant. His 
cr-^^c^sm °f injustice, oppression, exploitation and alienation 
from power, was a thorn in the side of Pak Chong-hui from the mid 
1960s, and became more incisive as he developed his metaphors and 
political imagination through his plays, poems and other writings 
(especially, "A Declaration of Conscience") during the 1970s and 
into the early 1980s. His literary works carried an awakening 
message for the ordinary worker, while his suffering, resistance 
and faith became a symbol of the people's voice in breaking the 
"silence of law and order."52
His approach was largely based on the cultural heritage of the 
people. He recognised that ecstasy (sinmyong), spiritual 
possession and the mystification of shamanism in Korean culture 
and history was the culmination of the people's struggle to break 
loose from coerced reality, and a coming to terms with oneself as 
a human being. Minjung theories (from the beginning of Kim's 
influence), based on the reassertion and reinterpretation of 
parts of the cultural heritage and national identity, were aimed 
at a national movement, through cultural symbolism, to awaken the 
people's consciousness in terms of 'self-reliance'. The strategy 
of this cultural movement was ingenious in that, on the one hand, 
it provided a certain minimal legitimacy (for group activities) 
against the censorship of the authorities, and on the other hand, 
it created a nationalistic rhetoric and attracted workers under 
the slogan of solidarity.
Social and political protest was, therefore, frequently staged 
by students, factory workers, farmers and church groups 
throughout the nation, either in the form of t'alch'um or 
madang-guk (generally referred to as Minjung-guk) . Protest drama 
in the form of t 'alch 'urn became especially a vital part of the 
Minjung Movement. Minjung exponents, as advocates of the 
solidarity movement, aimed to arouse nationalism and generate a 
seif~ consciousness of 'potential' state autonomy by promoting 
the greater richness of Korean folk culture over the capitalist 
culture of the West. Therefore, minjung theory, based avowedly on 
feeling, spirituality and culture, was far more powerful in 
mobilizing the people and awakening their consciousness than any 
alternative which appealed to logic. The people's feelings of 
han, and the spiritual-cultural impact of madang-guk and 
t 'alch 'urn, were key factors in motivating and energizing the 
Minjung Movement, at the same time as improving economic 
circumstances and standards of education in Korea in the 1970s 
and 1980s built up people's socio-economic expectations.
In particular, madang-guk, incorporating the people's han, became 
a symbol of solidarity. A myth was created that han lay at the 
core of the nation and had, in some way, to be avenged and 
righted. The notion of 'court-yard' (madang), which was promoted 
through madang-guk, gave the minjung a new freedom, a new 
dimension for protest and collective expression without 
restriction. Some of the more radical groups, such as student, 
labour and farmer movements, sought to promote democratisation 
and national unification through these activities. Their aim has 
been to build an "anti-capitalistic, collective 'democratic' 
community(ture kongdongch’e), which should ultimately lead to the 
construction of a unified national community (minjok kongdong­
ch 'e) with all the ideological implications of constructing
social democracy."53
Much of the literature in this regard is in the form of 
narrative, emotive poetry or simply assertion without cohesive 
theoretical logic. Nevertheless, the impact of han and cultural 
factors in lifting the ordinary Korean from apathetic passivity 
to an involved, socially conscious participant in a whole range 
of movements, aggregating into a national min jung movement, far 
outweighed any role that a more rationalised ideology could have 
had. This impact reached its zenith, its peak of legitimacy, when 
Minjung Theology adapted the notions of han, madang and kut into 
a theological framework. Not only were the indigenous roots and 
sufferings recognised and reinforced, but they were lifted into a 
revitalised spiritualism and structured ideology supported by 
significant sectors of the church's infra—structure.
In brief, the han of the Korean people, and their cultural roots 
realised through kut, madang, and t 'alch 'urn, were integrated into 
a most potent force, Korean nationalism, and ultimately sparked 
the phenomenon of the Minjung Movement. In the course of these 
developments, Kim Chi-ha was certainly the "transmitter of han" 
who transformed the meaning of han into a revolutionary 
consciousness.
Conclusion
It is a feature of modern Korea that traditional cultural 
practices, and especially shared collective action and 
consciousness, have been used to serve political ends. Modern 
cultural interpretations of ecstasy (shinmyong), spiritual 
possession, and the mystification of shamanism in Korean history 
are crucial to understanding this phenomenon, because they seek 
to symbolize the culmination of the people's struggle to break
loose from a coercive reality. Paek Ki-wan, director of the 
National Unification Research Institute argues along these lines, 
adding that ritual ecstasy Mis a momentum through which each 
individual experiences true transformation of self."54 This 
experience becomes socially significant when individual 
experiences combine into a social force. "Ecstasy in this sense 
should become the very momentum from which history 'develops'."55
On this basis, Shaman ritual, according to cultural minjung 
theorists, encapsulates the accumulated experience of the history 
of the people's struggle and social reformation. Paek ultimately 
calls for a national unification ritual through which each 
participant will be made aware of the people's realities and 
undergo a transformation of consciousness in the form of a Shaman 
ecstasy. This mass ecstatic experience is seen as capable of 
being fused into a collective force which is seen as having the 
power to achieve the unification of Korea. The minjung, formerly 
marginalised in recorded history, thus become the subject and 
central force in history. Minjung culture, according to the 
minjung theorists, is therefore a mainstream culture, a 
"methodology of redemption"56, an inevitable force moving towards 
the second perfect cycle of the world (huch 'on kaebyok) .
It should be noted, however, that the search for Korean identity, 
pride and self-reliance, through the revival of cultural 
tradition, especially through affirming the 'Koreanness' in the 
"best of Korean thought"57, was not exclusively advocated by the 
proponents of the minjung cultural movement. Although this search 
stemmed from a populist source, it was ironically propagated by 
President Pak Chong-hui who, in 1972 after promulgating his 
Yushin constitution, officially endorsed the Confucian precept, 
"loyalty to the state and filial piety (ch'unghyo sasang), as the
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ideological base for the re-establishment of "spiritual armament" 
against "North Korean communists" and for national security.58 
This dramatic and epoch-making promulgation of tradition was 
clearly for the purpose of political manipulation.
Pak and his regime, in the early 1960s, had officially denounced 
traditional Korean culture, particularly Confucian ideology and 
ethics, as the "source of nepotism and even despotism."59 The 
New Village Movement (saemaul undong), for example, heavily 
focussed on the modification of Confucian practices and their 
minimization. The regime considered that "they [Confucian 
ideology and ethics] irrationally bound people with emotional 
ties based on familism so that rational behaviour and 
individualism were almost impossible."60 This anti-Confucian 
stance changed dramatically after the late 1960s, when the 
Korean-US relationship deteriorated, particularly after the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine which was followed by the 
promulgation of the Yushin constitution. President Pak declared:
"The best of Korean thought involved loyalty to the state 
(king) and filial piety, but these have often been forgotten 
recently. Re-discovery of these thoughts is the rediscovery 
and redevelopment of the national and spiritual culture."61
The irony of this rediscovery and redevelopment of national and 
spiritual culture, which was soon articulated as 'Koreanness' and 
was at the same time passionately promoted62 as the core of the 
minjung cultural movement, was that the essence of Koreanness not 
only reflected the ideals of the ordinary Korean (minjung) , but 
also of the rulers. They consisted of two contradictory ideals, 
Confucian hierarchical ideology and the Shaman spirit of 
egalitarianism which idealized the universal equilibrium of
perfect harmony within unity.
The minjung cultural movement seemed most structured and potent 
when supported by the Christian churches. In fact, this 
intervention by foreign religion, which integrated min jung 
ideology and practice, generated a substantial level of social 
energy, both in physical and spiritual terms, through national 
and international networks, for the re—discovery of the Korean 
people's identity, and national and spiritual culture. An 
inherent contradiction between the two ideologies, Christianity 
and anti-foreign minjung ideology, was nevertheless evident. 
Representation of the cultural tradition, such as madang—guk and 
mask-dance, were merely reinterpretations of Korean history by 
Christian intellectuals and ultimately created a new approach to 
Korean historiography. In this context, the minjung cultural 
movement in regard to 'Koreanness', on the one hand, was a 
Christian movement for the universal ideal of egalitarianism and, 
on the other, provided characterisation for the min jung in terms 
of their own indigenous ideals.
In political terms, the cultural movement generated mainly by Kim 
Chi-ha and the churches provided distinct and contrasting 
political rationales to the government and the minjung 
proponents. To the former, the cultural movement provided a 
rationale for the political re-structuring imposed by the 
dictatorial Yushin system. Henceforth, the government officially 
interpreted the concept of "liberal democracy" as the political 
practice that was possible and realistic only "in long- 
industrialised societies."63 In the case of Korea, according to 
President Pak, "Democracy... ought to take a form in which the 
survival of the state is guaranteed to the maximum extent."64 
Furthermore, "...individual freedom should be restrained
voluntarily at a time when the survival of the nation and the 
state is at stake ...."65
To the latter, the cultural movement provided the people with a 
rationale for the right to resist dictatorship. According to 
min jung proponents, "the authority of the state cannot be 
justified if it does not contribute to a just and humane 
society."66 They argued:
"The idea that government equals the state comes out of the 
despotic way of thinking and runs against democracy. Anti­
government is not identical to anti-state. Citizens of a 
democratic state have, for the sake of the state, the right 
to put forward their demands to the government and to 
criticise and demand the correction of the wrongdoings of the 
government, and furthermore, to demand the resignation of the 
government. This is the point wherein the vitality of 
democracy lies."67
In summary, the minjung cultural movement was akin to a civil war 
between the government and the people "on the priority of human 
rights and freedom over state authority."68 It was also a war 
between the people themselves over the relative value of their 
political, social and economic consciousness and national 
aspirations, particularly industrialization and national 
unification. At this stage, the establishment of minjung 
democracy guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms, still 
remains an ideal (although some advance has been made since 
1987) There is no doubt that 'the second perfect cycle of the 
world' has not yet arrived.
Chapter Six
Minjung Theology
Historical Overview
'What is the theology of minjung ?' So Kwang-sun, former Dean of 
Ehwa Women's University, dismissed for his involvement in the 
Christian Minjung Movement, writes :
"Minjung Theology is a Korean theology. "Minjung" is a term 
which grew out of Christian experiences in their political 
struggle for justice over the last ten or more years.
Theology of Minjung or Minjung Theology is an accumulation 
and articulation of theological reflections on the political 
experiences of Christian students, laborers, the press, 
professors, farmers, writers and intellectuals as well as 
theologians in Korea in the 1970s. It is a theology of the 
oppressed in the Korean political situation, a theological 
response to the oppressors, and it is the response of the 
opppressed to the Korean church and its mission."1
The concept of Minjung Theology as 'a Korean theology' obviously 
raises the question of whether or not so-called Korean theology 
is rather a liberation theology imported from Latin America, or 
an adopted theory from the writings of Western Europe and North 
American communities. There is also likely confusion concerning 
whether Minjung Theology is a Korean version of Latin American 
revolutionary theory inspired by Marxist ideology. In response to 
these questions, So Kwang-sun, professedly on behalf of the rest 
of Korean minjung theologians, rejects most vehemently these 
assumptions or 'suspicions'(the author's term) and asserts that,
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"Such a theology would be politically an anathema in South 
Korea."2 His theory and that of other min jung theologians who 
reject these 'assumptions' is based on their interpretation of 
Minjung Theology as "a political hermeneutics of the Gospel and a 
political interpretation of Korean Christian experiences."3
What this means, in practical terms, is that, firstly, minjung 
theologians applied theological reflection to the Minjung 
Movement in Korea and attempted to blend the history of the 
Korean people with the biblical stories and the stories of the 
Exodus. From the beginning of Korean Christianity, in the minjung 
theologian's view, the Korean Christians (of the Protestant 
Church who entered Korea in 1884) took the central role in the 
national independence movements against Japanese oppression, just 
as the people of Israel struggled against Egypt.4
Secondly, they indentified the characteristics of Korean 
Christianity as "... the religion of the oppressed "nation" or 
"race" or "the people"5, who have traditionally been 
nationalistic and political. According to So Kwang-sun, 
therefore, Minjung Theology along with its struggles was not 
engineered by, or adopted from, any external source, but is 
unique in character. So writes :
"It was a rediscovery of a tradition which was there from the 
beginning of the Christian church in Korea. That is to say 
that along with its spiritual growth, Korean Christianity has 
also matured politically and socially. It is this factor that 
gives Korean Christianity its distinctive character."6
The rediscovery of the tradition and the spiritual growth of 
Korean Christianity, according to So, lies in the historical fact
that, unlike the commitments of the Korean Christians in the 
national independence movements, Christian missionaries in Korea, 
who were largely American Protestants, were mainly pro-Japanese. 
They maintained the view that the spirit of Christianity 
must be separated from politics and state. In spite of the 
American missionaries' dogmatic stance, the Korean church 
developed and expanded its characteristics as a Christian and 
oppressed people. These characteristics were exemplified in The 
March First Movement and national movements such as the Evening 
School Movement (yahak undong) and the Rural Enlightenment 
Movement(nongch'on kyemong undong) of the 1920s. According to So, 
Christian participation in the Minjung Movement from the 1970s 
was, therefore, a rediscovery of the characteristic tradition of 
the Korean Church and its people who had long struggled for 
social and political justice.
So adds a further point which helped Korean Christians to trace 
and rediscover their Christian roots in the 1970s, namely the 
meetings and activities organised by Protestants who, in 
preparation towards the centennial year of the Protestant mission 
in Korea in 1984, created "almost a theological fad to look back 
on the traditions of the Korean church."7 Active communication 
between Christians and other religious groups, such as Buddhists 
and Confucian believers, is the result of these efforts of the 
70's, including better understanding by Christians of Korean 
Shamanism and Buddhism.
It is evident that most minjung theologians are greatly "... 
influenced by modern theological schools of thought such as 
Liberation Theology, 'Missio dei' Theology, Asian Theology and 
the Korean "Indigenization of Theology" movement...."8 Hence 
they applied a similar interpretation to theological issues such
as 'liberation' or 'God's mission', linked them closely with the 
issue of human rights, and at the same time, adopted a new 
approach to theology in view of their own historical, cultural 
and political perspective.
Whilst the Minjung Movement is essentially a secular phenomenon, 
it has gained much of its momentum through Christian elements who 
have developed a minjung ideology theology that professes concern 
about the poor and calls for the legitimacy of relevant action in 
the economic and political arena. For Catholics this theological 
perspective was recognised by the Vatican Council (1962-1964).
The document 'Gaudium et Spes' stated:
"Never before today has man been so keenly aware of freedom, 
yet at the same time, new forms of social and psychological 
slavery make their appearance."9
"As a result very many persons are quite aggressively 
demanding those benefits of which with vivid awareness they 
judge themselves to be deprived either through injustice or 
unequal distribution."10
The encyclical goes on to declare that:
"Christians who take an active part in modern socio-economic 
development and defend justice and charity should be 
convinced that they can make a great contribution to the 
prosperity of mankind and the peace of the world."11
This statement removed any possible question about the Catholic 
Church's positive judgment on direct social action as a logical 
expression of Christian commitment. This action extended even to
the political sphere. "She [the church] has the right to pass 
moral judgments, even on matters touching the political order, 
whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make 
such judgments necessary."12
The General Conference of the Latin American Episcopacy (CELAM) 
of 1968 built on the more activist approach of Vatican 11. 
’Liberation theology' was born and quickly gained wide 
acceptance, including amongst many Catholics in South Korea. 
However, its spread needed an issue, and this was provided by the 
repressive Yushin policy of Pak Chong-hui. Incidents such as the 
accusation that the Seoul Metropolitan Mission was plotting to 
overthrow the Government led to trials of a number of Christian 
Church ministers. However, the prosecution of twenty one members 
of the People's Revolutionary Party(PRP) in 1974 stimulated a 
more significant response from a broader spectrum of church 
leaders. Christians formed support groups for families of the 
accused and Catholic priests issued declarations of support.13
The poet Kim Chi-ha was also active in his defence of the PRP 
groups, and as a consequence Kim himself was accused of being a 
Communist, and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. 
One foreign missionary was deported as a result of his role, but 
not before he had organised the Urban Industrial Mission ministry 
(UIM).14 Nevertheless, eight of the twenty one PRP members 
accused were executed.
Minjung Theology was seen in action in the manner in which the 
Christian community handled the PRP case. These features included 
ecumenism, identification with the dispossessed against the 
state, and courage in the face of police and Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) intimidation. In the context of the
PRP case (1973) the National Council of Churches called for a 
renewal of Christianity "by deepening our theological thinking, 
by our clear stance and solidarity with the oppressed and the 
poor...and we should prepare ourselves for martyrdom, if 
necessary..."15 This declaration was a charter for Christians to 
become involved in politics as an act of faith which soon became 
the foundation for a new theology, 'theology of Han' or 'Minjung 
Theology'. Its primary concern, therefore, lay on the recognition 
of basic human rights and freedom. Subsequently, the Christian 
leaders and theologians declared:
"Man is the image of God, and therefore he is a precious 
being. This means that men cannot be used as instruments. 
Instruments and laws are permissible only in so far as they 
serve to guarantee human rights. Institutions and laws exist 
for men; men do not exist for them."16
Christian leadership was provided not just by church leaders, but 
also by laymen such as Kim Tae-jung and Kim Chi-ha, both 
Catholics, who risked their lives in speaking out. Church support 
for their min jung thought was reaffirmed in March 197 6 when the 
'Declaration for the democratic salvation of the nation (Minju 
Kuguk Sononso)' was issued at a mass at Myong-dong Cathedral, 
Seoul. The Declaration was signed by Kim Tae-jung, Yun Po-son 
(former President), Chong Il-hyong (former Foreign Minister), 
General Kim Kwan-sok (Secretary, National Council of Churches),
Yi U-jong (activist), Ham Sok-hon (Philosopher), and three 
leading Min jung theologians: So Nam-dong, An Pyong-mu and Mun 
Tong-hwan. As a result of their public stance, all of these, and 
other signatories were harassed by the KCIA and several were 
imprisoned.
In the ensuing years the repression of the Christian Minjung 
Movement did not abate. Under Chon Tu-hwan many opposition 
leaders were oppressed and often imprisoned. However, while 
Minjung Theology developed in parallel with the Minjung Movement, 
it struggled to reconcile theory with reality, for the 'passover' 
from slavery, the ultimate object of their endeavours, just did 
not eventuate. In many ways the minjung ideology of the 1980s 
focussed as much on the plight of oppressed minjung leaders as on 
the 'dispossessed' masses. Government intervention in the 
ministry of the Christian clergy forced several out of their 
churches into forming 'hyonjang' church communities - that is 'on 
the spot', wherever services may be appropriate. Such communities 
often included dismissed professors, ex-reporters, ex-prisoners 
and the families of prisoners. Various Koinonia groups, through 
studying issues and providing support, also participated in 
minjung action. These included branches of the Korean Student 
Christian Federation, the Christian Ecumenical Youth Council, 
universities and seminaries, the (Catholic) Priests Corps for the 
Realization of Justice, the Young Christian Workers (YCW), the 
Catholic Farmers Association and the Justice and Peace 
Commission.
Minjung Theology defines 'the people' as the 'subjects of 
history', that is. as those who shape history. It is an activist 
ideology which posits that God wants the socio-economic-political 
order to change and that Christians are the instruments of His 
will. As beliefs are shaped by experience, Minjung Theology is a 
theology of praxis; and as minjung experience has been one mainly 
of suffering, its theology is energized by han. "The four noble 
truths of Minjung Theology are: (1) that han comes from being
victimized by oppressors; (2) oppressors oppress because of 
greed; (3) oppressors must cut (tan) their greed; and (4) when
the oppressed finally succeed, they must tan their natural 
tendency to become greedy oppressors themselves.”17
Consistent with Korean folk tradition this theology calls for a 
Christ, a Messiah, a saviour. Themes, such as the afflicted 
Israelites and liberation from Egypt, are readily applied to the 
min jung condition. The end purpose is the Promised Land. Jesus 
was placed in the role of liberator, at a time when the 
Israelites were ruled by Rome. The resurrection was a victory 
over death and a passage to the promised eternal life. Minjung 
Theology is therefore a theology of liberation.
Whilst Christianity, taught by foreign missionaries, exerted an 
enormous influence on Minjung Theology, some Christian elements 
in Korea resisted the foreign influence, particularly 
conservative Presbyterians. Many missionaries attempted to 
entirely spiritualise theology, to take it entirely out of 
politics and nationalistic objectives. However, their theology 
did not fit well with minjung thinking, and a Presbyterian group, 
led by Kim Che-jin, broke away from their conservatism as early 
as 1940 and established an early form of theological nationalism 
without a foreign influence. Kim's vision persists through the 
Han'guk Theological Seminary where Professors Mun Ik-hwan (gaoled 
most recently in 1989 for an illegal trip to Pyongyang) and Mun 
Tong-hwan continue the message that the Korean church must face 
the socio-political issues of today directly as a mature 
independent church. This element of the Presbyterian church is 
now a leading exponent of Minjung Theology.
An important aspect of Minjung Theology is the Christian 
expression of belief in ritual, which represents to many Koreans 
an extension of shaman ritual. Shaman ritual is widely practised
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not just in its traditional form by mudang (Shaman priestess), 
but also by students who conduct ceremonies full of shaman 
symbolism to exorcise the evil spirits which support the 
oppression around them. Mixed into these rituals is Christian 
prayer, thus marrying the mudang-gut (shaman ritual) with 
Christian prayer and liturgy. Korean mask drama which is heavily 
embellished with shaman ritual, provides a "ritual disguise"'18 
for min jung self expression, especially of han. Such ritual is a 
theological event in itself and leads to revelation of religious 
truth, which is not seen as a static dogma taught from a book, 
but as an interpretation of the cumulative minjung experience.
Liberation Theology of the type developed chiefly in Latin 
America, bears many similarities to Minjung Theology, as both 
represent activist liberation ideology and identify themselves 
with the oppressed. However, many Korean theologians claim, as 
does So Kwang-sun, that liberation theology is irrelevant in 
Korea, arguing that Minjung Theology must come from the minjung 
themselves, that is, from their growing consciousness of 
themselves as the subjects of history. As Koreans, their 
experience is unique and their theology must address that 
uniqueness. It cannot, therefore originate from external 
influences. The Bible provides the necessary framework for the 
interpretation of events and history as a whole, including the 
role of the will of God, the place of the Messiah in the 
attainment of liberation, and the collective oneness of the 
people.
Mainstream churches remain ambivalent about Minjung Theology. 
While the Catholic Church hierarchy does not officially propound 
Minjung Theology as such, Catholics, including many clergy, are 
highly visible in its practice. The roles of leaders such as
Cardinal Stephen Kim Su-hwan, Kim Tae-jung, Bishop Daniel Chi 
Hak-sun and Fr. Ch'oe Ki-sik have been prominent. Many Catholic 
organisations and publications have persistently promoted the 
cause of human rights throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, in 
strictly theological terms, the Catholic Church has not accepted 
the radical Minjung Theology which abrogates a top down 
infallible doctrine of faith and morals, and looks to theological 
revelation through minjung events, with the minjung as the people 
of God and the subjects of theological history. The larger 
Protestant churches, other than the liberal wing of the 
Presbyterian church, while committed to community service and 
social welfare, have in the main been too conservative to embrace 
Minjung Theology and have avoided class struggle issues and 
confrontation with the Government. Many fundamentalists and 
Pentecostal protestants see Minjung Theology as a communist front 
and as a fundamentally flawed teaching.
What then is Minjung Theology if it is to be more than the 
ritualisation of han and political activism by Christians. In 
this regard it is useful to examine the theories of Professor So 
Nam-dong who during his life time was one of the most influential 
theologians and was acknowledged as the one "who initiated 
Minjung Theology.”19 According to So, "the most important task 
of theology is to deal with the relationship between the 
revelation of God and the social and material infrastructure."20 
His position relies on basic Christianity, acting out Jesus' own 
life to the point of martyrdom and seeing in its enactment the 
liberating hand of God in action. The parallel between the 
history of the Jews and the Korean minjung is regarded as of the 
deepest theological significance, linking their struggle for 
justice and political reform to key Biblical events, as well as 
to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Despite its naivety
in many respects, Minjung Theology has demonstrated its power 
through the commitment, courage, and capacity for survival that 
it has generated amongst minjung Christians in the face of 
extraordinary levels of abuse and oppression.
Essence of Minjung Theology : Minjung
The essence of Minjung Theology is contained in Kim Chi-ha's 
perception of the minjung.
"The minjung are those who have increased and occupied the 
ends of the earth, revolutionized the world, built societies, 
and advanced the course of human history. They physically 
make up the substance of, what we call, humanity. In other 
words, the minjung are those who eat the food produced by 
their own labor, who till and cultivate the soil, and protect 
their country and its culture not just with words but with 
their very lives...."21
In So Nam-dong's view, from the beginning of biblical history 
(and thus human history) the minjung have been "the partners of 
the covenant with God and the true subjects of human history. "22 
To strive for their own salvation, they must "retake the power 
that has been taken from them and used against them and thus 
restore God's justice."23 In the Korean environment, according 
to So, the church "should unify God (spiritual renewal) and 
revolution (structural renewal) concretely..."24 In interpreting 
God's mission (missio dei), he suggests three clear 'references' 
through which the history of the minjung may be interpreted: the 
Exodus and Crucifixion-Resurrection, the history of the church, 
and minjung history in Korea. He refers to these pivotal 
theological references as "paradigms"25 which are reactualised or 
re-incarnated in the present Minjung Movement.
Through examining the socio-economic history of the minjung, in 
the hermeneutical framework of Biblical history, their corporate 
spirit, especially their consciousness and aspirations, is 
revealed. So is convinced that ’’the perspectives or framework of 
socio-economic history and the sociology of literature will 
reveal the identity of the minjung who will become the subjects 
of their own history and destiny."26 Political theology, to 
which Minjung Theology belongs, looks at not only the individual 
human being but the "social conditions of human existence.... 
P°iii-icai theology takes the stand that social conditions 
determine humanity."27 Humanity is thus defined in terms of "the 
social existence of groups like race groups, classes, sex groups, 
historical groups... etc."28
With reference to Biblical paradigms, So sees God's self­
revelation (God's salvation for human beings) as "a historical 
event rather than a mysterious religious experience."29 Thus the 
March First Independence Movement of 1919 and the liberation of 
15 August 1945, are interpreted as "events of God's salvation of 
the nation."30 Paradigms, however, have their own particular 
significance, for while the Exodus involved a heroic leader who 
achieved a revolution at a single historical point, the 
Crucifixion and Resurrection involved an apparent failure whose 
purpose was a permanent revolution where the minjung become the 
subjects of salvation. "Jesus was the very cry (aspiration) of 
the people themselves. In this sense, Jesus was truly a part of 
the minjung, not just for the minjung. Therefore, Jesus was the 
personification of the minjung and their symbol."31
Mark's Gospel in particular is conscious of Jesus' mission to the 
bottom rung of society, the 'ochlos ' (Mark 3:32,34), the 
minjung. Mark represents Jesus "as one whose existence is
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embodied concretely in the min jung,"32 so much so that Mark's 
theology seems focussed on the min jung rather than on Jesus. So 
therefore concludes that "The subject matter of Minjung Theology 
is not Jesus but the minjung... Jesus is the means for 
understanding the minjung correctly."33 But, in addition, the 
term 'minjung' has, according to So, a technical meaning in 
political theology which should be differentiated from the term 
1ochlos ' . 'Minjung', he argues, "is rather close to the meaning
of "the poor" in the Covenant Code (Ex. 20:22-23, 39), in the 
Prophets, and in the Epistle of James."34 He believes that 
minjung must not be translated but written as ’minjung', as a 
special word for a political theological concept.
Jesus himself, as a friend of the minjung, criticized the laws of 
Judaism, challenged the regulations of the priestly rulers, and 
was ultimately crucified as a political offender. "The 
crucifixion is the peak in the process of struggle in which the 
minjung become the protagonists of their own history and 
destiny."35 The Resurrection is interpreted as continuing to 
live among the oppressed minung, effecting their salvation. So 
argues that although the aspirations of the early Christians took 
the form of a longing for a millennium, the notion of the Kingdom 
of God was subsequently adopted, reflecting the symbol of the 
Utopia. He believes that,
"The symbol of the Millennium which secures social justice 
must be restored and must run parallel to the symbol of the 
Kingdom of God which secures the salvation of the 
individual."36
In interpreting the Bible and the experience of the church, he 
sees the Holy Spirit as the principle and the power through which
a new possibility for revelation is created. He does not see 
revelation as being confined to the Bible only. This rather 
secular approach to theology is "based on hope, revolution, 
liberation, politics, the minjung and the Holy Spirit"37 and, 
according to So, is the theology of the post-Christian era. In 
this era, he says, "the minjung church and minjung theology 
attempt to deal simultaneously with the purification of the 
person, which is the realm of freedom, and the humanization of 
the social structure, which is the realm of necessity."38 This 
view of theology is similar to that of Kim Chi-ha's perception of 
the unification of God and revolution.
To understand the process of the humanization of the social 
structure of the Korean minjung, So argues that the method of 
socio-economic history is significant, especially the fact that 
the minjung must be considered as the subject of Korea's history. 
The March First Movement brought the reality of the minjung to 
the surface, and has changed Korea's historical perspective to 
focus on the minjung rather than the history of dynasties. The 
study of Korea's socio-economic history and the sociology of 
literature certainly helps to identify the reality of the 
minjung, their developing consciousness, and their progress 
towards social reformation.
As I have shown in earlier chapters, Korea's history shows a 
progressive development of the social base of the ruling power. 
For many centuries the minjung were the objects of the ruling 
power. The minjung during that time did not attempt revolution 
but step by step set the pre-conditions for a historical 
reformation, preparing the way towards a democratic state. When 
viewed in the light of the hermeneutics of Biblical paradigms, 
Korea's history can be interpreted as revealing the gradual
liberation of the min jung. "Min jung history and theology testify 
to the fact that the minjung overcome with their own power the 
external conditions which determine and confine them, and become 
the subjects who determine their own social situation and 
destiny."39
According to So, the Korean minjung today, as members of a 
movement with consciousness, see their genealogy beginning with 
the Tonghak Movement and continuing through the Independence 
Club, the March First Movement, and the April 19 Movement. These 
events and movements he sees as "stepping stones to the onward 
movement of Korean minjung history.”40 However, the periods in 
between these events are not to be underestimated as during these 
periods "there was the progressive formation of the historical 
consciousness of the min jung...."41
The consciousness and struggle of the minjung are, in this view, 
also very clearly evident in Korean art and drama. Mask drama/ 
dance has a long popular tradition and is filled with minjung 
satirisation of the powerful, criticizing feudal privileges, 
pretentious ideology and male chauvinism. However, the drama/ 
dance did not offer an effective solution, or suggest 
revolution.42 Moreover, the ruling class often subverted the 
minjung purpose inherent in 'p 'ansori'(narrative drama) and 
t 'alch’urn (mask dance) by reworking them into the aesthetics and 
culture of the nobility, "an opium for the minjung."A3
The task for Korean Minjung Theology, So says, is to "interpret 
theologically the events which we consider to be God's 
Intervention in history and the work of the Holy Spirit. "44 He 
maintains that this requires not only what he calls "the 
pneumatological historical interpretation", but also the
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"traditional Christological interpretation."45 The former asserts 
that, "I imitate the life of Jesus and repeat in my life the 
events of the life of Jesus", and the latter that "Jesus of 
Nazareth has redeemed me from sin."46 A key factor in the unique 
nature of Minjung Theology, according to So, is that it advocates 
a 'theology of han ' which he describes in the words of Kim chi-ha 
as "the unification of God and revolution"47 and as:
"the unification of Donghak [Tonghak] and Christianity, the 
unification of the renewal of the human spirit and the 
revolutionary change for justice in the social structure, the 
unification of idea and practice, the unification of personal 
prayer and the corporate Mass, the coincidence of heaven and 
earth, and the coincidence of worldly food (bread) and 
heavenly food(freedom)."48
So, on the basis of Kim Chi—ha's minjung theology, reiterates 
that the accumulation of the han of the oppressed people must be 
changed and activated into revolutionary energy through the act 
of 'cutting' (tan), "to cut all adherence to the secular world in 
order that one may be for the revolution of the secular world."49 
The calling of the minjung church is seen as consoling and 
resolving the han of the minjung, to convert its destructive 
energy into a radical revolution where the minjung themselves 
seek their own liberation and salvation.
Han : Its Theological Dimension
It would not be an overstatement to say that every Korean lives 
with han. Han, in its unique form of emotion, freezes the minds 
of Korean people with insoluble grievance and bitterness and, at 
the same time, paradoxically strengthens them to be typically 
Korean. In this regard, han cannot be separated from the hearts
of Korean people, whether they are wealthy or poor, or powerful 
or oppressed, young or old, men or women. Poet Kim Chi-ha writes:
"This little peninsula [Korea] is filled with the clamor of 
aggrieved ghosts. It is filled with the mourning noise of the 
han of those who died from foreign invasions, wars, tyranny, 
rebellion, malignant diseases and starvation."50
On this basis, Minjung Theology seeks a means of salvation and 
redemption for the aggrieved souls and hearts of Koreans, both 
living and dead. The etymology of 'han' is "bitterness, grudge, 
spite, resentment, hatred, and regret."51 In the minds of the 
Korean people, han is underpinned by the complex emotion of 
their sufferings and often reguires tbe power of spirits to 
provide consolation or to relieve its otherwise permanent pain. 
In view of history and tradition, So Nam-dong refers to this 
cultural and hereditary emotion as "the fourfold han "52, which 
"is not nature or fate but is human greed and social 
contradictions. "53 Categories of han include :
"1. Korea as a suffering nation which struggled through 
numerous invasions by surrounding powerful nations; 2. Korean 
people as 'paeksong ' who suffered the tyranny of their 
rulers; 3. Women as suffering existence itself under 
Confucian laws and customs which discriminate against them;
4.The majority of people, near half of the population at 
certain points in Korean history, who were treated as 
property because they were registered as hereditary 
slaves."54
In developing a 'theory of minjung' along with a 'theology of 
han', So Nam-dong as well as other minjung theologians were
greatly inspired and motivated by the Catholic poet Kim Chi-ha 
and his writings, particularly his memos initially written over 
the period November 1974 to 15 February 1975 when he was released 
for a short time from prison. Kim, at that time, was already 
actively involved in human rights movements and, as a 
consequence, was arrested and imprisoned by the KCIA. His crime 
was to write and to speak out for the oppressed people through 
works such as 'Five Thieves', 'Groundless Rumors', 'Malttuk', 
Sacred Place', and Chang II—dam'. Overall he endured 
imprisonment over a total of seven and half years until he was 
finally released on 20 December 1980. An understanding of Kim's 
wr:*-tings, particularly his theory of 'Revolutionary Religion' 
which is illustrated in his ballad "Chang II—dam" is crucial, 
especially, to examining the characteristics of Minjung Theology, 
why and how that is uniquely Korean. A summary of the ballad of 
'Chang II—dam' follows :
"Chang Il-dam was a thief, the son of prostitute and a 
paekjong (butcher). Three generations of his forefathers had 
each been survived only by sons of prostitutes, and had all 
been killed; the first (generation) was killed in the Tonghak 
Revolution; the second in the Liberation Movement under the 
Japanese occupation; and the third in the Korean War being 
charged as a Communist.
In the tradition of a Korean-style Robin Hood, Im Kkok-jong, 
Chang Il-dam steals from the rich and gives to the poor. As a 
result he is imprisoned and, while in jail, he preaches 
revolution to his fellow prisoners.
He succeeds in escaping from prison and, while hiding in an 
alley frequented by prostitutes, he witnesses a child being
born to a prostitute. Full of venereal disease, she is close 
to death. She also has tuberculosis and severe mental 
illness. On seeing this, he attains the Way and says, "Ah, 
from this decaying body, new life comes forth! It is God who 
is born!" He genuflects and kisses her feet, saying "Oh, my 
mother, God lives in your womb. God is at the very lowest 
place."
He becomes involved in the liberation movement, and enters 
into debate with Urban Industrial Mission pastors, Catholic 
priests, intellectuals, professors, labor union leaders,
Buddhist monks, and social workers, and attacks their 
hypocrisy. In the course of this conflict and dialogue he 
becomes enlightened in his understanding.
With his disciples he forms a "Community of Koinonia" at
Mt Kyeryong where he teaches the philosophy of tan. Tan means 
self-denial that eradicates the temptation to pursue greed. 
It demands that one 'cut' the vicious circle of vengeance 
and, instead, follow the eternal wayfarer's road to heaven.
Chang Il-dam interprets the Tonghak doctrine, "Humanity is 
Heaven (In nae ch'on)", as 'rice is heaven' and the lowest 
place is heaven, so that uplifting the lowest place is to 
actualise the justice of heaven. He teaches the unification 
of God and revolution; the unification of deeds and prayer; 
and the unification of the food of earth and the food of 
heaven. His philosophy integrates individual spiritual 
reformation and social reformation. First one must accept 
God, secondly one must cultivate God, thirdly one must 
practice God, and fourthly one must live in God.
Chang Il-dam and his disciples finally march to Seoul, 
proclaiming 'Haedong Kung'nak (Paradise on the Korean 
peninsula)' where rice is shared by all. As he arrives near 
Seoul, he is arrested through the betrayal of one of his 
disciples. He is convicted of breaching the Anti-Communist 
Law and the National Security Law, and of inciting 
revolution. He is taken out to be executed, but just
before he is beheaded, he breaks his silence and sings the 
song, 'Rice is heaven.'
Rice is heaven
As you can't have all of heaven to yourself 
Rice is to be shared with one another 
Rice is heaven
As we see the stars in heaven together
Rice is to be taken by many people together
When we eat the rice
Heaven enters into our body
Rice is heaven
Ah, ah, rice is
To be shared with one another by all together
Chang was executed at the age of thirty-three. But a miracle 
happens. He resurrects three days after his death. However, 
his head appears not on his own body, but on the body of the 
betrayer.55
In regard to this peculiar ending, Kim Chi-ha writes: "It is an 
expression of Chang's conflicting thought that this is revenge 
but at the same time also the salvation of vicious men."56 Kim 
Chi-ha's theory of Minjung Theology advocates a spiritual revival 
which he named "The Unity of God and revolution".57 Kim argued
that spiritual resurrection in a revolutionary religion could 
only lead people to transform their personal bondage of emotions 
into positive energy in eschatalogical hope. Kim writes:
"... resurrection fashions people in God's image, opens their 
eyes to their own nobility and turns their frustration and 
self-hatred into eschatalogical hope. This kind of 
resurrection changes a selfish, individualistic, escapist 
anomie into a fraternal, united, realistic commitment to the 
common good.... This resurrection prevents the people's 
bitter resentment and moral indignation from evaporating in 
self-hatred and converts it into a fierce demand for God's 
universal justice. If necessary, the people's enormous energy 
may also be directed to a decisive, organized explosion. This 
is a revolutionary religion. This miraculous conversion which 
conceived the mystery of revival may also bring a decisive 
spiritual revival. This conversion is the philosophy of tan, 
the determination to choose the circumstances of one's death, 
that my hero Chang Il-dam sings about”58
He also argues that:
"The church ought to be the comforter to resolve the han of 
the minjung and cut the vicious circle of violence and to 
change it into a progressive movement. For this purpose, 
churches ought to accept limited violence and ought to be a 
sanctuary for radicals and fighters who are progressing 
out of the dark."59
In this context, han comes out of the structural contradictions 
in the Korean economic and political systems. Han must be changed 
and activated into revolutionary energy through the act of
'cutting'(tan), "to cut all adherence to the secular world in 
order that one may be for the revolution of the secular world."60
Mlnjung Messianism
Kim Chi-ha's concept of han and its dramatic resolution through 
the character of Chang Il-dam raises the notion of a messiah, a 
notion which has clear theological implications. Kim, through his 
ballad, has transcended the mlnjung experience and come to a 
religious perspective in which there is a role for both a messiah 
and the church. Chang Il-dam is, in a real sense, the 
encapsulation of the mlnjung experience through which the mlnjung 
and their aspirations may be understood.
According to the prominent mlnjung theologian, Kim Yong-bok, the 
mlnjung "transcend the power structures which attempt to confine 
them through the unfolding of their stories.... But power as it 
expresses itself in political powers does not belong to the 
mlnjung."61 Because of this relationship to power, he argues 
that mlnjung should be defined in political terms. However, like 
many other commentators, he adds that the identity and reality of 
the mlnjung cannot be achieved through definition but rather 
through "their own stories -their social biographies62
It is through these stories that the transcendent dimension of 
mlnjung history is achieved. This dimension represents "a 
'beyond' history which is often expressed in religious form."63 
The mlnjung view history, religion, folklore and culture closely 
integrated and as playing a transcending function. Minjung 
Theology posits such a transcendent - integrated perspective.
Kim writes that "In traditional theological terms we may say that 
they (mlnjung) are under and in a state of sin."64 They are a 
people in transition, "not yet fully the subjects of history."65,
but in the process of having their subjectivity being realised. 
"History is the process in which the minjung realize their own 
destiny to be free subjects of history and to participate in the 
Messianic Kingdom."66
Kim strongly focusses on minjung messianism which has emerged 
out the ruler-ruled conflict. The minjung dream of a Messianic 
Kingdom, he argues, is the core of history for the minjung 
struggle and implies a messiah who "is of the people and whom the 
people feel to be theirs."67 This messianism he says, "is based 
on the theodicy, which is the 'victory' of the justice of God 
over evil in history. The Messiah and the people actualize the 
justice of God in History."68
He sees messianism as the general resurrection of the minjung 
"for historical judgement against Evil and its followers."69 
Corporate subjectivity of the minjung is realized in their 
participation in the Messianic Kingdom where justice, koinonia 
(creative interaction) and shalom (peace) prevail. Theologically, 
minjung messianism is equated to Jesus-messianism and presents "a 
radical challenge to all forms of political, royal and power 
messianisms."70 Its concern is to save and transform, and to 
place all powers under the rule of Jesus the Messiah who as the 
suffering servant died and rose to redeem the minjung from death 
in history.
Kim puts Jesus-messianism in Korea in the context of a number of 
significant other instances of messianism in Korean history. 
During the Silla period and in subsequent centuries Korea was 
influenced by the messianic movement and ideology of Maitreya 
Buddhism. The traditional tale of Hong Kil-dong (who robs the 
rich and gives to the poor, and finally establishes his paradise)
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is in the messianic tradition. The Tonghak movement in the mid 
19th century manifested itself as a messianic religion among the 
common people. Its founder Ch'oe Che-u believed that there would 
be a second apocalypse when the world would be destroyed and a 
new era emerge. Christianity also had a messianic impact with the 
Great Revival of 1907 and the national liberation movement 
against Japan, including the March First Independence Movement of 
1919 which was motivated by the combined messianic traditions of 
Buddhism, Tonghak (later known as Ch'ondogyo) and Christianity. 
Messianism is understood by Kim largely as a political process, 
but "While political messianism attempts to make the minjung a 
historical nothing or an object of its messianic claims, the 
messianic politics of Jesus are the politics that will realise 
for the minjung their historical subjectivity, thus making them 
masters of their own historical destiny."71
The Bible, he notes, contains many models of messianic politics 
including King David, the Son of Man in apocalyptic literature, 
images of the Messiah in the prophetic books and, most 
importantly, Jesus the Suffering Servant. Jesus both identifies 
with the suffering people and acts as servant to the people's 
aspiration for liberation. Like the minjung, Jesus carried out 
his messianic struggle on the centre stage of the political 
arena. Kim therefore believes that a Christian political 
perspective must be developed in Korea based on : the general 
resurrection of the people; shalom understood to imply Korean 
unification; and koinonia (creative interaction). A key issue in 
implementing this perspective is the use of power in a political 
struggle, including the use of force and violence. Kim suggests 
that in considering these matters it should be understood that 
"power... has no ontological status in the framework of the 
Messianic Kingdom" which in reality "is the powerless status of
Jesus the Messiah and the people."72 Nevertheless, he considers 
that some "measure of political realism" should be adopted, 
taking into account the notion of people's power. He concludes, 
"Jesus the Messiah was resurrected as a foretaste and affirmation 
of the raising of all dead min jung to inaugurate the messianic 
rule of Justice, Koinonia and Shalom."73
Conclusion
As outlined above, Minjung Theology manifests many flaws and 
contradictions in both theory and practice. As a theory, firstly, 
it lacks coherence with Christian philosophy as a whole. The 
categorization of the minjung as "Christian students, laborers, 
the press, professors, farmers, writers and intellectuals as well 
as theologians in Korea..."74 not only contradicts the 
fundamental principle of Christianity, 'love and peace', but also 
creates unwarranted conflict, enmity and disunity among the 
Korean people. By early 1987, more than 60 per cent of 
respondents to national surveys, carried out by various bodies 
such as the media and Seoul National University, identified 
themselves as the middle class, and 5 per cent as upper class.75 
To dismiss these so called middle and upper class people from the 
minjung is not based on any theological rationale, but on the 
intransigence of Minjung Theologians who are misleading the 
spirit of Christianity as a type of liberation theology which 
"supports practical involvement for the clergy in social and 
political reform...."76
Secondly, the claim that the Minjung Theology is "a political 
hermeneutics of the Gospel and a political interpretation of 
Korean Christian experiences"77 has little substance other than 
sentiments based on the people's suffering, depicted through 
personal stories and experience. Individual suffering, however,
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is not necessarily related to the fact of one's Christian 
religion or to Christian suffering as such, even though many 
leaders of the nationalist movement against Japanese colonization 
and authoritarian politics can be identified as Christians.
Unlike Europe, Korea never experienced religious war or 
religious persecution as such, but rather punished and executed 
foreigners as unwanted intruders (including missionaries), as 
well as those who gave them refuge. The argument that Minjung 
Theology, represents a political and social methodology is, 
therefore, flawed. Furthermore, its theoretical intransigence, 
insisting on the exclusiveness of minjung specifications, created 
a new body of totalitarian thought misleading Korean Christians 
to "apotheosizing the masses."78
Minjung theology is currently under scrutiny to develop a broader 
perspective and more universal concepts which will support the 
true characteristics of Christian doctrine involving 
"transcendency."79 Without embracing this aspect of Christianity, 
Minjung Theology has no future for national unity, or peace and 
fraternal love among the people. Many scholars argue that as a 
theology, Minjung Theology certainly needs a broader perspective, 
one that is not just limited to class struggle, but one that 
listens to the needs and experiences of a wider constituency.
What will be its theological base if and when the class struggle 
is won? And why should there be a unique Korean theology? Minjung 
Theology, largely built on the struggle against exploitation and 
dehumanisation by oppressors, is too inward looking if it ignores 
its interrelationship with minjung elsewhere in the world, and 
with mainstream theology, and will offer little more than a 
futile process of navel gazing and theological hairsplitting 
while the rest of the world, including the fast growing Korean 
middle class, passes them by.
1?1
Sin Yu-gil, Professor of Theology at Kyemyong University, 
criticises the uncompromising and selfrighteous standpoint of the 
minjung as "moral arrogance", and points out that such arrogance 
is the "cause of political disunity" because it destroys 
democracy in the name of the min jung. 80 Sin concludes:
"Universality and the transcendental-self ego are essential 
characteristics of Christian theology. When a message from 
this theology loses the characteristics of universality and 
transcendency in a restrictive ideological context, there 
arises a certain danger that the message itself will fall 
into that same restrictive ideology. Ideology based on 
theology is the most dangerous ideology of all, because it 
makes excuses in the name of God."81
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Conclusion
In May 1970, a young poet, Kim Chi-ha, broke the "silence of law 
and order" in Korean society. He published a satirical poem 
entitled "Ojok (Five Thieves)", caricaturing the political system 
and denouncing the ruling elite. He declared that the enemy of 
the people were the rulers of Korean society because these rulers 
were, in fact, "malicious beasts who live by sucking the people's 
blood."1 The shameless 'five thieves', according to Kim, were 
the "the Tycoon, the Assemblyman, the High-Ranking Official, the 
Army General and the Cabinet Minister."2
The validity of this accusation was not as significant as the 
people's perception of the so called 'Five Thieves'. Nor was the 
literal meaning of the words, 'minjung' and 'han', as potent to 
the opposition movement during the Yushin period as the sentiment 
associated with these words.
Modern populist interpretations of the historiography and culture 
of the Korean people, have claimed to give full articulation to 
the people's thoughts and aspirations, and to provide some 
insight into the notion of minjung. Moreover, these 
interpretations, which also claimed to be based upon and to 
represent Korea's cultural heritage, especially the historical 
suffering of Korea and its people, predominantly hinged on the 
sentiment associated with the two words, 'minjung' and 'han'. 
These words, according to minjung proponents, can not be 
separated from one another because the life of the Korean people 
had historically been tied to han, that is, to an accumulated 
sense of insoluble grievance. The general description of minjung 
as the 'oppressed people with accumulated han has, therefore,
been adopted by all minjung schools of thought as the national 
identity of the Korean people.
The minjung schools of the 1970s and 1980s argued that a 
re-examination and re-interpretation of Korean history from the 
people's perspective, based on tradition, culture and thorough 
Koreaness (implying an anti-foreign attitude as a vestige of past 
dependency), would provide the best opportunity to revitalize 
national energy and strength, and to restore the true identity of 
Korea and her people. The government also endorsed something of a 
similar historical approach but with a different agenda, which 
pursued a rediscovery and redevelopment program of Confucian 
ideology, 'Ch’unghyo sasang' (loyalty to the state and filial 
piety). The minjung schools, on the other hand, followed their 
own minjung culture revival movement, arguing that the 
sovereignty of Korea belonged to the people, for they were the 
masters of history. This movement was particularly strong among 
minjung theologians and Christian left intellectuals, and was 
successful in attributing to the indigenous rituals of Korean 
Shamanism the status of national religion.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that these interpretations mainly 
emanated from a school of influential radical thinkers, the 
minjung school, and neither their treatment of Korea's history 
and culture, nor my treatment of this school, has been 
exhaustive. They represent only one perspective of many of the 
various interpretations and analyses that abound in regard to 
history, religion, culture and the socio-economy. Numerous 
factors have played their part in encouraging, developing and 
facilitating the populist view of history, especially the call by 
nationalistic social and political movements to transfer the 
focus of the people's consciousness from culture to politics.
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This call was the consequence of particular political 
circumstances, especially, the promulgation of the Yushin 
constitution and the phenomenal changes brought about by national 
development policy which engineered rapid Korean 
industrialization. Hence, the Minjung Movement of the 1970s and 
1980s was the people's resistance or protest movement against 
government controlled industrialization and against authoritarian 
dictatorship which, on the one hand, opposed liberal democracy, 
but on the other, created a newly developed nation whereby 
increased economic wealth, the expansion of education, public 
access to the outside world (through public media, overseas 
education, tourism, etc), and supportive organizations (which had 
legitimacy in the community, such as tertiary institutions and 
Christian churches) encouraged greater public debate and 
mobility. These factors led to a reinterpretation of history, a 
re-presentation of culture and the development of a minjung 
ideology (minjung-juui) which, though flawed in its inherent 
contradictions, endeavoured to offer the people hope for a new 
future, and thus attracted immense popularity among people until 
the collapse of the Yushin system.
However, minjung thought, expressed through the Minjung Movement, 
has not enjoyed a cohesive, unified and ideologically consistent 
existence, and its future is not assured if there is no 
improvement in its internal solidarity and no change in its lack 
of willingness to address the shifting needs of the general 
public. Above all, if movements like the Minjung Movement are to 
be effective populist bodies, the Korean people as a whole must 
te prepared to change their authoritarian hierarchical attitude, 
particularly in dealing with issues of politics and culture. This 
authoritarian mentality not only weakened the political appeal of 
the Minjung Movement, but also and, more importantly,
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"...reinforced the rigid class consciousness and the hierarchical 
order in the political and social system"3 which inevitably 
contradicted the minjung ideals of fraternity, pluralism and 
democracy in Korea.
Images of minjung, as the soldiers of the political struggle 
under the disguise of mask dance and court-yard drama, were 
mainly the invention of the cultural theories of the minjung 
school. Images of oppression, historical suffering and spiritual 
need for communal ecstacy were also their interpretation. There 
is little evidence, however, to support the argument that the 
Korean people had historically been nationalistic and united 
against rulers and foreign powers. Terms such as 'national 
consciousness' and particularly 'nationalist movement' did not 
emerge in Korea until the beginning of the twentieth century when 
Korea was faced with the prospect of annexation by Japan.
Although evidence shows that many Koreans resisted for nearly 
forty years Japanese rule, and the stories of the nationalist 
movement left their legacy on nationalist sentiment, Korea, as a 
nation, had always been subject to some sort of dependency. In 
addition, rulers of Korea, whether of the dynasty, the colonial 
period, or after liberation to the end of Yushin politics, had 
enjoyed little unity or harmony among themselves. After the 
Korean war, the Korean people, including students, on the other 
hand, were subject to a tightly controlled national policy based 
on an anti—foreign ideology, anti—Communism. As discussed (in 
Chapter one), the prevailing characteristic of modern Korean 
nationalism has mainly been antagonism not only to foreigners, 
but also to 'outsiders' of any shape or form, such as in 
reference to internal politics.
Minjung theories were most effective when supported and enhanced
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by Christian churches and their institutions. In fact, their 
foreign ideology generated the massive populist mobilization and 
energy through re-discovering, re-interpreting and re-educating 
the people in understanding their own identity and their 
collective spirit, Koreanness. It is ironic, however, that the 
essence of Koreanness, particularly Shaman traditional belief, 
was never before fully acknowledged until Christian theologians 
pronounced Shamanism as the root of the Korean people and the 
core of Koreanness. The role of Christian churches, in this 
context, was an apparent contradiction to the min jung ideal, 
which was intrinsically anti-foreign.
Moreover, this new Korean identity, which considers the ideals of 
'Koreanness' as most essential, is actually built on two 
conflicting ideals, Confucianism and indigenous Shamanism. If a 
historical basis is sought for a contemporary Korean movement it 
is not possible to isolate wholly 'Korean' elements since they 
have intermingled with foreign (mostly Chinese) influences over 
two millennia. These two ideals are antithetical to one another 
and generally require opposite human behaviour. The former, for 
example, requires an authoritarian mentality and operates on the 
ideal of authoritarian hierarchy; the latter requires an 
egalitarian mentality and operates on the ideal of pluralism. The 
underlying mentality of the so-called 'new Korean identity' is, 
therefore, nothing more than a reintroduction of an ancient 
mentality which, according to minjung proponents, was a key 
source of Korea's political, social, and cultural evils.
Nevertheless, exponents of the min jung cultural movement, 
particularly through the introduction of mask and court-yard 
drama as a means of a protest, gave a new impetus to the Korean 
opposition movement and its solidarity. In this regard, Kim Chi-
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ha's influence in promoting collective ecstasy, spiritual 
possession and Shaman mystification was outstanding. In addition, 
Kim's prolific imagination and powerful political impact, which 
enabled the integration of these cultural activities with minjung 
theology, elements of Marxism and political activism, cannot be 
understimated. In particular, he gave expression to the people's 
han, and gave the people the lead in using the most potent 
avenues available to them (drama, literature and the church) to 
express their protest. The notion of minjung culture was thus 
created as a means of redemption, as a means to mass ecstasy 
capable of generating revolution and of achieving Korean 
unification. In this sense, the rulers, especially President Pak 
Chong-hui recognised the power of the cultural ideals thus 
evoked, especially the Confucian values espoused, and manipulated 
them for their own political purposes. No matter how problematic 
minjung ideals may have been, the fact that even the government 
(political opponents of the Minjung Movement) were led to tap the 
same cultural spring, was an indication of power of these ideals.
Minjung theology and its proponents, the Christian churches, were 
the greatest sources of physical and psychological solidarity for 
the Minjung Movement. In particular, Minjung theology, with its 
own philosophical discipline and a long tradition of apologetics, 
attempted to develop a messianic- apocalyptic interpretation of 
the sufferings of the Korean people, especially of their han. The 
church's social welfare programs, its attempts to protect 
political dissidents, its belief in the suffering messiah, and 
its rituals, struck a resonance with many minjung proponents who 
viewed history, religion, folklore, tradition and culture as 
being closely integrated and thus playing a transcending
function.
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According to Minjung theology, the Christian notion of a 
Messianic Kingdom represented the final outcome of history for 
the minjung struggle, whereby the messiah and the people would 
achieve victory by actualizing the justice of God in history.
This notion of the Messianic Kingdom, however, is, in my view, a 
false hypothesis, because the notion that the minjung struggle is 
only a Christian struggle, organized by people under this single 
banner, is too narrow. Korea has never experienced a single 
religious war or any incidence of significanct religious 
oppression (as such) in her past. Furthermore, the perception by 
Christian minjung constituents of the wider non-minjung community 
is not only too inward looking and too exclusionary, but is also 
contradictory to the fundamental principles of Christianity, love 
and fraternity.
Under the patronage of the Christian church, both the cultural 
movement and human rights movement proliferated in parallel in 
the 1970s and 1980s, reshaping images of Korean people and their 
tradition in a religious-historical context. The notion of 
minjung culture, based in spiritual tradition and cultural 
heritage, however, was an invention largely of Christian 
intellectuals. Kim Chi-ha, So Nam-dong and many other liberal 
theologians, as well as Catholic priests, were pre-eminent on 
this area. Their theories of minjung culture, reinterpreting folk 
art and the Korean people*s traditional beliefs, ultimately 
created a modern Korean historiography. In this context, the 
minjung cultural movement represented a Christian movement for an 
egalitarian ideal.
I have argued that minjung thought based on socio-political 
theory, was also premised on false assumption and contradicted 
the minjung ideal. The leading thinkers of this school were Pak
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Hyon-ch'ae and Han Wan-sang: the former saw the min jung in terms 
of the 'proletariat' who were alienated from economic power, the 
latter saw the min jung in terms of the 'excluded people' who were 
alienated from the three power structures: political, economic 
and cultural. Analysts of this school, as well as its proponents, 
have seen the alienation of the minjung, the development of the 
'proletariat', as linked to national conflict, national partition 
and national dependence, which were the consequence of the 
pursuit of a dependent politics, a dependent economy and a 
dependent culture. The basis of this line of thought, however, 
contradicts the Korean ideal of fraternity and folk solidarity, 
for it leaves no basis for reconciliation with the wider 
community including rulers and capitalists.
In addition, this type of thinking also relies to a large extent 
on sentiment, especially where the causes of internal conflict 
are extrapolated to assume the dimensions of national and 
international determinants of partition and political power. This 
sentiment is founded on minjung claims of their unique 
Koreanness, but the ideology underlying it relies substantially 
on the Western social theories of Karl Marx and Christianity, 
rather than on a Korean philosophy which could have been derived 
either from Confucianism or from Shamanism.
Marxism inevitably played a substantial role in setting the 
ideological basis for perceiving minjung as social classes 
alienated from capital and from the product of their labour. Pak 
Hyon-ch'ae saw farmers as having been alienated from their 
subsistence lifestyle and forced into becoming either urban poor 
or wage labourers. Each of these three groups were thus seen to 
exist in a circulatory process as victims of capitalism. However, 
his thinking extended to the entire lower strata of the middle
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class, whom he argued, did not have sufficient economic power in 
competition with large capitalists. He thus equated the minjung 
with the proletariat, recruited and 'owned' by the forces of 
capitalism. Yet he noted that in their economically 
disenfranchised condition, the minjung sought socio-economic 
reform, and being motivated to struggle against capitalism 
therefore represented the progressive stratum in society.
While this analysis of proletarianization was constructed mainly 
in terms drawn from the European experience, dependency, 
world-systems and bureaucratic authoritarian theories were also 
seen to be relevant to the Korean context. The semi­
proletarianization thesis put by world—systems theorists, 
however, was not borne out by the Korean experience. Bureaucratic 
controls, supported by a Confucian social infrastructure, 
promoted a stable, full-time, cheap and flexible workforce 
through an absence of protective labour laws or formal wage 
system, thus facilitating the uninhibited growth of the 
proletariat, without the need for a semi-proletarian pool.
Ironically, it has been the economic success of Korean capitalism 
and not so much the struggle against capitalism, which has 
finally allowed the Korean workers to gain industrial strength in 
the form of unionism over the past ten years. The reduced 
capacity by industry to access additional labour, the 
substantially enhanced economic power of workers and the 
awakening social awareness of the Korean people as a whole, have 
combined with other elements of the Minjung Movement to force 
democratic reforms including reforms in the work place, but in 
collaboration with capitalism.
'The alternate socio-economic perspective of the minjung examined
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was that put by Han Wan-sang who distinguished two social groups, 
the ruling and the ruled, arguing that the possession of power 
determined social stratification and created inequality in the 
social order. He referred to the Weberian theory of social 
stratification to contrast the 'culturally ruling groups' with 
the 'cultural min jung1 deprived of honour and prestige. He also 
distinguished between the 'sleeping' min jung and the 'awakened' 
min jung, the latter comprising the Minjung Movement, especially 
those who were prepared to sacrifice themselves in their 
challenge to the ruling order. Han's broader perspective (as 
compared to that of Pak) presented a more realistic basis for 
communal action. However, both economic class and social stratum 
were valid determinants impacting on the extent to which the 
Korean people sought radical solutions.
The ruling order under challenge by these determinants was that 
of a bureaucratic authoritarian state incorporating a coalition 
of military, security, bureaucratic and business forces. After 
1961, a reshuffling of the social order developed, with the 
creation of a new status stratum comprised of members of this 
coalition, and new socio-cultural values were cultivated, based 
on economic competition and efficiency. This new stratum remained 
insulated from populist forces for nearly thirty years.
From an ideological perspective, both Pak's and Han's theories 
were shown in this work to contain major flaws. Pak clearly 
contradicted the Korean national ideal of fraternity, leaving no 
room for reconciliation or compromise, or for unity based on 
pluralism. Moreover, his concept of minjung did not adequately 
reflect the mixture of social strata which supported the Minjung 
Movement following the Yushin policies of the 1970s, and his 
analysis was shown not to adequately link class conflict with
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national partition and political power. Moreover, he used a 
fundamentally Western ideology to define a phenomenon which was 
allegedly fundamentally Korean. While Han's view was more broadly 
based, it also provided only a relatively narrow sociological 
definition which failed to comprehend the full diversity which 
underlay the notion of minjung. In terms of theoretical 
integrity, both the theories of Pak and Han contradicted a most 
fundamental principle of the minjung, anti-foreign Koreanness, by 
borrowing from the Western thought of Marx and Weber.
A key issue addressed in this thesis has been the identification 
of the minjung. I have examined views based on historical 
etymological references, and others based on sociological 
grounds. Minjung as a term or concept was shown to have become 
particularly subjective since the 1970s. The preconditions, which 
qualify individuals or groups as minjung constituents, were and 
remain much in discussion. However, the characteristics of the 
term are in constant flux, and can not thus be fixed within any 
specific type of people, or set of circumstances. I have shown 
that 'minjung' as a word or term posits not only conflicting 
premises, but also unfolds an ambivalence in its application.
This ambivalence, however, is not the result of its literal 
meaning, the 'masses' or the 'people in general', but from its 
employment. 'Minjung', in other words, has been employed as an 
element of nationalistic rhetoric (with varying intensity 
according to circumstances) crudely designed for political 
purposes, by all parties involved in the civil struggle.
Minjung theory as a whole, as examined through this work, is thus 
flawed as a formally workable socio-economic theory and from an 
ideological point of view contradicts its own principle of 
Koreanness. Nevertheless, the mystique that has been built around
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the term minjung, acquiring most potency in the course of the 
Minjung Movement, will not be wiped out, regardless of its 
theoretical flaws, or inherent contradictions, or circumstantial 
failings. The sentiment and perceptions associated with minjung, 
especially as the 'oppressed people with accumulated 'han' is no 
longer a simple view: it has attained a mythical status. In fact, 
to employ a metaphor used by K.R.Minogue to characterise 
nationalism4, I would conclude that minjung theory began as a 
whining pup on a summer's evening, and ended as a fire breathing 
dragon that ignited the imagination and nationalistic sentiments 
of the Korean populace. However, the nation's social 
conflagration set alight by this dragon rapidly passed as its 
fiery breath failed to maintain its heat amongst the people. Its 
ideals and calls for action ceased to be representative of the 
changing perspective of the majority, and are now, in the main, 
no longer perceived as conducive to democratic reform in a 
context of social stability, economic growth and national 
security.
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Glossary
List o f Korean terms
Note: Chinese characters are only shown where they are required to clarify the intended meaning of the words.
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chipdansinmyong
ChangD-dam
changgo
ch'on'guk
ch'unghyosasang j& k s s
chungin 4»A
ch'onmin 18®
han tt fR
HanMinjok f f S B l
haedongkung'nak « « t u g
huch'onkaebyok
hyongjang
inmin A S
In-nae-ch'on A7!)A
kongjung TT Z X .o  ö & &
kungmin B S
kut *
kwijok fö ä t
kyegup W R
madang-guk
madang-gut TS}X&5<
minjokhaebang SIMftSSt
min jung S if t
minjungminju-juui S l f t S S ^ S
minjungminjok-juui smmzm
minjungmunhwaundong n l  zx . a  *1  O o S Ü Ö t t M
minjungundong n l Z X . O XZ \ 1  Ö \L  O SlftSBÖ
Minmint'u a w E E H
mudang
myolgong fl-i- m
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Korean Chinese
Namin U-ol f£ A
nongch'onkyemongundong V- dt -J) T3 O O '"M O \L. O
nongjang JJX trvj
okwi-gut
paeksong
paekjong Ö T
pan'gong Shg- S Ä
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p'yongmin ¥ f i
salp'ulli 1M-°1
sammin AVn]T3 H 5
sangmin «R
simin ^]°] rfrS
sinhungyangban
Sohak
somin A1=1 JCB
saemaulundong
tajung £ *
taejung AIR:
tlch'umnori ! b § ^ - 0l
Tonghak * 5 *
uisik Sl A) * *
um o13
yahakundong «wan
yang °ol
yangban o>«VO U Mffi
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